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LET THE AUTHOR BEWARE: THE REJUVENATION OF
THE AMERICAN LAW OF LIBEL
RODNEY A. SMOLLAt
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LIBEL REJUVENATION
"A libeled American," Zechariah Chafee once wrote, "prefers to
vindicate himself by steadily pushing forward his career and not by
hiring a lawyer to talk in a courtroom."' Americans have changed,
Zechariah. America is in the midst of a rejuvenation of the law of li-
bel. Only a decade ago, the law of defamation appeared headed for
obsolescence.' Yet an astonishing shift in cultural and legal conditions
has caused a dramatic proliferation of highly publicized libel actions
brought by well-known figures who seek, and often receive, staggering
sums of money.
The reinvigoration of the modern law of defamation has been as
pervasive as it has been sudden, radiating across the American culture.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. B.A. 1975,
Yale University; J.D. 1978, Duke University. The author wishes to gratefully ac-
knowledge Mark E. Gralen, Mitchell B. Kalin and Andrea M. Dudek for their excel-
lent research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 106-07 (1947).
One prominent media lawyer, James C. Goodale, who represents Time maga-
zine and the New York Times, states that "What we're seeing is an entirely new era in
libel cases." Jenkins, Chilly Days for the Press, STUDENT LAW., Apr. 1983, at 23, 25.
3 Id. at 28; see also infra note 56.
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Defendants span a spectrum of size, wealth, power, and respectability,
ranging from the mainstream orthodoxy of the national-news giants,4 to
local news outlets,5 to the more sensational press.6
Those who are now striking out against the media as defamation
plaintiffs' include many who have previously profited from media at-
tention. People deeply involved in the political process, including
elected officials and advocates of specific political positions, have not
flinched from resort to the courts. Entertainers, writers, and others who
have reaped the benefits of media attention also have not been hesitant
to seek substantial damages when they believe that the media have be-
gun to do their images more harm than good.
Among the public officials joining the litigation feast have been
Philadelphia Mayor William J. Green, who sued a CBS television sta-
tion for $5.1 million for reporting that he was under federal criminal
investigation;8 former Governor Edward J. King of Massachusetts, who
filed a $3.6 million suit against the Boston Globe for implications con-
veyed by articles, editorials, and political cartoons that King was "unfit
and incapable of properly performing the duties of governor";9 Gover-
nor William J. Janklow of South Dakota, who filed a $10 million suit
against Newsweek for an article allegedly implying that he had raped
an Indian girl;10 former United States ambassador to Chile, Nathaniel
Davis, and two of his ex-assistants, who filed a $150 million suit
against the makers of Missing, alleging that the 1982 film implied that
the American embassy was connected with the killing of an American
free-lance writer during the 1973 coup d'etat in Chile; 1 and General
William Westmoreland, who has sued CBS for allegedly suggesting his
complicity or incompetence in connection with the underestimation of
enemy troop strength levels in Vietnam." Even former President
" See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 10 & 12.
' See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 8 & 72.
' See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 17 & 21.
For a categorization of defamation plaintiffs, see Franklin, Suing Media for Li-
bel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 795, 812-13 & table 18.
1 N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, § 4, at 8, col. 4. The suit was ultimately settled for
between $250,000 and $400,000. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
I Id., Jan. 5, 1982, at A10, col. 1; see also id., Apr. 3, 1983, § 1, at 30, col. 4.
10 Id., Feb. 26, 1983, at A7, col. 6.
" Jenkins, supra note 2, at 25.
12 The Westmoreland case arose out of 1982 CBS documentary, The Uncovered
Enemy, A Vietnam Deception. The documentary has drawn substantial criticism from
other media sources. The Public Broadcasting System's series Inside Look recently de-
voted an entire show to examining the journalism behind the CBS documentary. PTV
Productions, Uncounted Enemy: Unproven Conspiracy (Inside Story, program No. 303,
Apr. 21, 1983) (copy of transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review). CBS's motion for a change of venue in the Westmoreland case to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York was recently granted by the U.S.
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Jimmy Carter was prepared to join the list by suing the Washington
Post for a gossip column item relaying rumors that Blair House had
been bugged during Ronald and Nancy Reagan's residence there before
Reagan's inauguration. Carter chose not to take action after his public
threat of suit was enough to force a retraction from the Post and a
published letter of apology."3
Public interest advocates who are prominent among the list of re-
cent libel plaintiffs include Ralph Nader, who sued Ralph de Toledano
for statements de Toledano made in a syndicated column about Nader's
crusade against the lack of safety in General Motors' Corvair,"' and
feminist attorney Gloria Allred, who filed a $10 million libel suit
against a California State Senator because of a characterization in a
press release.1 5
Entertainers, writers, and other media figures have also contrib-
uted to the recent resurgence of the libel suit.1 6 Carol Burnett's $10
million libel action against the National Enquirer, and the $1.6 million
verdict returned by the jury, although later reduced by the court, 17 ob-
viously added great impetus to the trend. There have, however, been
many others. Wayne Newton sued NBC over a report linking him to
organized crime, 8 and Elizabeth Taylor filed a complicated action
against ABC over a "docu-drama" that depicts Taylor's life. 9 Writer
Norman Mailer filed a $7 million libel suit against the New York Post,
District Court for the District of South Carolina. Westmoreland v. CBS, 8 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2493 (D.S.C. 1982). See generally Bruck, The Mea Culpa Defense, AM.
LAW., Sept. 1983, at 82, col. 1.
13 See Note, Libel and the Reporting of Rumor, 92 YALE L.J. 85, 85-86 (1982).
14 Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980). The court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the publisher, but
reversed a summary judgment ruling in favor of the columnist de Toledano.
15 The sexist slur uttered against Allred was that she was a "slick butch lawyer-
ess." L.A. Times, Jan. 23, 1982, pt. I, at 18, col. 1.
16 The libel resurgence has not, however, been limited to those usually thought of
as media figures. For example, William Tavoulareas, the president of Mobile Oil, was
awarded over $2 million in a suit against the Washington Post for an article claiming
that Tavoulareas had used his influence to set up his son in business. The court subse-
quently granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that
a reasonable jury could not have found actual malice. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post
Co., 567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983).
17 Defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial were denied by the trial court in view of plaintiff's acceptance of the court's remit-
titur reducing the total damage award to $800,000. Burnett v. National Enquirer, 7
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County 1981). On appeal
the total damage award was reduced to $200,000. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc.,
144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983).
18 See Delugach, Trials and Tribulations: The Wayne Newton Story, L.A. Times,
May 23, 1982, Calendar, at 3, col. 1.
19 See Chi. Sun-Times, Nov. 30, 1982, at 36, col. 3. ABC has recently relented
and agreed not to broadcast the docu-drama.
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claiming that the newspaper defamed him in reports about the trial of
writer Jack Henry Abbott.2 0 Kimerli Jayne Pring, Miss Wyoming of
1978, was awarded $26 million (later reversed on appeal) by a federal
court jury in a suit against Penthouse magazine. 1 Even E. Howard
Hunt has sought the refuge of the courts to rehabilitate his reputation;
Hunt was awarded $650,000 in damages by a federal jury in Miami
against a weekly newspaper called the Spotlight, for a story that linked
Hunt to the assassination of John F. Kennedy."2
The increase in the number and prominence of libel suits28 is
more compelling when considered along with data from several studies
that indicate a dramatic and continuing change in the resolution of libel
cases even within the last decade. The data show a trend toward more
generous jury awards, and a corresponding trend toward the media set-
tling suits at a substantial cost. The earliest study, conducted by Profes-
sor Marc Franklin, involved cases decided between January 1976 and
mid-June 1979.24 Franklin's overall conclusion was that libel actions
rarely met with success.25 Sixty-nine percent of the cases studied by
Franklin involved nonmedia defendants, and thirty-one percent in-
volved media defendants.2 6 The study considered only reported cases,
'0 Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1982, § B, at 20, col. 4. Norman Mailer is not the only
writer who has recently filed a defamation suit. See Goodman, Literary Invective, N.Y.
Times, June 19, 1983, § 7 (Book Review), at 35 (Lillian Hellman has sued Mary
McCarthy for $2.25 million for McCarthy's statements on the Dick Cavett Show that
McCarthy "think[s] [Hellman] is terribly overrated, a bad writer and a dishonest
writer," and that "[elverything ... every word she writes is a lie including 'and' and
'the.' "). Libel suits by writers are not, however, an entirely modern phenomenon. See
Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (libel suit brought by James
Fenimore Cooper against Horace Greeley).
I"' The district court ruled that plaintiff was not a public figure and denied Pent-
house's motion for summary judgment. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 7 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1101 (D. Wyo. 1981). The jury's $26.5 million verdict was reduced by the trial
court on remittitur to $14 million. The Tenth Circuit reversed and dismissed the ac-
tion, holding that the fictional fantasy about a promiscuous Western beauty queen
could not reasonably be considered to state defamatory facts about the plaintiff. Pring v.
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3112
(1983). In a related case, Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F.
Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981), the court granted summary judgment for defendant on the
grounds of a failure to present evidence sufficient to find actual malice.
2 Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, No. 80-1121 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 1981).
11 See Daniels, Pre-Complaint Phase: Avoiding Litigation-Preventive Counsel-
ing, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1981, at 19 (noting "[t]he increasing number of [libel] suits
filed"); see also supra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
24 Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455. Professor Franklin's ground-breaking empiri-
cal research on defamation has contributed greatly to clearer thinking about defama-
tion, and demonstrates the usefulness of that type of legal research.
25 Id. at 498.
36 Id. at 465. The study defined "media" defendants as those involved in broad-
casting, or in newspaper, magazine, or book publishing. Id.
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but concluded that the limited sample would not distort the results,
largely because settlement was not an important factor in the disposi-
tion of libel cases.27 Interestingly, juries were overwhelmingly more
favorable to plaintiffs than were judges, both as to liability and dam-
ages. This divergence was most notable in the ultimate success rates
after appeal for defamation plaintiffs, which were quite low. In cases in
which plaintiffs sued nonmedia defendants, plaintiffs won judgments
after appeal in only twelve percent of the cases. In suits brought against
media defendants, plaintiffs received winning judgments in only five
percent of the appeals.28 Furthermore, the Franklin study uncovered a
substantial appellate court tendency to rule against defamation plain-
tiffs. Although appellate courts affirmed seventy-five percent of the ap-
peals from judgments in favor of defendants, they affirmed less than
fifty percent of the lower court rulings for plaintiffs.2" When they did
affirm a plaintiff's verdict, appellate courts generally reduced damage
awards that trial courts had upheld."
A second litigation study by Marc Franklin,81 designed to assess
the impact of two ostensibly "anti-defendant" defamation decisions by
the Supreme Court, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,"2 and
Hutchinson v. Proxmire,8" was limited to cases involving media defen-
dants. The second Franklin study included most of the media cases
from the prior survey, as well as media cases after Wolston and Hutch-
inson through September of 1980. The second Franklin study revealed
the faint beginnings of an anti-defendant trend in appellate courts, at
least in the application of legal doctrine: prior to Hutchinson and Wol-
ston appellate courts were more inclined to grant defendants constitu-
tional protection" than after those two cases.35 The study also seemed
27 Id. at 461-64.
23 Id. at 498.
29 Id.
3o Id.
31 Franklin, supra note 7.
32 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
443 U.S. 111 (1979). The Wolston and Hutchinson cases are discussed infra
text accompanying notes 253-74.
" See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text for a description of constitutional
protection from liability for defamation.
3' Franklin's study thus noted that:
The strongest indication of the impact of Hutchinson and Wolston is
a shift in disputed Times-Gertz cases. Before the Supreme Court decisions,
appellate courts awarded Times protection in 35 of the 39 cases in which
the plaintiff contested the defendant's request for such protection. After
the Supreme Court acted, the courts granted Times protection in 24 of the
34 contested appeals. This difference is statistically significant and sug-
gests that something other than chance explains the shift.
Franklin, supra note 7, at 825. The study generally disclosed relatively little percepti-
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to indicate that settlements play a more important role in defamation
litigation than was originally thought,"6 although it stated that the set-
tlements apparently involved relatively small recoveries for plaintiffs.
37
Yet on balance, the second Franklin study tended to confirm the find-
ings of the first: plaintiffs were rarely successful, winning only five per-
cent of their appeals.38 Franklin concluded that suits against the media
were still "not likely to be rewarding," but noted as a caveat that "even
unsuccessful suits may be costly to defend." 9
More recent studies by the Libel Defense Resource Center
(LDRC)40 vividly demonstrate significant changes in defamation cases.
Although the LDRC studies have shown a continuing tendency for li-
bel damage awards to be reduced or reversed on appeal,4 they reveal a
dramatic increase in the size of damages awarded at trial.4' The most
recent data from the LDRC indicate that the typical damage award is
now in the millions of dollars,43 a sharp contrast to the Franklin survey
which found only one case in the period from 1976 to 1980 in which a
damage award was over a million dollars." Moreover, although data
was not compiled on punitive damages in the Franklin studies, one
LDRC study showed that thirty out of forty-seven damage awards in-
cluded punitive damages, and seven of those punitive damage awards
ble change in outcomes after Wolston, however. Id. at 821-26.
3' Id. at 800 & n.12. The study cited one preliminary study indicating that of 118
cases handled by one insurer, 25 were dropped by the plaintiff, 30 were settled for
payment, and 55 were litigated. Id.
37 Id.
3 Id. at 802 & table 4, 829.
39 Id. at 829; see also id. at 800 & n.13.
40 The Libel Defense Resource Center is a New York-based information clearing-
house organized by media groups to monitor developments in libel law. The LDRC
publishes a quarterly bulletin which contains a section entitled "Damages Watch" de-
tailing and summarizing the results of recent libel and invasion of privacy cases. These
studies of libel litigation build on and seek to continue the chronicling of that litigation
begun by Marc Franklin. Although they draw from a data base broader than that used
by Franklin, see Libel Defense Resource Center, Bulletin No. 4, Oct. 15, 1982, at 4
[hereinafter cited as LDRC Bulletin No. 41, there are many valid comparisons that can
be made among the various studies, see infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
41 E.g., LDRC Bulletin No. 4, supra note 40, at 3-4; Libel Defense Resource
Center, Bulletin No. 7, July 15, 1983, at 58 [hereinafter cited as LDRC Bulletin No.
7]. But see Libel Defense Resource Center, Bulletin No. 6, Mar. 15, 1983, at 2 ("the
favorable defense record on appeal previously documented has been eroded somewhat,
with the defense winning 64% of the appeals recently decided as opposed to approxi-
mately 73% ...in the prior study").
42 See, e.g., LDRC Bulletin No. 4, supra note 40, at 3 (comparing the damages in
cases in the Franklin studies with those in a study of cases that were decided after the
Franklin studies).




were for $1 million or more.45 More recent data from the LDRC indi-
cate even more pervasive punitive damage awards, which have now
reached a staggering average of "almost $8 million per punitive
award." '46
The prospect of such lucrative awards is likely to entice more po-
tential defamation plaintiffs to bring suit despite the fact that their
claims do not meet the legal standards that appellate courts are strug-
gling to impose.
Tabulating the changes in the number and outcome of libel suits is
more precise and verifiable than identifying the reasons for the changes.
Most students of modern defamation law would be likely to argue that
the most meaningful way to understand these shifts is by considering
the developments in constitutional doctrine during the same time.
4 7
Such a starting point is reasonable because the Supreme Court since
1964 has mandated various constitutional requirements in an area of
law that had previously been developed by each state according to its
own legislation and common law. In 1964 the Supreme Court reviewed
for the first time in its history a state judgment in a civil libel suit.4
That case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9 involved the largest libel
judgment in Alabama history50 awarded to the police commissioner of
Montgomery who claimed that he had been libeled by an advertise-
ment, printed in the New York Times, that sought contributions to sup-
45 LDRC Buttetin No. 4, supra note 40, at 3, 5 & table 2, 6 & table 2-B.
46 Libel Defense Resource Center, Special Alert, July 29, 1983, at 1.
47This reasoning, for example, apparently affected Professor Franklin's decision
in his first survey to consider only cases decided prior to Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), and Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). See
Franklin, supra note 24, at 457, 459-60.
4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 n.3 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
4, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prosser called the New York Times case "unquestionably
the greatest victory won by the defendants in the modern history of the law of torts."
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 118, at 819 (4th ed. 1971). The
classic commentary on the New York Times case is Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,' 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
For additional comment on the New York Times case, see Berney, Libel and the First
Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1, 46 (1965); Pedrick,
Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 581, 585-89 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1963
Tern, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 166, 201-05 (1964); Note, State Law Allowing Libel
Suit By Public Official Without Proof of Malice Held Unconstitutional, 42 TEX. L.
REV. 1080 (1964); Comment, First Amendment Requires Qualified Privilege to Pub-
lish Defamatory Misstatements About Public Officials 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284 (1964).
50 C. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 216 (1971). The judg-
ment was for $500,000, the full amount of the plaintiff's claim. New York Times, 376
U.S. at 256.
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port civil rights activities. "
The Court concluded that the state common law rule which pro-
vided a strict liability standard for libelous publications52 was unconsti-
tutional. The Court held that:
The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with "actual mal-
ice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not.53
This actual-malice standard was subsequently extended to com-
munications about non-elected public officials" and public figures not
employed by the government who, by their positions alone or by pur-
poseful activity, have thrust themselves into a public controversy in
some significant way." Importantly, however, in the 1971 decision in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,5" only a plurality of the Court was
51 376 U.S. at 256. The New York Times decision to some degree embodied legal
and cultural inclinations that were waiting to be crystalized into more sharply con-
toured doctrine. The case came before the Court at a time in American history that
could not help but influence all legal thought related to free expression. It is no acci-
dent that the New York Times decision came just as the cultural turbulence of the
1960's was about to be unleashed in full force. The struggle for genuine equality for
blacks that followed Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was intimately
bound up with the protection of defiant and rebellious speech. Many of the most im-
portant legal decisions that helped give impetus to the civil rights movement were not
equal protection cases, but rather first amendment cases protecting strategies of mass
protest. For first amendment cases with civil rights overtones decided by the Warren
court, see, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (denial of parade
permit for a demonstration unconstitutional); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(demonstration on public street in front of courthouse-jail is protected speech and as-
sembly); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (ban on giving legal representation to
a person not a party to a case is unconstitutional); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (plaintiff had a constitutional right to deny a request by a state court for its
membership list, since protection of the list is closely related to the members' ability to
pursue their first and fourteenth amendment rights). But cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39 (1966) (demonstration on private road in front of jail was trespass and did not
implicate the first amendment). From the perspective of cultural history, the New York
Times decision was itself largely a civil rights case, for it prevented the law of defama-
tion from being used as a tool against those using the media to protest injustice against
blacks.
52 376 U.S. at 263-64.
53 Id. at 279-80.
51 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84-86 (1966) (county recreation area supervi-
sor can be a public official and so fall under actual-malice standard).
I Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (defamation claims of ath-
letic director of state university and of student participant in a political demonstration
are governed by actual-malice standard).
" 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971). Rosenbloom involved a suit brought by George Ro-
senbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area, against the opera-
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willing to apply the actual-malice standard in actions brought by pri-
vate figures damaged by communications about matters of "public or
general interest."
It was not until 1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,5 that the
Court returned to its "struggle[ ]. . .to define the proper accommoda-
tion between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and
press protected by the First Amendment." '58 Gertz involved a libel ac-
tion brought by Elmer Gertz, a well-known Chicago attorney and law
professor, against Robert Welch, Inc., for statements it had published
in American Opinion, its monthly magazine affiliated with the John
Birch Society.59
tors of radio station WIP in Philadelphia. Following Rosenbloom's arrest during a
police crackdown on the distribution of allegedly obscene books and magazines, WIP
broadcast a series of news reports describing Rosenbloom's arrest and the seizure of
books and magazines from his home and a local warehouse. Rosenbloom sued the radio
station, predicating his action on certain errors in the broadcasts, and the station
claimed that it was entitled to invoke the New York Times actual-malice standard in its
defense. The judgment of the Supreme Court was announced in a plurality opinion
written by Justice Brennan, who phrased the issue before the Court as whether the
New York Times knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard "applies in a state civil libel ac-
tion brought not by a 'public official' or a 'public figure' but by a private individual for
defamatory falsehood uttered in a news broadcast by a radio station about the individ-
ual's involvement in an event of public or general interest." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at
31-32. Brennan held that the New York Times standard applied to any defamatory
speech involving matters of "public or general interest," id. at 43-44, invoking the
phraseology of the famous Warren and Brandeis article on the right to privacy. 403
U.S. at 31 n.2 (citing Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193, 214 (1890)). "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest," Justice Bren-
nan wrote, "it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become
involved." 403 U.S. at 43. Rather, Brennan argued, the public's primary interest is in
the event; the public's natural attention is on the content, effect, context, and impor-
tance of the conduct and actions of the participants in newsworthy events, not in the
participants' prior anonymity, notoriety, or fame. Id.
57 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" Id. at 325.
59 The family of Ronald Nelson, a 17-year-old who was killed by a Chicago po-
lice officer named Richard Nuccio, had retained Gertz as co-counsel to pursue civil
actions against Nuccio. Nuccio was ultimately convicted of murdering Nelson, but
Gertz played no role in Nuccio's criminal prosecution and made no public statements
or comments concerning the civil or criminal actions. Shortly after Nuccio's conviction,
the article, Frame-Up: Richard Nuccio and the War on Police, appeared in American
Opinion. The article alleged that Nuccio was being "railroaded" as part of a Commu-
nist conspiracy to undermine local police so as to pave the way for a national police
force which would support and enforce a Communist dictatorship. The article named
Elmer Gertz as one of the members of this conspiracy. He was identified as the lawyer
of the Nelson family and one of the leaders of the attack on Nuccio. Gertz was further
described, among other things, as a "Communist-fronter," a "Leninist," and a "Marx-
ist." Virtually everything of significance in the American Opinion article was false.
The Court fully recited the facts of the case at 418 U.S. at 325-27.
Welch claimed that Gertz was a public figure and that the actual-malice standard
therefore applied to its conduct. The trial court initially held that the communication
19831
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In Gertz, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed upon the mini-
mum constitutional requirements for any state system that compensates
injury to reputation. The requirements are based on the principle that
the minimum level of care that a defendant must exercise before com-
municating information depends on whether the plaintiff is a public or
private figure, the same principle that the Court was close to rejecting
in Rosenbloom.6 ° First, Gertz established that suits brought by public
officials and public figures, at least against media defendants,"1 must
always meet the actual-malice test.2 Second, all defamation suits, even
those by private plaintiffs based on communications about nonpublic
issues, must not provide for liability unless there is a showing of fault."'
Third, damages may no longer be awarded without proof of injury,
although a broad range of injury is still compensable and the proof
requirements are not stringent." Finally, there must be proof of actual
malice before punitive damages may be awarded. 5
The Gertz compromise, with its focus on the distinction between
was libelous per se, but later granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
ground that the subject matter of the article was of "public interest," and therefore
required a showing of actual malice. The decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit,
which applied Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed. 418 U.S. at 327-32.
Interestingly, in 1982, eight years after the historic Supreme Court decision in
Gertz, the Seventh Circuit decided the merits of the defendant's appeal from the district
court decision on remand. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1233 (1983). In that decision Gertz was able to prove both
negligence and actual malice, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed a jury award of com-
pensatory damages in the amount of $100,000 and punitive damages of $300,000. In
summarizing the defendant's behavior, the circuit court noted with regard to Scott
Stanley, the managing editor of American Opinion, that:
Stanley conceived of a story line; solicited Stang, a writer with a known
and unreasonable propensity to label persons or organizations as Commu-
nist, to write the article; and after the article was submitted, made virtu-
ally no effort to check the validity of statements that were defamatory per
se of Gertz, and in fact added further defamatory material based on
Stang's "facts." There was more than enough evidence for the jury to con-
clude that this article was published with utter disregard for the truth or
falsity of the statements contained in the article about Gertz.
Id. at 539 (footnote omitted).
o See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
61 See infra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
62 418 U.S. at 343.
"' Id. at 347. The Gertz Court, in fact, invited state courts to proceed to evolve for
themselves the proper standard of liability in suits brought by private plaintiffs. Thus,
the Court stated that as long as they do not attempt to dip below the negligence stan-
dard, "States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy
for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual." Id. at
345-46.
" Id. at 348.
65 Id. at 349-50.
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public and private figures, still dominates constitutional analysis of def-
amation cases.6" Although the application of the Gertz test may now
favor plaintiffs and the imposition of liability, 7 this modification in
doctrine hardly explains the large shift in the results between the sec-
ond Franklin study' and the LDRC studies, 69 particularly the tremen-
dous increase in the judgments awarded by juries.70
I contend that there are four contributing causes to the recent reju-
venation of American libel law, each of which is considered in the next
section. The first factor is a new legal and cultural seriousness about
the inner self. Tort law has undergone a relaxation of rules that for-
merly prohibited recovery for purely emotional or psychic injury, a doc-
trinal evolution that parallels the growth of the "me-generation." A
second factor is the infiltration into the law of defamation of many of
the attitudes that have produced a trend in tort law over the past
twenty years favoring compensation and risk-spreading goals over fault
principles in the selection of liability rules. A third cause of the new era
in libel is the increasing difficulty in distinguishing between the inform-
ing and entertaining functions of the media. The blurring of this line
between entertainment and information has affected the method and
substance of communications in important ways and highlights the in-
adequacies of the current legal standards governing defamation actions.
The final factor is doctrinal confusion, caused in large part by a perva-
sive failure to accommodate constitutional and common law values in a
coherent set of standards that is responsive to the realities of modem
communications. That doctrinal confusion is particularly telling in an
environment where cultural trends, such as a heightened concern for
the inner self, and legal trends, such as the trend in tort law in favor of
strict liability, both work against the ideals of free expression.
I hope that a relatively free spirited inquiry into how defamation
law and cultural trends have diverged in recent years will both explain
the current rejuvenation of defamation law and suggest that some re-
forms in the law are necessary.
In the final section of this Article I propose a number of reforms
for defamation law. They provide what I believe is the most important
reform of all at this time-the simplification of the law. One substan-
e6 See, e.g., WoIston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
67 See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
*S See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
70 In fact, the changes in constitutional doctrine appeared to have at most only a
marginal impact on the results in Professor Franklin's second study when compared to
the first. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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tial reform would be to move to a "context public figure" doctrine,
which would ensure that speech receives actual-malice protection if the
object of the defamation is a "public" person when considered within
the context of the audience to which the information is published. A
second major reform is to reinvigorate the common law system of
checks and balances that surrounded libel and slander law before much
of it was superseded by constitutional doctrine. Although the addition
of the first amendment to the law of libel substantially liberalized the
law of defamation, giving life to free expression values that the common
law too often slighted, it also had a tendency to displace the natural
evolution of the common law. It is necessary that we take common law
doctrine seriously again. By combining a reinvigorated common law
with a more flexible application of prevailing first amendment jurispru-
dence, the confusion in the law of defamation can to some degree be
eliminated, and the rejuvenated law of defamation restored to a balance
more appropriate to modern American life.
A failure to adjust defamation doctrine that is fast becoming out-
moded can be expected to have a severe impact on the media. Although
appellate courts will likely continue to attempt to police excessive
awards, the doctrinal shifts in favor of plaintiffs will certainly result in
more affirmances of large judgments against media defendants."1
Many media outlets simply cannot absorb very substantial awards;
they defend libel actions under the peril of shutdown if they lose. The
Alton Telegraph, a daily paper from Alton, Illinois with a circulation
of 38,000, was faced with a $9.2 million judgment because of a memo-
randum written by two of its reporters.7 ' The newspaper was forced to
71 In assessing the impact of outmoded legal doctrine and of developing social atti-
tudes on suits against the media, it should be recognized that libel suits may be subject
to a feedback effect in which relatively subtle changes in the prevailing legal doctrine
translate into substantial impact on the media.
The feedback effect is the proclivity of certain news events to self-generate into
larger phenomena than they would naturally, because the media attention paid to them
becomes part of the events themselves. Whatever may be happening to legal doctrine or
attitudes toward the media that may explain the proliferation of libel actions, it is clear
that the explosion feeds on its own publicity as much as anything. As the media focuses
with ever more interest on the efforts of famous and powerful people to sue it for
gargantuan damage awards, a litigious atmosphere of libel is created, as if each libel
action had the capacity to produce multiple offspring.
72 The lawsuit against the Alton Telegraph, a small newspaper in Alton, Illinois,
arose out of memorandum sent by two Telegraph reporters in 1969 to a Justice De-
partment official in charge of a task force investigating organized crime in southern
Illinois. A jury awarded James Green, a real estate developer allegedly libeled in the
memorandum, $6.7 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive
damages. Green v. Alton Telegraph Co., 77-66 (Madison County, Ill. 1980). The Al-
ton Telegraph case has drawn substantial media attention. For some examples, see 60
Minutes, Oct. 11, 1981 (transcript on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
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file for bankruptcy to avoid having to sell its assets. The Alton Tele-
graph finally managed to reach a settlement that allowed it to stay in
business,7 but its near-demise was a chilling lesson: however painful a
successful libel action may be to CBS or the National Enquirer, it can
be devastating to small media outlets.
As the Alton Telegraph example suggests, large judgments have
also increased the cost of settling cases. 7 ' Although public announce-
ments of settlement results are rare, because the media defendant will
often condition the payment of the settlement on the plaintiff's promise
not to disclose the amount, the current climate for defamation actions
assures that many settlements will be impressive. The ABC television
network reportedly settled a suit brought against it by Synanon, a Cali-
fornia communal organization, for $1.25 million.73 In Philadelphia
Mayor Green's suit against CBS the New York Times reported the set-
tlement as between $250,000 and $400,000.76
Whether a suit is settled, won, or lost, the legal fees alone can be
chilling.77 Hundreds of thousands, and even millions of dollars can be
spent paying lawyers to defend a single case,78 and the ongoing costs for
counseling on libel matters and for liability insurance escalate as the
media perceive the threat of successful libel actions with increasing
view); Howard, The Press in Court, 6 WILSON Q., Special Issue, 1982, at 86, 87-88;
Jenkins, supra note 2, at 23. An appeal by the Telegraph from the $9.2 million judg-
ment was dismissed by an Illinois appellate court, which ruled that the Telegraph's
filing of a petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174, 1301-1330 (Supp. V 1981), had the effect of removing the entire
case to the bankruptcy court. Green v. Alton Telegraph Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 755, 438
N.E.2d 203 (1982).
7 The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois approved a
$1.4 million settlement of Green's suit against the Telegraph, after necessary funding
was obtained from the newspaper's insurance carriers and loans were arranged to allow
the newspaper to pay off the remainder of the settlement. News Notes, MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA), June 8, 1982. However, two other libel actions based on the same unpublished
memorandum are still pending in the bankruptcy court. Id. For a poigniant discussion
of how the settlement has affected the Telegraph, see Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1983, at 1,
col. 6.
74 Howard, supra note 72, at 87.
75 Jenkins, supra note 2, at 25.
76 N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, § 4, at 8, col. 4. The Times described this settle-
ment as "a mere pittance next to the $120 million Gen. William Westmoreland is
asking in his claim that CBS libeled him." Id.
77 For example, ABC's legal fees for the Synanon suit were reportedly $6 million.
Jenkins, supra note 2, at 25.
78 Professor Franklin suggests that changes in constitutional doctrine that lead to a
restricted application of the Gertz public-figure test will increase legal costs for libel
defendants. See Franklin, supra note 24, at 498-99 ("Expansion of the private plaintiff
category and restrictions on summary judgment would add significantly to media litiga-
tion costs.").
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fear.79 Moreover, perhaps due to the confusion in the law, defamation
cases are now more likely to go to trial rather than to be decided upon
summary judgment motion.80 The expense of a full trial is significantly
higher than that of a case decided upon summary judgment,8 and so
the current trends in defamation litigation are likely not only to spur
more plaintiffs into bringing cases, but are also liable to increase the
cost of litigating each of those cases.
The time is overdue for taking account of the reasons for the reju-
venation in our libel law and for beginning to develop a modern law of
defamation that is more responsive to the first amendment values of
modern society.
II. EXPLAINING THE REJUVENATION OF
AMERICAN LIBEL LAW
This part of the Article will isolate the cultural and legal trends
that together explain the current volume of libel litigation and the in-
creased risk of liability for defendants, particularly the media. A proper
balance between free-speech and reputational values will only be possi-
ble when these cultural and legal trends are understood and, when nec-
essary, the legal doctrine is modified to accommodate society's develop-
ing attitudes toward reputation and the media.
A. The Value of Reputation: Heightened
Concern for the Inner Self
In William Shakespeare's Othello, the character lago describes the
sanctity of reputation in words that are well-known to the modern ear:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash-'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
79 See Daniels, supra note 23, at 19 (arguing that prelitigation counseling on ma-
terial to be published is "unfortunate but nevertheless essential" in light of modern
realities of libel law).
80 See Lempert, Winds of Change Hit Libel Practitioners, Legal Times, Oct. 31,
1983, at 1, col. 3, 36, col. 1 ("Many media defense lawyers share the perception that
they cannot count on summary judgment in cases in which five years ago they would
have made the motions with confidence.").
81 Id. at 36, col. 2 (defamation suit carried out to trial costs about four times as
much to litigate as one decided on summary judgment).
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And makes me poor indeed.82
As often as these famous lines are held up as evidence of the highest
regard for reputational values that runs through the Anglo-American
cultural tradition, other less-famous words, also spoken by Iago, are
usually ignored:
As I am an honest man, I thought you had
received some bodily wound; there is more sense in
that than in reputation. Reputation is an idle and
most false imposition; oft got without merit and lost
without deserving. You have lost no reputation at
all, unless you repute yourself such a loser.83
Iago, of course, is a duplicitous character who does not hesitate to
utter contradictory sentiments in the same play. But the two conflicting
views that Iago voices about the importance of reputation are more
than merely the self-serving statements of a fickle Shakespearean an-
tagonist;8 4 they reflect a deeper dissonance in Anglo-American culture
82 W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act III, scene iii, lines 158-64, in THE COM-
PLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE CAMBRIDGE TEXT 955, 971 (1980).
83 Id. at act II, scene iii, lines 261-66, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE: THE CAMBRIDGE TEXT 968 (1980).
84 Iago is certainly not alone in voicing conflicting, possibly self-serving statements
about the value of one's reputation. The Court has at times written in ringing terms
about individuals' right to protection of their good names, treating it as "the immediate
jewel of their souls." In Gertz, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, quoted with ap-
proval a prior statement of Justice Stewart, that "the individual's right to the protection
of his own good name 'reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty.'" 418 U.S. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stew-
art, J., concurring)). This "essential dignity and worth" was apparently thought of by
the Gertz Court as constitutional in dimension, for it went on to quote Stewart for the
proposition that "[tihe protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself,
is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But
this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a
basic of our constitutional system." 418 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added). This high regard
for reputation evidenced in Gertz was resoundingly reemphasized in several post-Gertz
decisions. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
The Justices who voted to vindicate reputational interests at the expense of free
expression in this line of cases, however, voted in precisely the opposite way when the
value of reputation was at issue in a different legal context. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976), Justice Rehnquist, who authored Firestone and Wolston, wrote about rep-
uthtion in a manner that directly contradicted the sentiments of Gertz and its progeny.
Paul was an action brought by Edward Davis, a Louisville newspaper reporter, against
two local police chiefs, because the reporter's name and picture had been circulated on
a police flyer purporting to identify "active shoplifters." Davis had been arrested for
shoplifting, but at the time the materials were circulated the charge had not yet been
tried, and it was subsequently dismissed. Davis brought his suit in federal court under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981), claiming that the police flyer branded him as a
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concerning the value of reputation, a dissonance that has in turn mani-
fested itself in sharp contradictions within the law of defamation. 5
Like Iago, American courts have frequently been of two minds in their
solicitude for reputation, at times permitting harsh penalties for defam-
atory speech well out of proportion to the harm of the words or the
culpability of the speaker, and at times permitting obviously damaging
speech uttered with transparently dark motives to be spoken with com-
plete impunity.88 Thus, any attempt to account for changes in defama-
criminal, without the benefit of trial, thereby damaging his reputation and depriving
him of "liberty or property" without due process of law. In a Iago-like reversal, the
same six Justices who treated reputation as legally hallowed in Firestone, found that
Davis' reputation was not the type of palpable legal interest encompassed by the words
"liberty or property" in the due process clause. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. Just as Iago
admonished Cassius that "I thought you had received some bodily wound," for "there
is more sense in that than in reputation," the Supreme Court conveniently abandoned
its view of reputation as "a basic of our constitutional system," and held that "[tihe
words 'liberty' and 'property' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment do not in terms
single out reputation as a candidate for special protection over and above other interests
... . [T]he frequently drastic effect of the 'stigma' which may result from defamation
by the government in a variety of contexts, . . . does not establish the proposition that
reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is...
by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause." Id.
For critiques of the Paul decision, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §
26.12, at 427-29 (2d ed. Supp. 1982); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62
CORNELL L. REV. 405, 423-29 (1977); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary
View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 322-38 (1976); Tushnet, The Constitutional Right to
One's Good Name: An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 64
Ky. L.J. 753 (1976); Note, Reputation, Stigma, and Section 1983: The Lessons of
Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191 (1977). For an attempt to rehabilitate Paul on
grounds other than those used by the Court, see Smolla, The Displacement of Federal
Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 831.
The contrast between the treatment of the importance of reputation in the defama-
tion cases and the due process cases accents the manipulative pliability of "reputation."
On the Burger Court today reputation is a "basic to our constitutional system" when
measured against the competition of the first amendment, but it is not "a candidate for
special protection" when it faces off with the Court's new judicial federalism. The
Supreme Court freely manipulates reputational values, either enhancing or diminishing
their importance as it sees fit. Perplexingly, the unifying principle appears to be that
reputation will be given whatever level of importance is necessary to undermine other
constitutional guarantees. The importance of reputation is built up by the Court when
such a build-up helps decrease the coverage of the first amendment's free speech guar-
antees; the importance of reputation is dismantled when the dismantling serves to con-
strict the scope of the due process clause.
85 See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 111, at 737 ("It must be confessed at the
beginning that there is" a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense. It
contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer has had a kind word
.... "); id. at 738-39 (history of defamation law is analogized to the "swing[s]" of a
"pendulum").
88 See id. at 737 ("[Defamation] is a curious compound of strict liability imposed
upon innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found in the law, with a
blind and almost perverse refusal to compensate the plaintiff for a real and very serious
harm.").
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tion law by looking only at the current adjustment between first
amendment and reputational values ignores the importance of consider-
ing our contemporary attitude toward the value of reputation which, in
fact, underlies the whole of defamation law. It is my contention that the
rejuvenation of the law of defamation is in part the result of strongly
felt cultural attitudes about the importance of protecting psychic well-
being, attitudes that have been able to flourish largely because the con-
tradictions in reigning doctrine provide no coherent set of rules to hold
them in check.
There has always been some support for the position that the law
of torts has no business getting involved in compensation for psychic
injury. Calvert Magruder, writing in 1936, noted that "the common
law has been reluctant to recognize the interest in one's peace of mind
as deserving of general and independent legal protection.187 Magruder
approved of this reluctance, arguing that it would be quixotic for the
law to pursue the general securing of peace of mind: "[a]gainst a large
part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments inci-
dent to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the
mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.'' 8
Zechariah Chafee8 9 and David Reisman9" both suggested that there
was something almost un-American about pursuing a libel suit. Reis-
man, in fact, argued that protection of reputation is intrinsically unim-
portant in American capitalist culture:
[T]he American attitude towards reputation is unique. In
Europe, where pre-capitalist concepts of honor, family, and
privacy survive, reputation is a weighty matter not only for
the remnants of the nobility who still fight duels to protect it,
but for all the middle groups who flood the courts with petty
slander litigations as we flood ours with automobile and
other negligence actions. But where tradition is capitalistic
rather than feudalistic, reputation is only an asset, "good
will", not an attribute to be sought after for its intrinsic
value. And in the United States these business attitudes have
colored social relations. The law of libel is consequently
unimportant. 91
87 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936).
" Id.
" See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
O Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 CoLUm. L.
REv. 727 (1942).
91 Id. at 730.
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The social usefulness of providing legal redress for injury to one's
reputation and psychological injury generally continues to be ques-
tioned. Shortly after the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan92 decision
Arthur Berney stated that "society could survive the abolition of the
defamation action," '9 and in his recent book, Speech and Law in a
Free Society,"' Franklyn Haiman follows Magruder's prescription of a
"toughening of the mental hide" and advocates the abolition of psycho-
logical torts such as invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional
distress.
These arguments minimizing the need for protecting psychic well-
being are not dominant in either common law tort doctrine, modern tort
analysis, or contemporary public sentiment. The common law certainly
reflects unease about attempting to place a monetary value on the
psychic injury caused by defamation. This unease is apparent in the
use by courts of a relatively transparent legal fiction as they attempt to
objectify an injury. The orthodoxy has been that the law of defamation
does not provide compensation for emotional disturbance, but rather
remedies a wrongful disruption in the "relational interest" that an indi-
vidual has in maintaining personal esteem in the eyes of others." The
common law thereby distinguished an injury to reputation from an in-
vasion of privacy:9" "the fundamental difference between a right to pri-
vacy and a right to freedom from defamation is that the former directly
concerns one's own peace of mind, while the latter concerns primarily
one's reputation.1
97
92 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a discussion of New York Times, see supra notes 49-
53 and accompanying text.
9S Berney, supra note 49, at 46. Professor Berney generally discounts the impor-
tance of protecting psychic injury, stating that "the interest in psychic well-being is not
too highly valued in our society, and it is held in particularly low regard by public
officials." Id. at 43. Cf Franklin, supra note 24, at 499-500 (questioning whether libel
law is dysfunctional because few cases settle, the costs of litigation are so high and
plaintiff success rates are low).
Professor Laurence Eldredge, in his comprehensive treatise on defamation, de-
scribes the suggestion that society could survive without the law of defamation as a
"silly ipse dixit." L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 53, at 294 (1978).
Professor Eldredge states that "I suppose this society could survive abolition of the tort
actions for fraud and deceit, or for bodily injuries, or any other tort-or even a nuclear
bomb attack-but it would be a more brutish society, and one which reasonably sensi-
tive people would find it hard to endure." Id.
94 F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 155 (1981). For a review
of Haiman's book, see Farber, Recent Books on the First Amendment, 77 Nw. U.L.
REV. 729, 730 (1982).
" See L. GREEN, CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS 193-276 (1940); Berney,
supra note 49, at 40-41; Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35, 36 (1936).
91 Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1094
(1962).
97 Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 57, 27
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Notwithstanding such rationalizations, it seems clear that the bulk
of the money paid out in damage awards in defamation suits is to com-
pensate for psychic injury, rather than to compensate for any objec-
tively verifiable damage to one's community standing. Even common
law doctrine, which presumed the existence of damages when certain
types of defamation were proved,"8 demonstrates that defamation was
not originally meant to protect simply a reified interest in reputation.99
Modern legal analysis is more openly supportive of compensating
injuries to the psyche. Stanley Ingber has recently argued that the func-
tion of tort law is the promotion of human dignity "by discouraging the
violation of an individual's personal or psychological integrity." 100 The
law of defamation promotes individual dignity by providing a forum for
an official declaration that the attack on the victim was undeserved, by
imposing on the publisher an economic penalty that acts to deter the
imposition of such invasions of dignity, and by providing compensation
to the victim for the loss that occurs.101
Developments in all areas of tort law other than defamation indi-
cate that courts are increasingly'willing to recognize the legitimacy of
protecting emotional and mental tranquility from injury.'0 2 Courts have
steadily relaxed the rules restricting liability for the negligent and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress'0 3 and are more receptive to the
N.E.2d 753, 755 (1940).
" See C. MORRIS, MODERN DFrAMATION LAW 38 (1978); W. PROSSER, supra
note 49, § 112, at 754-60, 762.
" See Berney, supra note 49, at 41. For a penetrating examination of the contrast
between the imagery of the term reputation and the law's actual concern with protect-
ing psychic integrity, see Probert, Defamation, A Camouflage of Psychic Interests: The
Beginning of a Behavioral Analysis, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1173 (1962). Professor
Probert's insight into the law of libel's underlying concern with psychic well-being is
not only interesting in its own right; it also serves as another window on how the law
of defamation might have evolved without New York Times. Probert's article, written
two years prior to New York Times, is an unabashed celebration of the law's increasing
willingness to protect against psychic injury. Probert describes this trend as a liberaliz-
ing, humanizing development. Yet after New York Times, it almost seemed un-Ameri-
can to take psychic interests seriously when they confronted apple-pie, first amendment
rhetoric.
'00 Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. REv.
785, 791 (1979).
101 Id. at 791-92.
'0 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968) (mother awarded recovery for emotional trauma and physical injuries suffered
when she witnessed the accident that killed her child); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424
A.2d 210 (1980) (expanding the parents' recovery for the wrongful death of their child
to include the pecuniary, although not the emotional, value of future lost
companionship).
11" See Note, The Death of the Ensuing Physical Injury Rule: Validating Claims
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 10 HorsTmA L. REv. 213 (1981)
(describing progress in the recognition of emotional injury without accompanying phys-
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maintenance of suits based on invasion of privacy."' Across various
categories of tort law the concept of "injury" has been stretched out-
ward to encompass new legal shelter for mental and emotional calm.
10 5
This trend in tort law has paralleled and has been responsive to a
corresponding trend in American culture. American culture from the
mid-1960's to the early 1970's was dominated by mass political action
advocating significant social change. Opposition to the Vietnam War
vulcanized disparate strands of countercultural energy into a united
movement of antiwar dissent. The antiestablishment energy generated
by the war protest subsequently dissipated into a range of less directed
fads and causes, many of them preoccupied with the discovery and
nourishment of various formulations of the individual self.2
06
This shift has resulted in what is now widely perceived as the "me
generation. 1 0 7 Contemporary America's attitude toward a defamed
plaintiff is likely to reflect society's increased expenditure of money and
ical harm).
104 For discussions of both the growth and the worth of the tort of invasion of
privacy since its origin in Warren and Brandeis's seminal The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), see generally Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystjfing a Landmark Citation, 13 SUF-
FOLK U.L. REV. 875 (1979); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Bran-
deis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); Pember & Teeter, Privacy
and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REV. 57 (1974); Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Schneiderman, Constitutional Right of Privacy and
State Action, 6 GONZ. L. REV. 54 (1970); Note, The Invasion of Defamation by Pri-
-vacy, 23 STAN. L. REV. 547 (1971).
15 See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 54, at 327-35; Bohrer, Fear and Trembling
in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 61
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that workers should be able to recover for emo-
tional distress when exposed to harmful chemicals in the workplace); Delgado, Words
that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 152, 165, 179-81 (1982) (noting that several courts "have
upheld causes of action or verdicts for black plaintiffs in cases which stemmed in large
part from racial insults" and arguing that there should be "fa]n independent tort for
racial slurs").
106 As examples of this societal transition, consider Eldridge Cleaver and Bob Dy-
lan, who were considered spokesmen of the countercultural masses of the 1960's and
who then declared their own concern for their inner selves by becoming "born-again"
Christians in the 1970's. See generally Wolfe, The "Me" Decade and the Third Great
Awakening, NEW YORK, Aug. 23, 1976, at 26, 34 ("Many members of the New Left
communes of the 1960's began to turn up in Me movements in the 1970s .... It is
entirely possible that in the long run historians will regard the entire New Left experi-
ence as not so much a political as a religious episode wrapped in semi military gear and
guerilla talk.").
107 The term "me generation" was introduced into the lexicon by the journalist
Tom Wolfe. See id. The sensitivity of American culture in the contemporary era has
been noted by other commentators as well. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1983, at B2,
col. 1 (Television critic Tom Shales notes the anachronism of a television series because
it places in a 1950's setting three characters who "unfortunately . . . all owe their
sensibilities to the sensitive '80s.").
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effort directed first to finding and then to nurturing the inner self.'08
One does not go to significant personal expense in an effort to define a
self image, and then sit idly by as that work is 1ublicly undone by 60
Minutes or the National Enquirer.
This conjecture is supported by the recognition that juries today
are becoming notorious for their free and easy attitude in awarding
stupendous sums in libel suits, 09 an attitude that must be attributed to
their sense of the rough equities of the issues litigated." 0 As Henry
Kaufman, General Counsel of the Libel Defense Resource Center,
notes, "When a libel case gets to a jury, the First Amendment kind of
drops to the wayside.""' This observation is consistent with the advice
offered in a recent book on libel litigation which counselled defense
attorneys not to "overuse the First Amendment theme" because
"[ j ]udges and juries are not necessarily sympathetic to claims of the
media that they have a special privilege to run roughshod over their
fellow citizens."
'"12
The current reinvigoration of libel law, therefore, seems to be in
part a grass roots response by jurors and the society they represent to
the threat to psychic equanimity posed by the media.
108 See Main, The New Narcissism, HARPER'S, Oct. 1975, at 45 (noting "the
trend in therapy toward a deification of the isolated self"); see also E. SCHUR, THE
AWARENESS TRAP: SELF ABSORPTION INSTEAD OF SOCIAL CHANGE 1-8 (1976) (not-
ing the increasing American interest in becoming aware of oneself and one's feelings);
Lasch, The New Narcissist .Society, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 30, 1976, at 5, col. 1 ("It
is no secret that Americans have lost faith in politics. The retreat to personal satisfac-
tions-such as they are-is one of the main themes of the Seventies."); id. at col. 3
(People today hunger not for personal salvation, let alone for the restoration of an
earlier golden age, but for the feeling-even if it is only a momentary illusion-of
personal well-being, health, and psychic security.") (emphasis added).
10" See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
110 See Winfield, Introduction, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1981, at 14 (R. Winfield
ed.) ("Libel cases are never decided in a vacuum: they are uniquely sensitive to the
prevailing public mood."); cf. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring)
("The scarcity of testimony to show that Commissioner Sullivan suffered any actual
damages at all suggests that these feelings of hostility [toward desegregation] had at
least as much to do with rendition of this half-million-dollar verdict as did an appraisal
of damages.").
111 Jenkins, supra note 2, at 28.
112 Schwab & Barton, Trial of a Libel Case, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1981, at 293
(R. Winfield ed.).
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B. The Influence of Strict Liability on
the Law of Defamation
1. Conflict Between the Proscription of Strict Liability in
Defamation and the General Trend Toward
Strict Liability in Tort Law
At the same time that the Supreme Court made its decision in
New York Times to establish constitutional requirements for state defa-
mation law, many state courts were also in the process of articulating
new standards of fault in several other areas of tort law. The New York
Times rule with its emphasis on higher standards of fault and subjective
culpability on the part of the defendant, however, was sharply in oppo-
sition to the general trend in tort law toward the deemphasis of fault in
favor of the obje6tive measurement of conduct.
In the products liability area, for example, strict liability for the
manufacture and sale of defective products was beginning to crystallize
during the same period that the 1964 New York Times decision began
erasing traditional strict liability standards for defamation and impos-
ing fault principles in their stead. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,"' one of the critical waystations on the road to strict products
liability, was decided in 1960. The California Supreme Court's water-
shed decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,1 4 which fi-
nally shed the verbiage of the law of sales and broke through to a
straightforward standard of strict liability in tort, was decided in 1962.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts gave dispositive impetus to the trend
in 1965 by publishing section 402A, making strict liability the gov-
erning standard in products liability cases. 1
Although products liability cases form the most striking counter-
a13 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (holding manufacturer of defective steering
mechanism liable for injuries suffered when steering failed; liability based on breach of
implied warranty of merchantability despite waiver of all but express, limited warranty
by purchaser and lack of privity between injured party and manufacturer).
114 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Justice Traynor's
landmark decision contained words that many juries apparently believe are equally
relevant sentiments for defamation: "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products [substitute "defective media publica-
tions"] are borne by the manufacturers [publishers or broadcasters] that put such prod-
ucts on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT]. The law was changing so fast during this period that § 402A was actu-
ally drafted three times; it first applied only to food and drink, then to any products for
"intimate bodily use," and finally to all products. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V.
SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 762 (7th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER & WADE]; RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 402A comment d.
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point to the New York Times rules, other trends in modern tort law
tend to parallel the products liability accentuation of compensation and
risk spreading goals over notions of fault. Modern courts have found
defEndants vicariously liable in new contexts by using enterprise liabil-
ity concepts to expand the availability of respondeat superior as a
means of reaching deeper pockets.116 Conventional notions of cause-in-
fact and proximate cause have been expanded, sometimes beyond recog-
nition, to facilitate plaintiffs' recoveries.11 Immunity doctrines, such as
interfamilial and charitable immunity, that once shielded defendants
from liability have been emasculated. 1 The defense of contributory
negligence, once an absolute bar to recovery, has given way in the ma-
jority of states to the ameliorating doctrine of comparative fault, with
most of the change taking place in the late 1960's and the 1970's.119
I16 See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172 (2d
Cir. 1968) (ship fell off drydock due to mindless prank of drunken sailor; the United
States, as the sailor's employer, was held liable because the court believed such an
accident was foreseeable given the "proclivity of seamen to find solace for solicitude by
copious resort to the bottle"); Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972) (vicarious
liability imposed on employer of salesman at a convention who injured plaintiff in a car
accident at 2:00 a.m., while returning to hotel from a bar); M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN,
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 16-19 (1983) (discussing economic justifications of
vicarious liability); PROSSER & WADE, supra note 115, at 685 (noting "tendency to
liberalize" vicarious liability rules).
117 See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Sindell allowed an action to be brought
by a class of women whose mothers had taken DES during pregnancy, although no
injured class member was able to identify the precise manufacturer of the product that
her mother actually used. The court apportioned liability for the injuries to the class in
Sindell according to the market shares of the drug manufacturers. For a review of
Sindell's relatively radical departure from traditional cause-in-fact requirements, see R.
EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUcTS LIABILITY LAW 159-60 (1980); Note, Market Share
Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1981);
Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REV. 695
(1981). See generally Kinsely, Fate and Lawsuits, NEw REPUBuC, June 14, 1980, at
20 (layman's critique of enterprise liability); Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978) (a prospective look at enterprise
liability written before the Sindell case arose).
118 See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326,
211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1965); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's,
446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d
485 (1967). These cases all involve courts declaring an end to charitable immunities for
hospitals.
For sources outlining the end of interfamilial immunities, see, e.g., Gibson v. Gib-
son, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76
N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 768-69, 775-76 (1980).
119 M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 116, at 372 ("Until the late 1960's,
only a handful of states had abandoned the all-or-nothing contributory negligence ap-
proach. . . .By the end of the 1970's, however, almost 40 states had adopted some
version of comparative negligence.").
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My hypothesis is that the large jury awards and the doctrinal re-
treats that have characterized the recent libel explosion are in some
degree caused by an unconscious infiltration of strict liability values
into the law of defamation, despite the fact that such values have been
officially banned. Libel and slander are creatures of the common law of
torts, and the law of torts has always been a quintessential example of
the law as Holmes described it: the "external deposit of our moral
life."' 2 Particularly if one separates formal doctrine from the results of
cases, tort law has always seemed more immediately responsive to shifts
in cultural winds than any of its common law siblings. Unlike the com-
mon law of contracts, property, or crimes, all of which are dominated
by what are at least provisionally static bodies of doctrine, the law of
torts is explicitly tied to floating community norms. The "ordinary rea-
sonable person" construct is designedly fluid; it reflects no more than a
trier-of-fact's discernment as to the consensus judgment of what is ordi-
nary and reasonable in a given time and place. ' 2 Even when attempts
are made to apply more neutral or stable principles to liability deci-
sions, debate over those principles tends to fade into disputes over nor-
mative preferences.12 2 The ongoing dialogue over whether negligence or
strict liability rules are economically more efficient has yielded no obvi-
ous answer.'12  Negligence under the traditional Learned Hand
formula,12 4 with a contributory negligence defense, seems to be no bet-
ter or worse at reducing the sum of accident costs and accident preven-
tion costs than strict liability with a contributory negligence defense.'
25
120 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
121 See, e.g., James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16
Mo. L. REv. 1 (1951); Reynolds, The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health
Report on the "Odious Creature," 23 OKLA. L. REv. 410 (1970).
122 Compare R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.11 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that neutral economic principles of economics should inform legal liability
standards) with Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REv. 451 (1974) (arguing that use of economic analysis is not value neutral).
See generally infra note 130 (negligence associated with deviation from custom).
12 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF AccIDFrrs (1970); R. POSNER, supra
note 122, § 6.11 at 137-42; Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1056-78, 1082-84 (1972); Posner, Strict Liability: A Com-
ment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 205-15 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Strict Liabil-
ity]; Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980).
124 For a discussion of the Learned Hand negligence formula, see infra notes 393-
409 and accompanying text.
125 This summary statement is of course a severe oversimplification of the rich
literature on this problem. I mean only to point out that stripped down to the bare-
bones question of which liability system produces the lowest sum of accident costs and
accident prevention costs, negligence and strict liability rules produce identical results.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 123, at 1055-78 ("If we make the assump-
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Tort theorists on both sides of the negligence/strict liability debate have
thus often resorted to elaborate moral arguments to break the ostensible
tie.126 Intuitive feelings about the relevance of causation, or essentially
political choices concerning the redistribution of wealth, and other obvi-
ously normative arguments have thus played an integral role in con-
temporary discussions of tort theory. Given this traditional normative
bias in tort law and the current cultural and doctrinal emphasis on
compensation, risk spreading, and strict liability, it is reasonable to sus-
tions under which the Learned Hand test would work adequately, the fascinating thing
is that as good a result in terms of reducing primary accident costs could be achieved by
a liability rule which is the exact reverse of the Learned Hand test." Id. at 1058.);
Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 123, at 205-12 ("At least as a first approximation,
then, a strict liability standard with a defense of contributory negligence is as efficient
as the conventional negligence standard, but no more efficient." Id. at 207.). But see
Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) (posing an elab-
orate economic argument showing that, in some cases, the two standards do not provide
equivalent incentives to reduce accident losses).
126 See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973);
Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
477 (1979); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537
(1972); Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (1979).
Professor Robert Rabin has succinctly explained the renewed interest in the develop-
ment of moral perspectives on the tort system:
[I]s a moral conception of liability necessarily distinct from an eco-
nomic perspective? Perhaps considerations of economic efficiency provide
an adequate moral foundation for a liability system. More specifically,
could it not be argued that the exclusive concern of a tort system should be
to assure that society has neither more nor fewer accidents than its mem-
bers would "choose" through an ideally operating pricing system?
Whatever the ultimate response to this question, an exclusively eco-
nomic justification for a system of liability rules will inevitably face chal-
lenge from a wide variety of competing moral principles. This point is not
lost on the economic theorists themselves.
Liability rules, in other words, could serve as many ends as there are
definitions of justice-constitutional issues aside, rules could systematically
discriminate in favor of injury victims on the basis of age, wealth, national
origin, or a virtually unlimited variety of other characteristics. The quest
for a just theory of liability becomes meaningful, of course, only when we
begin to explore moral conceptions that are based on widely shared no-
tions of fairness. The paucity of tort literature exploring principles of cor-
rective justice other than those related to fault liability undoubtedly re-
flects the difficulty in identifying generally accepted norms that would
support a comprehensive alternative liability system.
In recent years, however, scholars have begun to indicate an interest
in developing new moral perspectives on the tort system. Without a
doubt, the recent intense economic debate about liability rules is partially
responsible for provoking the new efforts; indeed, the authors . assert
that economic analysis is an unduly restrictive perspective for deciding
what they regard as questions of interpersonal corrective justice. At a more
fundamental level, however, the articles . . . are almost certainly an ex-
pression of the pervasive unrest created by the relentless assault on the
fault principle in both the judicial and legislative forums.
R. RABIN, PERSPECIVES ON TORT LAW 237-38 (2d ed. 1983).
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pect that the general trend toward strict liability has played some role
in the rejuvenation of defamation law.
2. Evidence of the Infiltration of Strict Liability
into the Law of Defamation
If one accepts that from a longer view of history the law of defa-
mation is more properly treated as part of the grand scheme of tort
rather than constitutional law, it makes sense in trying to account for
the current state of libel litigation to consider whether the cultural and
doctrinal movements toward strict liability that have been prominent in
tort law over the last twenty years have also influenced defarriation law.
Discerning the influences of these strict liability pressures is difficult,
however, and may be inherently speculative, because the influences are
not acknowledged in the case law, which must conform with the gen-
eral proscription against strict liability for libel in New York Times and
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 127 Insights into the prevailing atmosphere
surrounding defamation, however, might still be garnered by examining
what shreds of evidence we do have. This evidence consists of, first, the
analogous position of the consumer plaintiff in a products liability suit
in relation to the defendant corporate producer of consumer goods and
the defamation plaintiff in relation to the defendant corporate media
outlet, and, second, the reaction in state defamation law to the constitu-
tional mandate of fault standards for liability.
a. Perceived Imbalance Between Corporate Media Outlets and Private
Individual Defamation Plaintiffs
The application of one of the classic normative arguments for ex-
plaining when strict liability rules are most appropriate, George
Fletcher's idea of reciprocal risks,12 would develop liability rules quite
different from those created by New York Times and Gertz. Fletcher
argues that as long as the risks imposed by a particular form of activity
are relatively even among various individuals in society, negligence is
the appropriate liability standard. 2 ' Because all drivers of automobiles
impose roughly equivalent or "reciprocal" risks on one another, Fletch-
er claims, no moral basis exists for imposing liability in the absence of
2.7 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
128 Fletcher, supra note 126, at 543-56.
129 Fletcher describes the general principle underlying the "paradigm of reciproc-
ity" as: "a victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree
and different in order from those created by the victim and imposed on the defen-
dant-in short, for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks." Id. at 542.
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negligence, since it is only one person's deviation from standards of or-
dinary reasonable care that increases risk and upsets the reciprocity
balance.1"' When, however, a particular form of activity creates risks
against others that are not matched by corresponding risks imposed by
others against those undertaking that activity itself, the lack of recipro-
cal risk justifies imposing strict liability rules against the enterprise. 3
Thus, those who engage in abnormally dangerous activities, such as the
operation of a nuclear power plant, should be strictly liable for harm
caused by that which makes the activities abnormally dangerous, such
as radiation leaks.13 The nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island imposes
risks on the surrounding populace of a magnitude that the populace'
does not impose on the owners and operators of the reactor.
The existing constitutional rules for defamation 33 do reflect
Fletcher's formulation in one sense. Higher standards of fault are re-
quired when the media defames a public person than are required
when the media defames a private individual, partly on the logic that
the public person has greater opportunity for counter-speech, 1 4 a no-
tion analogous to Fletcher's reciprocity norm. But the entire plane of
fault in the current law of defamation has been lifted one step higher
than would be the case in Fletcher's system. The media remain pro-
tected by the negligence standard rather than being subjected to strict
liability even though the risks may be grossly nonreciprocal.
Most individuals, even those who are famous or powerful, do not
impose reciprocal risks on media outlets. Whereas media outlets can do
substantial damage to an individual by incorrectly reporting wrongdo-
ing or other information about the individual, that individual poses lit-
tle risk of harm to media outlets. Over time, as the risks come to be
realized, this nonreciprocal situation would result in what amounts to a
transfer in wealth from individuals, in terms of uncompensated damage
to reputation, to media outlets, in terms of uninternalized costs of re-
porting information. Thus, according to Fletcher's analysis, since there
is no flow of wealth back from media outlets to defamed individuals
through risks imposed by those individuals on the media, the courts
130 "[A] negligent risk, an 'unreasonable' risk, is but one that unduly exceeds the
bounds of reciprocity. Thus, negligently created risks are nonreciprocal relative to the
risks generated by [those] who engage in the same activity in the customary way." Id.
at 548.
131 Id. at 542, 545-48.
13' Cf Prosser's discussion of the common law's strict liability rule for defamation:
"The effect of this strict liability is to place the printed, written or spoken word in the
same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals." W. PROS-
SER, supra note 49, § 113, at 773.
133 See supra note 48-67 and accompanying text.
134 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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should ensure compensation by strict liability rather than relying on
notions of fault which may leave a long-run imbalance between media
outlets and those who are the topics of media reporting.135
Media outlets, especially national television and newspaper net-
works, not only have the appearance of imposing nonreciprocal risks,
but they also have the attributes of corporate, deep pocket defendants,
rich enough to satisfy the goals of risk spreading and impersonal
enough to draw no sympathy from jurors.
An individual who is scrutinized by the Washington Post or 60
Minutes is likely to feel helpless before the whim of the powerful me-
dia. ' It is quite possible that juries (and perhaps judges) 37 moved by
this perception of imbalance, are unconsciously applying strict liability
standards against the media, imposing damages for defamation even
though the media acted carefully, while all the time adhering "in prin-
ciple" to the negligence standard.
Plaintiff's lawyers certainly attempt to exploit this perception of
imbalance by trying to associate the harm caused by the media with
harm caused by products' manufacturers. In a 60 Minutes story"3 8 on
Green v. Alton Telegraph Co."3 9 Rex Carr, the trial attorney who suc-
cessfully handled the plaintiffs' case and obtained a $9.2 million ver-
"' This narrow view of the relationship between individuals and the media does
not, of course, take account of the fact that those who are the subject of media reporting
generally benefit from media exposure in addition to being subject to risk of harm from
defamation, see supra notes 7-22 and accompanying text, or that the broader group of
all individuals in the United States receive a benefit that cannot be measured in mone-
tary terms through the operation of an independent and unfettered press, see W. PROS-
sa , supra note 49, § 113, at 773 ("In the interest of our traditional freedom of expres-
sion, it is not clear that the losses due to innocently inflicted harm to reputation should
be borne by the publishing industry . . ").
130 Even those in less than helpless positions often find the power of the media
intimidating. A New York-based firm called MediaComm specializes in coaching peo-
ple who will be interviewed by the media, charging as much as $1400 to $1700 a day
for the coaching sessions. Weisman, 60 Minutes: A Look at Whether the Show's Success
Has Affected the Quality and Zeal of Its Reporting, T.V. GUIDE, Apr. 16, 1983, at 5.
The head of MediaComm is quoted by Weisman as stating that: "'I have yet to find
one single [client] who wants to be on 60 Minutes. There's a fear that, frankly, they're
up against more than they can handle. And there's a very, very significant fear of
unfair editing.'" Id. Similarly, the head of the Pentagon's Directorate for Defense In-
formation says that most of the military establishment is reluctant to go on camera
before the likes of 60 Minutes: "'General X tells me, I sit there Sunday nights in front
of that TV set and watch those guys take people like me apart. I'm sure as hell not
going to be interviewed by them.'" Id.
"3 See Lempert, supra note 80, at 36, col. 4 (judges' decisions in defamation cases
reflect a negative view of the media).
11 60 Minutes, Oct. 11, 1981 (copy of transcript on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
139 107 Ill. App. 3d 755, 438 N.E.2d 203 (1982). For a discussion of the Alton
Telegraph case, see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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dict, stated that: "The Telegraph newspaper or General Motors or
anybody would be responsible for those damages caused Jim Green.
They did the same thing here. They wrote a paper, a memo, that
caused this damage to Jim.
1 40
b. State Defamation Law Reaction to the Constitutional Fault
Requirement
In addition to the pervasiveness of strict liability in tort law and
the relationship between corporate media defendants and private indi-
vidual plaintiffs, the suspicion that strict liability principles retain an
important influence on defamation law also arises from two trends in
state law: first, some states continue to follow strict liability thinking in
the one category of cases in which such adherence remains arguably
permissible (cases that do not involve the media); and second, states
have overwhelmingly opted for the lowest standard of fault permitted
under Gertz when a private-figure plaintiff is allegedly libeled by the
media.
(i) Explicit and Implicit Strict Liability in Nonmedia Defamation
Cases
Open traces of strict liability thinking in defamation exist in those
decisions that have held that the alterations worked by Gertz on the
common law are inapplicable to cases that do not involve the media.
The literal language of Gertz refers only to media defendants; each
time Justice Powell stated his holding he was careful to insert the
words "publisher" or "broadcaster," using those terms over fifteen
times.141 As George Christie pointed out, after Gertz "we are left won-
dering whether an action between private parties is to be governed by
the common law." 42 Melville Nimmer also intepreted Gertz as limited
140 60 Minutes, supra note 138, at 15. Cf Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373
F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.). Judge Friendly observed in Buckley that:
Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting companies are businesses con-
ducted for profit and often make very large ones. Like other enterprises
that inflict damage in the course of performing a service highly useful to
the public, such as providers of food or shelter or manufacturers of drugs
designed to ease or prolong life, they must pay the freight; and injured
persons should not be relegated to forums so distant as to make collection
of their claims difficult or impossible unless strong policy considerations
demand.
But ef. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 432 n.52
(1975) (attacking the analogy between enterprise liability and defamation).
'Il Note, Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New York Times Defamation
Protection to NonMedia Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1877 n.9 (1982).
142 Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflict-
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to the media. 43 The American Law Institute, although suggesting that
courts extend Gertz to purely private defamation, 1 4 acknowledges that
"[if there are some situations where fault is not required, the States
will be free to apply their own rules, and they may or may not continue
to apply the traditional common law rule,"'145 and that "[t]he precise
holding of the [Gertz] case . . . does not extend beyond a statement
published by a member of the communications media; and the constitu-
tional requirement of fault on the part of the defendant may turn out to
be limited to this holding, though this seems unlikely." 46 the Restate-
ment's guess that a return to the traditional common law standards was
"unlikely," however, underestimated the continuing force of the con-
ventional pro-reputational values of the common law and overestimated
the persuasiveness to the states of the Supreme Court's first amendment
limitations on those values. Although many states have chosen to apply
Gertz to nonmedia cases, several have not. 4
ing Approaches, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 43, 50 (1976).
148 Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Free-
dom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 649 (1975). See generally the following discus-
sions of the distinctions between the protection afforded media communications and
nonmedia communications, and between the rights of a free press and free speech:
Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel
Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975); Lange, The Speech and
Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1975); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech
and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1978); Stewart, "Or of
the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); Note, First Amendment Protection Against
Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
902 (1974).
144 RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 580B comment e.
145 Id. at § 613 comment j.
146 Id. at § 580B comment e.
10 Four states-Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin-have expressly
held Gertz inapplicable to nonmedia defendants when the plaintiff is a private figure.
Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1979);
Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977);
Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W.
3258 (1982); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
But cf. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
There appears to be general agreement, however, that the New York Times actual-
malice requirement applies across the board in actions by public officials or public
figures, even against a nonmedia defendant. The theory of the decisions is a relatively
straightforward one: criticism of public officials and public figures implicates the consti-
tutional values sought to be protected by New York Times, and there is no principled
reason for distinguishing between media and nonmedia defendants when the plaintiff is
a public official or public figure. Several of the major Supreme Court decisions apply-
ing the actual-malice standard, including New York Times itself, involved defamation
actions brought by public officials against nonmedia defendants. See, e.g., St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 727 (1964).
Moreover, the Maryland Court of Appeals held New York Times applicable to
defamation actions by public plaintiffs against nonmedia defendants in Jacron Sales
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In Calero v. Del Chemical Corp.,1 48 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin held that "[n]either [New York] Times' nor Gertz' protections
apply" to defamation not involving the media, public officials, or public
figures.1 49 In an even -more far reaching nonmedia decision, Harley-
Davison Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, °50 the Oregon Supreme Court
held that the traditional strict liability rules of the common law, includ-
ing the rule of the Restatement (First) of Torts that one "who falsely,
and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to an-
other ... is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 590-91, 350 A.2d 688, 694-95 (1976), althoughJacron is
more often cited for its extension of Gertz to nonmedia defendants. For other, more
recent decisions holding that the actual-malice standard applies to nonmedia cases in-
volving public officials and figures, see Antwerp Diamond Exchange v. Better Business
Bureau, 130 Ariz. 523, 637 P.2d 733, 737 (1981); Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 653 P.2d
1145, 1150 (Hawaii 1982), Anderson v. Low Rent Hous. Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d 239,
247 (Iowa), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981); Michaud v. Inhabitants of Livermore
Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Me. 1978); Williams v. Pasma, 656 P.2d 212, 215 (Mont.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 108, 593
P.2d 777, 785 (1979); DeCarvalho v. da Silva, 414 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1980).
Federal courts also uniformly apply the New York Times rules to nonmedia defen-
dants in defamation actions by public plaintiffs. See Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 649
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Woy v. Turner, 533 F. Supp. 102, 104 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Other state courts in cases involving public plaintiffs and nonmedia defendants
have simply applied the New York Times rule without discussing the issue. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604 (Del. 1971); Grad v. Copeland, 280 So. 2d 461 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 287 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1973); Fox v. Kahn, 421 Pa. 563,
221 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966); Wollman v. Graff, 287 N.W.2d 104
(S.D. 1980).
One state court has expressly refused to apply New York Times in an action
against a nonmedia defendant by an arguably public figure. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980). In Stuempges, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that neither New York Times nor Gertz were applicable to nonmedia defendants.
According to the court, "the [New York] Times 'actual malice' standard was fashioned
as an exception to the common law rule to permit the printed and electronic media to
perform their function of informing the public about newsworthy people and events
without undue fear of defamation liability." Id. at 258. Accordingly, the court treated
the case as a common law defamation case, analyzing the facts in terms of conditional
privilege, "ill will" malice, and presumed damages.
It should be noted that Chief Justice Burger dropped a footnote in Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), stating that the Court had never decided "whether the
New York Times standard can apply to an individual defendant rather than to a media
defendant." Id. at 133 n.16. One court has cited this footnote and stated, in dicta, that
it is "far from settled" whether New York Times applies to a nonmedia defendant.
Thomas Merton Center v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 280 Pa. Super. 213, 221, 421 A.2d
688, 692 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 497 Pa. 460, 442 A.2d 213 (1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1134 (1982).
I take the position that Gertz should be held applicable to all suits, media and
nonmedia. See infra text accompanying notes 425-28.
141 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
149 Id. at 505, 228 N.W.2d at 747.
250 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977).
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reputation results therefrom,"15 continue to be the law of Oregon, de-
spite Gertz.1 52 Justice Holman's opinion in Markley held that Gertz is
totally inapplicable to cases not involving media defendants. 5 Justice
Holman drew on Melville Nimmer's argument that the institutional
press is entitled to special protection deriving largely from the separate
free-press clause in the first amendment."" Justice Holman then re-
sponded to the argument that because the news media has been granted
special protection under Gertz, fairness and symmetry require that
nonmedia defendants be placed in no less favorable a position:
Because a private individual's right to recover for libel has
been made more difficult in situations in which his interests
have been at least partially out-weighed by important consti-
tutional values, it does not follow, for obvious reasons, that
his recovery should be made more difficult in situations in
which no such constitutional values are involved merely for
the sake of securing symmetry of treatment of defendants. It
is our conclusion that Gertz does not require application of
the constitutional privilege to actions of defamation between
private parties insofar as the issues raised here are
concerned.1"5
In addition to such explicit holdings retaining common law rules,
there are indications that in the case of nonmedia defendants, many
common law courts implicitly retain strict liability, but have not had to
face the issue directly because common law privileges apply in most of
the cases that come before them. This implicit retention of strict liabil-
ity is made apparent, however, if one examines the standard of fault
many courts apply when those privileges are employed.
Many courts continue to follow the principle that common law
privileges are lost if the defendant acts negligently in communicating
libelous speech.15 If, however, Gertz outlaws liability without fault for
'5' 279 Or. at 364, 568 P.2d at 1361-62 (quoting Hinkle v. Alexander, 244 Or.
267, 272, 411 P.2d 829, 830 (1966) (quoting 3 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §
569, ch. 24 (1938)); see also Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1979)
(reaffirming Markley).
152 279 Or. at 369-71, 568 P.2d at 1365.
153 Id. at 371-72, 568 P.2d at 1365-66.
154 Id. at 369, 568 P.2d at 1364 (citing Nimmer, supra note 143, at 656).
155 279 Or. at 370, 568 P.2d at 1365.
156 This loss of the common law privilege is sometimes limited to the issue of the
scope of the people to whom the speech is published. See, e.g., Dillard Dep't Stores,
Inc. v. Felton, 276 Ark. 304, 634 S.W.2d 135, 138 (1982) (quoting Arkansas Associ-
ated Tel. Co. v. Blankenship, 211 Ark. 645, 651, 201 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1947)).
Loss of privilege has, however, also resulted from negligence in ascertaining the
truth or falsity of the information. See, e.g., Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41
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defamation in all cases (media and nonmedia), common law conditional
privileges are meaningless unless conduct more egregious than negli-
gence is required before the privilege is lost.157 Prior to New York
Times and Gertz, when strict liability remained the operative law, a
privilege that shielded a defendant from liability unless the defendant
was negligent made sense, because requiring proof of negligence added
a burden to the plaintiff's case. If, however, negligence is required as a
matter of course in plaintiff's case for defamation, a privilege that can
be overcome by negligence is no privilege at all.
158
The fact that some courts continue to use the negligence standard
to rebut common law privileges in nonmedia cases implies that they are
rejecting the negligence standard for liability in those cases. They
clearly do not intend the common law privileges that they are explicitly
applying to be meaningless. The negligence standard for abuse of privi-
lege is thus evidence of an unconscious clinging by judges to strict lia-
bility thinking.159
(ii) State Law Choice of Liability Standards After Gertz
A second telling indicator of the prevailing judicial mood lies in
the responses of the various states to the option that Gertz left open to
them. Although the Supreme Court in'Gertz stated that it did not be-
lieve it wise for the Court itself to proceed on a case-by-case basis in
attempting to balance the constitutional claims of the press against indi-
vidual claims for compensation, the Court invited state courts to pro-
ceed to evolve for themselves the proper standard of liability in suits
brought by private plaintiffs.'60 Thus the Court stated that as long as
Ill. 2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217 (1968); Spencer v. Community Hosp., 87 Ill. App. 3d 214,
408 N.E.2d 981 (1980); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810
(1976).
'17 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, ch. 25 special note on conditional privi-
leges and the constitutional requirement of fault.
158 See PaossER & WADE, supra note 115, at 1077. Alert to this problem, some
courts have adopted the actual-malice standard for common law privileges. See, e.g.,
British Am. & Eastern Co. v. Wirth Ltd., 592 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1979); Luster v. Retail
Credit Co., 575 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Skagg-Albertson's Properties, Inc.,
563 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1977).
159 It is, of course, also likely that because the law of defamation today is so com-
plicated, many courts have simply not realized that their use of negligence to defeat
common law privileges is either a redundancy under Gertz or an application of strict
liability. As I argue in part III of this Article, the most sensible approach to this conun-
drum is to elevate common law privileges to the actual-malice standard of New York
Times, thus synchronizing them with constitutional privileges. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 373-83. At this point it is enough to recognize that this inconsistency is
substantial evidence of the inertia that strict liability values have retained two decades
after New York Times.
180 418 U.S. at 347.
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the states do not attempt to dip below the negligence standard, "[s]tates
should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal rem-
edy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private
individual."1 1
Most states that have considered the issue have chosen the "low
option" allowed by Gertz, refusing to extend the actual-malice standard
to actions brought by "private figure" plaintiffs.1 62 Only a handful of
161 Id. at 345-46.
162 In the following cases, courts in 18 states and the District of Columbia ex-
pressly adopted the Gertz standard of negligence when a private figure sues a media
defendant: Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977);
Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423
So. 2d 376 (Fla. App. 1982); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522,
543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76
(1975); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky.
1981); Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied specif-
ically approving decision, 320 So. 2d 203 (La. 1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276
Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass.
849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978);
Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334
N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television,
Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12, 292 S.E.2d
23, cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3304 (Oct. 18, 1982); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nich-
ols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d
809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d
968 (Utah 1981); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81
(1976); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982).
In the following cases, courts in eight additional states have assumed without dis-
cussion that Gertz represents the law of the state, and have, accordingly, applied the
Gertz standard of negligence in defamation actions: Browning v. Birmingham News,
348 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 1977); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356
A.2d 472 (1975); Savannah News-Press Div. v. Whetsell, 149 Ga. App. 233, 254
S.E.2d 151 (1979); Williams v. Trust Co. of Ga., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45
(1976); Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891
(1977); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1979); DeCarvalho v. da Silva,
414 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1980); Colombo v. Times-Argus Ass'n, Inc., 135 Vt. 454, 380 A.2d
80 (1977); Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976).
Moreover, in the following cases, federal courts have interpreted state law in three
additional states as having adopted Gertz: Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626
F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981) (applying Mississippi
law); Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Va. 1979) (applying
Virginia law); Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa
1978) (applying Pennsylvania law).
In the following cases, several other state courts appear to have adopted the Rosen-
bloom standard, although the status of the law in some of these states is ambiguous due
to ostensibly conflicting decisions: Rollenhagen v. City of Orange, 116 Cal. App. 3d
414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981) (4th District), but cf., Widener v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 75 Cal. App. 3d 415, 142 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977) (1st District) (court assumes
Gertz is the applicable law, but uses the New York Times standard because the plaintiff
so stipulated), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978); Diversified Management v. Denver
Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982); Colson v. Stieg, 89 Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246
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states have opted for the high option by requiring more than negligence
to sustain an action brought by a private figure.168 The near unanimity
of the states in rejecting the application of the New York Times stan-
dard when given a chance to do so reveals the tort system's essential
antipathy for heightened barriers to recovery for defamation. This post-
Gertz response arguably indicates that the common law is still basically
disposed toward facilitating recovery for libel and slander.'"
3. The Influence of Public Perception and
Social Sentiment on the Law
Because we have become unaccustomed to thinking of defamation
(1982) (This nonmedia case does not expressly adopt Rosenbloom, but its language and
holding appear to implicitly follow Rosenbloom. Colson is discussed in detail infra
notes 343-70 and accompanying text); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266
N.W.2d 693 (1978).
In the following case, a federal court interpreted state law as having adopted Ro-
senbloom: Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12 (D. Alaska 1979) (applying Alaska law).
New York follows an approach all its own, opting for a test between Gertz and Rosen-
bloom. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d
569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975) (private individuals must prove gross negligence in mat-
ters of public concern).
The Restatement has adopted the lower Gertz negligence standard:
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a
private person, or concerning a public official or public figure in relation
to a purely private matter not affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his
public capacity, is subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 580B (1977).
16 See Rollenhagen v. City of Orange, 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49
(1981); Diversified Management v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982)
(extended protection already granted to defendants by adopting the definition of "reck-
less disregard" established in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)); Walker v.
Colorado Spring Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162
Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner v.
Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978); Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1975); Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132 (1976).
16 The choices of the states in response to the decisions that Gertz left to them are
analogous to the response of states to the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), which had struck down the death penalty laws of 40 states, see id. at
437 (Powell, J., dissenting). At least 35 states had responded by enacting new death
penalty statutes, when the court reconsidered the constitutionality of the death penalty
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Gregg decision, permitting the death
penalty under certain circumstances, was obviously influenced by the state legislative
response. See id. at 179 ("The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the
death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman.").
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as a basic component of tort law, suggestions that defamation may be
largely influenced by strict liability values may not be accepted. Why
should strict liability values be thought of as retaining an influence on
defamation? Is it likely that judges and juries regard the injury of a
libelous article as seriously as the bodily injury caused by a defectively
designed appliance? Is it likely that the tort system would be prone to
treating the output of a television news broadcast as the equivalent of
the physical product that comes off of the assembly line? Theorizing
about the continued influence of strict liability may be nothing more
than academic speculation over the inertia of the common law, without
something more to give those tracings of strict liability credence. Even
well-entrenched common law rules can be made to give way if the re-
forms that displace them capture a widely shared social sentiment. I
hypothesize that, when combined with the seriousness with which
Americans view the inner self, the lingering influences of strict liability
rules are quite likely to be real. If there is an increasing public percep-
tion that the information that is spewn forth by modem media outlets is
a form of "product," essentially indistinguishable from soap or hair-
spray, to which tort liability should attach whenever it is "defective"
and causes injury, the influence of strict liability makes perfect sense.
C. The Blurring of the Entertaining and Informing Functions in
Contemporary Mass Communications
A third phenomenon that has contributed to the libel explosion is
a trend toward a general blurring of the line between the informing
and the entertaining functions of media broadcasts and publications.
News is increasingly packaged as if it were entertainment and en-
tertainment as if it were news.' This blurring of the distinction be-
ie5 This packaging has been particularly evident in television reporting. See F.
FEDLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MASS MEDIA 283 (1978) (noting trend toward
"happy news" in TV news broadcasting); A. WESTIN, NEWSWATCH 208 (1982)
("'What sells is good' is operative at too many [TV news] stations."); F. WHITNEY,
MASS MEDIA AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN SOCIETY 257 (1975) ("Television is an
entertainment medium and it cannot seem to escape from this notion even in its per-
formance of the information function in news coverage or documentaries."); Powers,
Eyewitless News, in AMERICAN MASS MEDIA: INDUSTRIES AND ISSUES 400 (R. Atwan,
B. Orton & W. Vesterman eds. 1978) (expressing opinion that if Edward R. Murrow
were alive to observe a modern TV news broadcast, "'What the hell,' Murrow might
understandably have asked, 'has all this got to do with news?' "); Seib, Walters: New-
sperson or TV-Age Communicator, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 1976, at A13, col. I ("The
line between the news business and show business has been erased forever .... It
disappeared with the announcement that Barbara Walters will get a million dollars a
year to help preside over the ABC television network's evening news show."). The
trend has not, however, been absent from the print media. See Hewitt, The 61st Min-
ute, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1983, at 8 ("[Llet me remind [those who insist on labeling
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tween news and entertainment has affected the media's method of re-
porting as well as the content of the information reported by the media.
Each effect has tended to encourage an increase in libel litigation.
1. The Methods of Reporting Information
One important aspect of the contemporary media has been its con-
cern with the way that the news is reported, particularly for television
broadcast. Influenced by public opinion polls indicating that viewers
want a more relaxed presentation of the news,166 corporate managers
have invested in new faces for news broadcasts and have often en-
couraged a "happy talk" format for reporting the news . 67 This pack-
aging, which is actually an attempt to provide more entertainment
within a news format, is directed toward gaining higher ratings and the
higher earnings those ratings represent.'6 " This commercial attitude to-
TV news 'showbiz'] that [TV] didn't invent gossip columns, advice to the lovelorn,
horoscopes, banner headlines, Maggie and Jigs, Barney Google, crossword puzzles, the
quote of the day, and Wingo, a bingo-style numbers game. Newspapers did.").
166 See F. FEDLER, supra note 165, at 284. Fedler comments that:
Consulting firms, often called 'news doctors,' are largely responsible for
the phenomenon known as 'happy news.' Hired to help stations improve
their ratings, the firms advocate the use of lively musical themes, attractive
sets, and more banter among newscasters. They also recommend the use of
more short news stories, and lots of them. . . . Many [consultants] deem-
phasize the coverage of routine government affairs. At some stations, en-
tire staffs have been replaced by persons considered more suitable for the
new format.
See generally R. PowERs, THE NEWScASTERS (1977).
167 See Brown, ABC Seeks Changes to Lift News Ratings, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1976, at 83, col. 2 ("the mandate from corporate management [to improve ratings] is
expected to lead to changes in the ABC newscast, one of which is bound to be the
teaming of Mr. Reasoner with a partner, probably a woman. . . ."); see also A. WES-
TIN, supra note 165, at 209 ("In its worst manifestations, 'happy talk' in the seventies
meant that news writers were spending more time planning snappy repartee and joke
lines than journalistic content."). But cf. id. at 228 ("There are some positive signs.
The pendulum of 'happy talk new' has swung back. There is still excess but a balance
is achieved at many stations.").
16 According to the New York Times:
A [TV] station that climbs from third place to first place in the local
news competition, gaining six or seven rating points in the process, will
improve its profits by millions of dollars. Some leading television stations
derive more than half their total income from the local newscasts in the
early and late evening, which in most situations represent less than two
hours of the entire broadcasting day.
Brown, Livelier and Longer TV News Spurs Hunt for Talent, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22,
1974, at 71, col. 1; see also A. WESTIN, supra note 165, at 207 ("It was the search for
higher ratings and more revenue rather than desire for 'image' that led most stations to
the discovery that news programs run in [local] 'station time' could provide advertising
revenues."); Powers, supra note 165, at 406 ("Television stations often reap enormous
profits from the communities they are licensed to serve. Annual pretax profits of be-
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ward the communication of information is likely to reinforce the view
that the media is yet another industry with a product to sell, an indus-
try which ought to be held strictly liable for any damages caused by its
product.1 6 9
Investigative reporting undertaken by media stars has been an-
other packaging strategy designed to win viewers and readers. This fo-
cus on the reporters themselves and their investigative tactics has been
profitable for the media. For example, 60 Minutes reportedly makes a
profit contribution of over $60 million a year to the CBS network. 70 In
one CBS season the show's revenues are reported to have spelled the
difference between an overall profit and loss for the network." The
news packaging has also generated a new group of celebrities. As critic
John Weisman has noted, the roles of Harry Reasoner, Morely Safer,
Ed Bradley, and Mike Wallace "are no less well defined, no less honed
and crafted, than Hill Street's Capt. Frank Furrillo, Dallas' J.R., or
M*A*S*H's Hawkeye Pierce. 1 7' 2 This high-profile, intentionally con-
troversial reporting, however, has generated a large amount of libel liti-
gation. In particular, CBS's 60 Minutes and ABC's 20/20 are sued
with an alarming regularity.
1 73
tween $2 million and $10 million ... are not uncommon. Average rates of return on
sales are consistently between 30 and 50 percent-robust figures indeed in the Ameri-
can industrial community."); cf Seib, supra note 165, at A13 ("[When ABC hired
Barbara Walters it] went for the quick [ratings] fix: it got itself a star.").
19 Cf Powers, supra note 165, at 406-07 ("Until local television news ceases to
exploit the entertainment bias that is conditioned by its host medium, and shares some
of [its] profit with its 'market' in the form of comprehensive, compact newscasts, it is
engaging in a pollution of the worst sort: a pollution of ideas.").
170 Weisman, supra note 136, at 5.
21 Id. at 6.
172 Id. at 5. The development of news media stars is more understandable when
one realizes that opinion polls indicate that television viewers choose news programs on
the basis of the newscaster's "personal charisma" rather than the "news content." N.Y.
Times, Apr. 28, 1981, at C10, col. 3.
178 60 Minutes has reportedly been sued over 150 times. Weisman, supra note
136, at 5.
In the last three years alone, ABC has become embroiled in at least five separate
lawsuits brought by alleged victims of Geraldo Rivera's reports on 20120. On Febru-
ary 7, 1980, the program included a segment.entitled "Arson and Profit" concerning an
alleged arson-for-profit conspiracy in Chicago. A Chicago building manager accused in
the program of deliberately setting fires to defraud insurance companies, brought a libel
and invasion of privacy action against ABC. ABC's motion to dismiss was denied in
Cantrell v. ABC, 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The court ruled that the plaintiff
was a private figure, and that the broadcast was not susceptible of an innocent con-
struction under Illinois law and was libelous per se.
In Cleveland, a plaintiff filed a multimillion dollar lawsuit over Rivera's "Injustice
for All" segment of the April 17, 1980, 20/20 telecast, claiming that the program had
depicted her as a prostitute who had sexual relations with a judge in exchange for a
lighter prison sentence. The jury rejected the plaintiff's claims, ruling in favor of ABC
and Rivera on May 10, 1982. See N.Y. Times, May 11, 1982, at A13, col. 2. Still
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The new methods of reporting information, therefore, have made
the media less sympathetic as defendants" 4 while at the same time the
methods have increased the likelihood of libel litigation.
2. The Substance of Reported Information
Modern reporting is also notable for the subjects it pursues. The
distinction between entertainment and news may no longer be mean-
ingful when applied to much of contemporary mass communication.
Broadcast 17 5 and print 176 media have expanded their coverage well be-
yond political events and now widely report private information that in
the past would not likely have been published so prominently to such a
wide audience. 17 7 Also, the intentional mixing of fact and fiction has
become an increasingly important method of modern communication.
For example, Norman Mailer won the 1979 Pulitzer Prize for fiction
for a novel that painstakingly documents the events surrounding the
pending, however, are two other libel actions based on the same program, which ex-
amined public corruption in Akron and Summit County, Ohio. News Notes, MEDIA L.
REP., May 18, 1982.
In Virginia, Howard Safir, the head of the Justice Department's witness-protec-
tion program, is suing ABC and Rivera over a 20/20 broadcast containing various
allegations about the witness-protection program. ABC has responded with a counter-
suit, alleging that Safir was involved in bugging confidential conversations of ABC re-
porters. Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1983, at 31, col. 3. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corporation has filed a $40 million libel suit against ABC and Rivera over a 20/20
broadcast which accused Kaiser of knowingly selling dangerous household-electrical
wiring and withholding information about the product. Chi. Tribune, Apr. 27, 1981, §
III, at 6, col. 2.
In another case involving ABC, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that summary judg-
ment was improperly granted to ABC in a defamation action against the network for
an April 22, 1977 documentary entitled "Sex for Sale: The Urban Battleground."
Clark v. ABC, 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1433 (1983).
The plaintiff in Clark, who in fact was never a prostitute, brought a libel and invasion
of privacy action claiming that the broadcast had depicted her as a "common prosti-
tute" by photographing her walking down the street. See generally Chi. Tribune, Mar.
22, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
174 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
I sincerely believe that most print and broadcast journalists regard their profession
even more seriously than many reporters of the past. I also believe that pressures from
within their corporate confines tend to adulterate that seriousness of purpose, confusing
entertainment and news.
175 Consider, for example, the following television shows: Real People, That's In-
credible, Entertainment Tonight, as well as 60 Minutes and 20/20.
178 Consider, for example, People and Us magazines, as well as the National En-
quirer, the Star, and the Globe newspapers.
177 Yellow journalism and tabloids are certainly not uniquely modern phenomena,
see F. ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE NINETEEN-TwEN-
TIES 186-225 (1931), but modern television coverage of this type of material is a new
phenomenon that allows for very wide circulation in a very prominent format.
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execution of Gary Gilmore.17 8 Mailer's account was then recycled as a
"docudrama" on prime time television. Because these developments test
the proper limits for invoking first amendment protection, they raise
doubts about the usefulness of some of the standards currently applied
in defamation cases.
1 79
The media's increased reporting of matters that are entertaining or
diverting to the public, but that have little relevance to keeping all citi-
zens well informed on matters of political concern,"1 0 raises two impor-
tant problems for current defamation law. First, the distinction drawn
in Gertz between public and private figures may be misplaced when
applied to a claim that a report of this new type is libelous. Although
Gertz rejected the Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.""1 "general or pub-
lic interest" test in part because that test would require courts "to de-
termine . . . 'what information is relevant to self-government,' "182 the
public-figure test reaffirmed in Gertz is based on a traditional market-
place of ideas, public-controversy model of the first amendment.1 8 3 The
language used by the Court in articulating the test calls for the exis-
tence of "public controversies," 1 4 "public questions, 18 5 or a "public
issue,"1 ' with the person acting "to influence the resolution of the is-
sues involved,"18 or "to influence [the] outcome [of the public is-
178 N. MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1979); see N.Y. Times, Apr. 15,
1980, at 1, col. 3.
179 For a discussion of the standards for defamation cases established under Su-
preme Court first amendment jurisprudence, see supra notes 48-66 and accompanying
text.
10 A report about a piece of juicy gossip, for example, may not be the type of
speech we "would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve." Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). See also New York Times, 376 U.S.
at 301-02 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg noted that:
Purely private defamation has little to do with the political ends of a self-
governing society. The imposition of liability for private defamation does
not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected
by the First Amendment. This, of course, cannot be said "where public
officials are concerned or where public matters are involved . . . . [O]ne
main function of the First Amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for
the people to determine and resolve public issues. Where public matters
are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor of freedom of expres-
sion rather than against it."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting W.O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 41
(1958)).
181 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
182 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
18 For a standard articulation of that model see supra note 180.
1 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
185 Id. at 351.
186 Id. at 352.
187 Id. at 345.
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sue]." ' 8 Except that Gertz provides general public-figure status for any
person of widespread notoriety,"8 9 this public-figure test is entirely un-
responsive to news reports that are more entertaining or diverting in
subject matter.190
The new areas of reporting also pose difficulties for courts that
must assess the publication according to a negligence standard.191 As I
will argue later, analysis of the utility of a publication or broadcast is
crucial when applying the negligence standard to an allegedly defama-
tory statement.1 92 Gossip, however, is likely to cause confusion and dif-
ficulty for a court that must assess its value. There are certainly as
many Americans who find the vivid low brow discourse of the tabloid
more relevant and interesting than the endless dissections of the Presi-
dent's budget message in the mainstream press. To many, the romantic
life of Elizabeth Taylor or Michael Landon either reveals more of the
human condition or provides more of a relief from the mundane rou-
tines of daly life than the statistical machinations of David Stock-
man. 9 There is nothing in the text of the first amendment to indicate
that it is aimed at protecting only elitist speech preferences.
The Supreme Court has, of course, indicated that even the com-
munication of pure entertainment is protected by the first amend-
ment.1 94 The problem is not whether to protect entertainment speech,
188 Id. at 352.
is, This general public figure status would likely be applicable to virtually all
celebrities. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 482 F. Supp. 406, 407 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (Entertainer Johnny Carson and his wife "admittedly are public figures.").
Io At least one member of the Court has specifically argued that broad scope be
given in determining whether a communication relates to an area of public interest. See
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 42-43 (opinion of Brennan, J.); cf Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("In-
creasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are
blurred. . . . This blending of positions and power has . . . occurred in the case of
individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions . . ").
191 The negligence standard would be most likely to apply if a court concluded
that the plaintiff was a private figure. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
192 See infra text following note 400.
19I As writer Ron Rosenbaum has pointed out, the lurid subjects of the typical
tabloid front page-the exposed love-triangles, psycho-killers, missing coeds, and movie
star gossip-are no more self-evidently absurd than the evening headlines of the Wash-
ington Post or lead story on the CBS Evening News. Rosenbaum, The Fourth Estate:
Link Founding Father to Sleaze King, HARPER'S, Jan. 1983, at 19-21, 24. The only
difference is that the craziness of human life that appears on the pages and broadcasts
of the "respectable" press is conducted in large scale by established published institu-
tions, rather than individuals. Id. at 20.
19 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977)
("entertainment. . . enjoys First Amendment protection [and] . . . itself can be impor-
tant news"); id. at 580 (Powell, J., dissenting) (The TV news broadcast of a human
cannonball in flight "is a routine example of the press' fulfilling the informing function
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but how much protection should be granted that type of speech. Lack-
ing any clearly articulated standard for weighing the value of entertain-
ment against the risk of defamation, judges and juries may be liable to
undervalue entertainment.
The final area in which the blending of news and entertainment
has become important is the use of an artistic form that combines facts
about actual people and events with an array of additional details and
characters created by the author's imagination to communicate infor-
mation. Contemporary culture abounds in novels, motion pictures,
plays, and television programs based on real people and events.19 The
American artistic tradition of drawing directly on real people and
events as the grist for fictional works has served a vital role in revealing
and critiquing American culture. Orson Welles' classic movie "Citizen
Kane" was a thinly concealed portrayal of William Randolph Hearst;
Robert Penn Warren's novel All the King's Men 96 was a fictional
elaboration on the life of Huey Long. From E.L. Doctorow's Rag-
time, 97 to Phillip Roth's Our Gang,19 to Father Andrew Greeley's
The Cardinal Sins,"" popular American fiction deals constantly in va-
rying degrees of disguise with actual people, often revealing more in-
sight into their lives and the society that surrounds them than would be
possible in any nonfictional account.
Despite the importance of this method of communication, current
defamation law is conceptually inadequate when applied to fiction,
largely because it fails to take proper account of the distinction between
the factual (news) and the fantastic (entertainment) elements of the
work. Fiction is actually a second-class informational citizen, receiving
less first amendment and common law protection than equivalent
speech would receive in another medium.
When someone sues the publishers of a fictional work alleging
that a fictional character is in reality a portrayal of the plaintiff, the
normal vocabulary with which a defamation case is handled under the
so vital to our system.").
195 See Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979); Franklin & Trager, Literature and Libel, 4
COMM/ENT 205 (1982); Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths" of Art, and the First
Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1065 (1978); Wilson, The Law of Libel and the Art
of Fiction, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (1981); Comment, Defamation in Fiction:
The Case for Absolute First Amendment Protection, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 571 (1980);
Comment, "Hey, That's Me!"-The Conundrum of Identification in Libel and Fic-
tion, 18 CAL. W. L. REV. 442 (1982); Note, Fiction Based on Fact: Writers' Liability
for Libel on Invasion of Privacy, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 1029 (1981).
2" R.P. WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN (1946).
21, E.L. DOCTOROW, RAGTIME (1975).
ls P. RoTH, OUR GANG (STARRING TRICKY AND HIS FRIENDS.) (1971).
101 A. GREELEY, THE CARDINAL SINS (1981).
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common law and the first amendment breaks down. In a defamation
case not involving fiction the plaintiff must prove that the speech in-
volved was "of and concerning" her, that it was defamatory, that it was
false, that the speaker negligently failed to realize the speech was false
(if the plaintiff is a private figure), or recklessly or intentionally disre-
garded the speech's truth or falsity (if the plaintiff was a public fig-
ure).20 0 Expressions of opinion, as distinguished from misstatements of
fact, are not actionable at all.20 1
When these rules are applied to fiction they work very poorly,
tending inappropriately to work inexorably toward a plaintiff's victory.
The failure in translation can be illustrated by imagining two defama-
tion actions brought by the late John Cardinal Cody, the former Cath-
olic Archbishop of Chicago. (This is a safe hypothetical comparison, for
there is no libel against the dead.)20 2 Father Andrew Greeley has writ-
ten two books out of which libel suits by John Cardinal Cody might
have originated. In a nonfiction work, Greeley in- his The Making of
the Popes, 1978 203 portrayed Cody in a highly unflattering light. The
negative portrayal of Cody consists primarily of Greeley's reports about
Cody's competence and character as a church official, including charges
that three Popes tried to have Cody dismissed from his post.2 Later,
in a work of fiction, The Cardinal Sins, Greeley wrote about a Cardi-
nal who had several striking similarities to John Cody.2" 5 In The Car-
200 The basic elements of the defamation cause of action are set forth in RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 115, § 558 (1977).
2011 A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an
opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of
undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. Id. at § 566; see also Christie,
Defamatory Opinions and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 75 MICH. L. REv.
1621 (1977). For cases discussing the constitutional overtones to the common law rule
that "pure" opinion is not actionable, see, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co.,
639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court,
22 Cal. 3d 672, 586 P.2d 572, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961
(1979); Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977); National Ass'n of Gov't Em-
ployees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 396 N.E.2d 996 (1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 7 Mass. App. 676,
389 N.E.2d 779 (1979); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369,
366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
202 RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 560 ("One who publishes defamatory mat-
ter concerning a deceased person is not liable either to the estate of the person or to his
descendants or relatives.").
203 A. GREELEY, THE MAKING OF THE POPES, 1978 (1979).
204 Id. at 31, 89-92, 172, 238-39.
203 A. GREELEY, supra note 199. Greeley, a catholic priest who is a sociologist,
syndicated columnist, and prolific writer, had been a harsh critic of Cody throughout
Cody's tenure as archbishop of Chicago. In his book The Making of the Popes, 1978,
Greeley claimed, among other things about Cody, that Cody had been asked to resign
by three popes. A. GREELEY, supra note 203, at 31, 172, 238-39. Cody called the
charge "a dirty lie." Greeley's fictional work, The Cardinal Sins, had many transpar-
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dinal Sins the fictitious Cardinal engages in a variety of illicit sexual
escapades, and is flawed by a consuming quest for power.2 "
In Cody's hypothetical suit based on The Making of the Popes the
odds are extremely high that Greeley would prevail. First, with regard
to factual statements made by Greeley about Cody's administrative ac-
tions, Cody might well have a difficult time proving factual inaccuracy.
Second, even if Cody could prove that defamatory falsehoods were con-
tained in the book, Cody would be classified as a public figure for the
purposes of a book written about church affairs, and would thus be
forced to meet the New York Times standard of knowing or reckless
disregard for the truth. The overwhelming likelihood is that he could at
best prove negligence on Greeley's part; it would be almost impossible
to demonstrate that Greeley knowingly or recklessly printed false-
hood.207 Finally, Cody would have run up against the distinction be-
ent similarities to the Cody situation. In a story in the Chicago Lawyer, Rob Warden
wrote that The Cardinal Sins "seems to be something more than prophetic. In fact, it
virtually is a blueprint for the [Chicago] Sun-Times disclosures that began on [Septem-
ber] 10 about Cody's relationship with Helen Dolan Wilson, his step-cousin." Warden,
The Plot to Get Cody, Chi. Law., Oct. 1981, at 5, col. 2. In addition to pointing out the
similarities between Cody's real world problems and the fictional revelations in The
Cardinal Sins, Warden's article went so far as to accuse Greeley of plotting to "oust"
Cody. Id. at 4, col. 3.
The controversy surrounding Cody's finances was the subject of a series of copy-
righted stories in the Chicago Sun-Times revealing that a federal grand jury in Chicago
was investigating the Cardinal to determine if he illegally diverted as much as $1 mil-
lion in tax-exempt church funds to enrich a lifelong friend, Helen Dolan Wilson of St.
Louis. The allegations included charges that the Cardinal provided money for a
$100,000 luxury vacation home in Florida; that the Cardinal inaccurately identified
Wilson as his cousin, when she in fact was a cousin by marriage with no conunon
bloodline with Cody; that Wilson was paid a secret church salary in the Chicago
archidiocese from 1969 to 1975, and that Wilson was the beneficiary of a $100,000
insurance policy on Cody's life. Chi. Sun-Times, Sept. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 1; see also
Salerno, This and Heaven Too, HARPER'S, June 1982, at 54, 56; see also N.Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 1981, at 16, col. 1.
"I See, e.g., A. GREELEY, supra note 199, at 129, 170, 177, 251, 253, 261-62,
299.
2 7 The New York Times standard is not satisfied merely by failing to investigate
allegations sufficiently, or by failing to verify information given by one source. St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356,
357 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964). A plaintiff must prove that
the defendant published the information despite the fact that the defendant subjectively
"in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. at 731 (emphasis in original); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 160 (1979) ("essential to proving liability that the plaintiff focus on the con-
duct and state of mind of the defendant"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
335 n.6 (1974) ("subjective awareness of probable falsity").
"[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing." St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U.S. at 731. Because Greeley could surely point to a substantial number of
sources to support his charges, a jury would probably find for Greeley (assuming no
overriding bias in favor of the Cardinal), and if it did not, Greeley would still be likely
[Vol. 132:1
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tween fact and opinion as an interdiction against recovery for many of
the worst things said about him in The Making of the Popes. To the
extent that Greeley was editorializing about Cody's competence, his
statements were opinion and not fact, and therefore beyond the pale of
a libel action. 08
If Cody, instead, were to bring a libel suit against Greeley for The
Cardinal Sins, it is ironic that his chances of victory could be substan-
tially higher, even though the novel is ostensibly not about Cody at all.
The only significant battle in this litigation would be over the identity
issue: Cody would have the burden of convincing the trier of fact that
the novel was actually "of and concerning" him, 09 an element of the
cause of action that the law of defamation, in its love for an obscure
terminology all its own, labels "colloqium."210 Every reader need not
believe that the fictitious character was actually the real Cardinal; it is
enough that the jury finds that the "reasonable reader" would so un-
derstand the novel.2" In deciding this issue the jury normally considers
the number of similarities between the character and the plaintiff; the
presence or absence of a disclaimer; the testimony of the author, of
readers, of the plaintiff, of those who know the plaintiff, and perhaps of
literary "experts," and circumstantial evidence, such as evidence show-
ing some special connection between the author and plaintiff.212 In the
case of The Cardinal Sins, Greeley's novel would probably be found to
be "of and concerning" Cody. 
13
The conceptual inadequacy of the current law dealing with defa-
mation is revealed in what would happen next. Unlike The Making of
the Popes, which enjoyed both the protection of the actual-malice stan-
dard and the dichotomy between fact and opinion, The Cardinal Sins
would find both defenses essentially useless. Those aspects of the novel
most damaging to Cody-the events depicting ruthless grabs for power,
and the illicit sexual affairs-would be, as admitted products of Gree-
ley's imagination, "knowingly false" by definition.21 4 A fictional work,
to prevail on appeal.
208 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
209 See Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966).
210 See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 111, at 749.
"" The recipient of the defamatory communication must "correctly, or mistakenly
but reasonably" understand that it was intended to refer to the plaintiff. RESTATE-
MENr, supra note 115, at § 564. It is not necessary that everyone recognize the plain-
tiff; it is enough that those recipients who do recognize the plaintiff be reasonable in
their understanding. The fact that only a few people purport to recognize the plaintiff,
however, is a factor in determining the reasonableness of their belief. Id. at § 564
comment f.
212 See Franklin & Trager, supra note 195, at 208-12.
211 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
214 See Wilson, supra note 195, at 36.
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in which characters determined to be based on real people do things
imagined by the writer, is a work for which the writer has automati-
cally confessed guilt under New York Times. 15
The Cardinal Sins, unlike The Making of the Popes, would not
receive the benefit of the rule that opinion is not actionable. The princi-
ple that there is no such thing as a false idea2 16 would not protect the
novel, for the defamatory elements of the book would be treated as mis-
statements of fact, rather than opinions or ideas. 17 Thus, although The
Making of the Popes would be immune from liability for statements
accusing the Cardinal of being power hungry and ambitious because
such statements would be construed as opinion, imagined descriptions
of the same behavior in The Cardinal Sins would be treated as actiona-
ble factual falsehood.
The plausibility of this troublesome hypothetical is supported by
the result of a recent California decision, Bindrim v. Mitchell.218 Dr.
Paul Bindrim, who led "nude marathon" group therapy sessions,
brought a defamation action against Gwen Davis Mitchell, over a novel
entitled Touching. Mitchell attended a Bindrim therapy session and
two months later received a $150,000 advance from Doubleday to write
Touching, a book depicting nude encounter sessions run by a fictitious
Dr. Simon Herford. Bindrim claimed that the fictitious character was
really him, and that the portrayal, which painted him as abusive and
insensitive to patients, was libelous. Although the real Bindrim was
clean shaven with short hair, the physical description of Herford was
that of "a fat Santa Claus type with long white hair, white sideburns, a
cherubic rosy face, and rosy forearms. '219 The only evidence that
linked the fictitious character with the real plaintiff were several tape
recordings of actual sessions for comparison with the novel and testi-
mony by three witnesses that the nude encounter sessions depicted in
the book closely resembled the actual nude encounter sessions conducted
by Bindrim.12 0 The court found that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the identification requirements,221 and applied the New York
Times standard mechanically to find liability against the author and
I" See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (There is no first amendment value to false state-
ments of fact.).
"' See id. at 339 ("Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea.").
217 See, e.g., Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
218 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
219 Id. at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
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publisher, because the negative depiction of Bindrim's personality was
made with "knowledge" of falsity.
222
The shortcomings of this approach are plain. The novel Touching
was more than anything else an indictment of one peculiar form of
fadish Californian therapy. The outcome-dispositive nexus between the
real character and the fictitious character-the nude marathon encoun-
ter therapy itself-was true. The elaborations on the true fact that such
therapy exists communicated the opinion that such therapy is either
frivolous or affirmatively harmful. That the writer chose to express that
critique through the vehicle of fiction should not diminish the legal pro-
tection to which the speech is entitled. As the dissenting judge noted:
"Those practices which are similar to plaintiff's technique are classified
as identifying. . .[while] those which are unlike plaintiff's are classi-
fied libelous because they are false."22 Current libel law analysis of
fiction fails because it focuses too narrowly on the identity of fictional
characters. It should look more broadly to the fictional work's effect
upon the audience in relation to the plaintiff and to the author's con-
duct in relation to that effect.
224
3. Conclusion
Moved largely by the modern media's desire to earn greater profits,
the methods of informing have increasingly come to resemble the meth-
ods of entertaining. In addition the information reported by the modern
media has begun to appear less like news and more like entertainment
(or in the case of much fiction, the appearance is more like news and
less like entertainment). This blurring of the line between the media's
entertaining and informing functions has likely made juries more will-
ing to decide cases against the media and has led to doctrinal confusion
for both the constitutional and common law strands of libel law.
D. The Constitutionalization of Defamation Law
The final element that has contributed to the reinvigoration of the
American law of libel is the failure of courts to synchronize common
law defamation doctrines with the constitutional principles that have
been superimposed upon them. Because the common law of defamation
in its sometimes elegant and sometimes baffling intricacy has never
fully adjusted to the imposition of constitutional rules upon it, there has
222 Id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
221 Id. at 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (Fites, J., dissenting).
12' Later, I will suggest a more coherent standard for evaluating whether fiction is
libelous. See infra notes 411-23 and accompanying text.
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been a proliferation of standards and terms that frequently fails to pro-
mote either common law or constitutional values. Any given jurisdiction
is faced with the task of stating its one "law of defamation," a combina-
tion of state and federal doctrine that allows rules of decision to be
applied to a variety of cases in a coherent manner. As long as the two
sources of doctrine remain unsynchronized, however, both reputation
and speech are intermittently undervalued or overvalued without rhyme
or reason. There is no widely shared conceptual understanding of how
defamation law is supposed to operate.
1. Overly Confusing Standards
The confusion of defamation standards is perhaps best illustrated
by identifying some of the distinctions that must currently be made
when a defamation action is brought. The plaintiff's public- or private-
figure status has become crucial, 225 and in some states the media or
nonmedia status of the defendant may also be important.226 A defen-
dant may claim a common law privilege22' 7 in addition to its constitu-
tional privilege. The finding whether the two types of privileges are lost
may depend on separate determinations of the existence of "malice."
Malice currently has two totally different definitions: common law mal-
ice (roughly equivalent to ill will) and New York Times actual malice
(reckless or intentional disregard of the truth).
2 28
The complexity inherent in these basic distinctions is indicative of
the effect of imposing new constitutional standards in what had already
been a confusing area of the law. Legal scholarship in the years follow-
ing New York Times has also reflected the confusion resulting from one
old and one new source of defamation law. As Marc Franklin has re-
marked, tort scholars applying traditional tort analysis seem to have
been frightened away by the progeny of New York Times from analyz-
ing the new law of libel.229 Many articles written about defamation
since 1964 have tended to emphasize constitutional theory, either ignor-
ing altogether any serious discussion about the development of common
law doctrines, or treating the development as secondary.230 Franklin
225 See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
228 See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notis 298-320 and accompanying text.
228 See infra notes 374-75 and accompanying text.
229 Franklin, supra note 24, at 457-58.
220 But see Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. And Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Frakt,
Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 RuT.-
CAM. L. REV. 519 (1979); LaRue, Living With Gertz: A Practical Look at Constitu-
tional Libel Standards, 67 Vi. L. REv. 287 (1981); Sowle, Defamation and the First
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suggests that tort theorists who never considered themselves constitu-
tional lawyers were reluctant to venture into unfamiliar first amend-
ment territory.2'3 The same may be true in reverse; to many constitu-
tional academics the arcane complexity of the traditional tort rules
surrounding libel and slander may appear almost comically Byzantine.
Rather than delve into the cluttered labyrinth of checks and balances
that had evolved in the common law to accommodate interests in free
expression with interests in reputation, constitutionalists seem to have
found it easier to sweep the law of defamation clear and apply the
progressive new jurisprudence of New York Times to solve everything.
The result has been complex and conflicting doctrine regarding
which few attempts have been made to develop a coherent and consis-
tent body of law.
2. Insufficient Attention to Common Law Doctrine in the
Formulation of Constitutional Standards
The last two decades of defamation decisions highlight the perils
of displacing the common law. Ever since New York Times, there has
been a tendency to forget that defamation is still preeminently part of
the common law of torts, with an evolution that is bound up as inti-
mately with general trends in tort law as with evolving constitutional
interpretations.
2 32
An important example of this tendency can be seen in the under-
standing of common law conditional privilege. The orthodoxy after the
New York Times decision was that many of the rules formerly applied
to conditional privileges under the common law had been taken over by
the constitutional privilege recognized in New York Times, thus render-
ing the conditional privilege doctrines largely obsolete.23 ' This orthodox
vision, however, grew out of a period in which the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence was characterized by an expansion of first amendment
protection for defamatory utterances at the expense of reputational in-
terests. The perceived obsolescence of common law privileges was thus
the product of a conviction'that the New York Times decision would
inevitably expand privilege concepts beyond what the common law had
ever contemplated. Constitutional privilege was regarded as the
animated and vigorous sphere of defamation law; it would be through
Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 469 (1979); Spencer, Establishment of Fault in Post-Gertz Libel Cases, 21 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 374 (1977).
21 Franklin, supra note 24, at 457-58.
232 See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
"' See W. FnossER, supra note 49,.§§ 115, 118, at 792, 819-33.
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the progressive evolution of an approach to the constitutional privilege
based on the "public interest" in the subject matter of the communica-
tion that free speech values would come to fruition. The highwater
mark for this vision came after Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,2  in
which a plurality of the Supreme Court extended the actual-malice
standard of New York Times "to all discussion and communication in-
volving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether
the persons involved are famous or anonymous. "235
Since Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court has tended to devalue the
role of the first amendment in insulating defamation defendants from
liability. The narrower view of the first amendment's role in modern
society has emerged in the last decade, a view that sees the amend-
ment's primary function as the encouragement of untrammeled debate
about controversies related to self-government..23  The same new solici-
tude for protective self-worth by encouraging recompense for defama-
tion that has captured an emerging social consensus has met with sym-
pathetic ears on the Court, and media claims for special first
amendment protection in suits brought by individuals who are only on
the periphery of mainstream news events have failed.
When the United States Supreme Court was "progressive" in em-
phasizing first amendment values over reputational values, it was true
that the constitutional jurisprudence spawned by New York Times had
a liberalizing effect on state defamation law. But today the Supreme
Court is vigorously opposed to the Rosenbloom-style enhancement of
first amendment principles at the expense of protection of reputation.
23 7
The retreat from Rosenbloom began in Gertz, 2 8 in which the Court
ruled that New York Times protection was required only for "public"
figures and officials, but not for private persons, and has proceeded
through a series of Supreme Court decisions that have drastically con-
stricted the constitutionally based definition of "public figure."
The hopes for a pervasive constitutional privilege that sprang from
New York Times and Rosenbloom ended with Gertz. In an ironic turn
of legal and cultural history, constitutional doctrine now acts as a stulti-
2- 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
233 Id. at 44 (footnote omitted).
238 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)
("even though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total sup-
pression of erotic materials ... it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this
type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in
untrammeled political debate .... ).
s See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
238 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a discussion of Gertz,
see supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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fying force on the natural evolution of the common law of defamation
in most states. As the Supreme Court narrows the scope of its public-
figure doctrine, it threatens to contract the scope of common law privi-
leges below the level to which they would have naturally evolved had
the law of defamation not become constitutionalized.
In addition to substantially undermining any evolution in the pro-
tection offered by common law privileges, the Supreme Court has been
largely insensitive to long-standing and beneficial doctrines of the com-
mon law when mandating the constitutional requirements of state defa-
mation law. The Court's insensitivity is most apparent both in its for-
mulation and subsequent elaboration of the public-figure doctrine and
in its lack of attention to the content of the fault standard.
The failure of first amendment jurisprudence to bring new order
to the law of defamation is in large part the result of the Court's dis-
mally mechanistic implementation of the compromise it established in
Gertz. This compromise was the public-figure doctrine, which offered
enhanced protection for the media when their reports concerned a pub-
lic figure.2"" A public figure was defined in the following way:
For the most part those who attain [public figure] status
have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all pur-
poses. More commonly, those classed as public figures have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public contro-
versies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved. 40
The limited purpose public figure described in the last sentence
theoretically gave the Court flexibility in deciding whether a plaintiff
was a public figure because it "look[ed] to the nature and extent of an
individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the
defamation. 24 1 It is apparent, however, that the flexibility was in-
tended to be limited because the Gertz Court also rejected Rosenbloom's
"ad hoe" approach of granting constitutional protection to communica-
tions that address issues of "'general or public interest.' ")242
Time, Inc. v. Firestone 243 was the first case to demonstrate the
practical rigidity of Gertz's public-figure doctrine. The case involved
"I See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
240 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
241 Id. at 352.
141 Id. at 346.
24S 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
1983] LIBEL
52 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Mary Alice Firestone, who was married to Russell Firestone, the scion
of the wealthy Firestone family. In 1964 the Firestones became em-
broiled in a vigorously contested divorce proceeding in Palm Beach
County, Florida. Mary Alice had filed a complaint seeking separate
maintenance, and Russell had counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of
"cextreme cruelty and adultery." The circuit court granted the divorce,
and included in the final judgment the following language:
"This cause came on for final hearing before the court
upon the plaintiff wife's second amended complaint for sepa-
rate maintenance (alimony unconnected with the causes of
divorce), the defendant husband's answer and counterclaim
for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery, and
the wife's answer thereto setting up certain affirmative de-
fenses . ...
According to certain testimony in behalf of the defen-
dant, extramarital escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and
of an amatory nature which would have made Dr. Freud's
hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would indi-
cate that defendant was guilty of bounding from one
bedpartner to another with the erotic zest of a satyr. The
court is inclined to discount much of this testimony as unreli-
able. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of the
court that neither party is domesticated, within the-meaning
of that term as used by the Supreme Court of Florida. ...
In the present case, it is abundantly clear from the evi-
dence of marital discord that neither of the parties has shown
the least susceptibility to domestication, and that the mar-
riage should be dissolved.
The premises considered, it is thereupon
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. That the equities in this cause are with the defen-
dant; that defendant's counterclaim for divorce be and the
same is hereby granted, and the bonds of matrimony which
have heretof6re existed between the parties are hereby for-
ever dissolved.
4. That the defendant shall pay unto the plaintiff "the
sum of $3,000 per month as alimony beginning January 1,
1968, and a like sum on the first day of each and every
[Vol. 132:1
LIBEL
month thereafter until the death or remarriage of the
plaintiff."244
Time magazine printed the following brief account of the divorce in its
"Milestones" section:
"DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to
the tire fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third
wife; a onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of ex-
treme cruelty and adultery; after six years of marriage, one
son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent
trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures
on both sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair
curl.' "245
Mary Alice Firestone sued Time for defamation and won a jury
verdict for $100,000, which was ultimately affirmed by the Florida Su-
preme Court.2 46 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Time
argued that the actual-malice standard should have applied because the
Firestones' divorce was a "cause celebr6," a characterization of the
Florida Supreme Court,247 and Mary Alice Firestone was a "limited
public figure" with regard to the divorce proceedings. 24' The magazine
further pointed out that Mrs. Firestone subscribed to a press dipping
service to chronicle her media exposure, and held several press confer-
ences during the course of the divorce litigation in order to answer
questions regarding the case.
The Supreme Court held that Firestone was not a public figure
and that Time magazine was not entitled to the protection of the New
York Times standard with regard to her claim. Mary Alice Firestone's
prominence in what Justice Marshall in his dissent depicted as "the
sporting set ' 249 did not qualify her as a person of "'especial promi-
nence in the affairs of society.' "251 Even though Mary Alice Firestone
initiated litigation in a public court of law, the Court held, her action
was hardly a purposeful insertion into a matter of public controversy,
since state law compelled her to resort to legal process in order to ob-
tain lawful release from the bonds of matrimony. The Court also re-
jected the argument that New York Times protection should extend to
244 See id. at 450-51.
245 Id. at 452.
248 Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated and remanded,
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
247 Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972).
248 See 424 U.S. at 454.
249 424 U.S. at 486 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 453 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
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all reports of judicial proceedings. The Court held that even if nar-
rowed to reports of what actually transpires in a courtroom, application
of the New York Times privilege would sweep too broadly, for "the
details of many, if not most, courtroom battles would add almost noth-
ing towards advancing the uninhibited debate on public issues."25 Al-
though the Court conceded that some participants in some litigation
may be legitimate public figures, either generally or for the limited
purpose of press coverage concerning the litigation, the Court indicated
its belief that the majority will resemble poor Mary Alice Firestone,
"drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order to obtain
the only redress available to them or to defend themselves against ac-
tions brought by the State or by others.)
25 2
This narrow and rigid approach toward the public figure doctrine
was reaffirmed in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,253 which in-
volved a book written by John Barron and published by the Reader's
Digest Corporation entitled KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret
Agents. The KGB book listed the plaintiff, Ilya Wolston, as being
among a group of "Soviet agents identified in the United States," and
further stated that those in the list were "Soviet agents who were con-
victed of espionage or falsifying information or perjury and/or con-
tempt charges following espionage indictments, or who fled to the So-
viet bloc to avoid prosecution." 2" Wolston sued, claiming that the
charges were false and defamatory. The trial court, in a decision af-
firmed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, held that
Wolston was a "public figure" and that the actual-malice standard of
New York Times thus applied. 255 The court granted summary judgment
for defendants, finding that although the book was in error in implying
that Wolston had been indicted for espionage, there was nonetheless no
evidence to support a finding of actual malice on the part of the
defendants.258
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ilya Wolston was not a
public figure within the meaning of Gertz and that it was therefore
error to apply the actual-malice standard to Wolston's claim. The Su-
preme Court's analysis in Wolston is strong evidence of just how con-
stricted is the Court's current conception of "public figure." The Court
heavily emphasized the fact that Wolston had been "dragged unwill-
251 Id. at 457.
252 Id.
253 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
254 Id. at 159.
255 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977), affd, 578
F.2d 427 (1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
256 429 F. Supp. at 180.
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ingly" into the controversy surrounding KGB presence in the United
States, rather than having "voluntarily thrust" or "injected" himself
into the forefront of public attention.25 Wolston's connection to the is-
sues depicted in the book arose out of a special federal grand jury in-
vestigation conducted during 1957 and 1958 in New York City to in-
vestigate the activities of Soviet intelligence agents in the United States.
As a result of the grand jury probe, Wolston's aunt and uncle, Myra
and Jack Soble, were arrested in January 1957 and charged with espi-
onage. The Sobles later pleaded guilty to the espionage charges, and in
the ensuing months, the grand jury's investigation focused on other par-
ticipants in a suspected Soviet espionage ring, resulting in further ar-
rests, convictions, and guilty pleas. On the same day that the Sobles
were arrested, the FBI interviewed Wolston at home in Washington,
D.C. Wolson was subsequently interviewed several more times by the
FBI, and traveled to New York on various occasions pursuant to the
special grand jury's subpoenas. On July 1, 1958, however, Wolston
failed to respond to a grand jury subpoena, and a federal district judge
in New York issued an order to Wolston to show cause why he should
not be held in criminal contempt of court. The Supreme Court explic-
itly acknowledged that "[t]hese events immediately attracted the interest
of the news media, and ...at least seven news stories focusing on
petitioner's failure to respond to the grand jury subpoena appeared in
New York and Washington newspapers. ' ' 5s
Wolston ultimately did appear in response to the show cause or-
der. Wolston pleaded guilty to the contempt charge,25 and received a
one-year suspended sentence and three years' probation, conditioned on
his cooperation with the grand jury in any further inquiries regarding
Soviet espionage. In all, Wolston's episode with the grand jury was the
focus of fifteen newspaper articles in New York and Washington. The
Supreme Court itself described this as a "flurry of publicity," but then
noted that the publicity subsided after Wolston's sentencing, and that
Wolston thereafter "succeeded for the most part" in returning to "the
private life he had led prior to issuance of the grand jury subpoena."'2 60
The Court's qualifying phrase, "for the most part," was a bit of an
understatement, however: Wolston was subsequently mentioned in two
publications other than Barron's book on the KGB. In a book entitled
My Ten Years as a Counterspy, Boris Morros, a former confederate of
157 Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166.
258 Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
'5 The Court implied that Wolston's guilty plea resulted at least in part from his
concern about his wife's well being. See id. at 163.
260 Id.
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Jack Soble who became a double agent, wrote that Soble had identified
Wolston as a Soviet agent.2"' In a report prepared by the FBI entitled
Expos of Soviet Espionage May 1960, Wolston was listed as among
people "the FBI investigation resulted in identifying as Soviet intelli-
gence agents."'2 2
Despite these facts, the Supreme Court concluded without appar-
ent second thought that Wolston was not a "public figure" for the pur-
poses of triggering the actual-malice standard. Wolston, the Court
noted, was clearly not a "general public figure" under Gertz, for he
had achieved no general fame or notoriety and had assumed no role of
special prominence in the affairs of society as a result of his contempt
citation or his connection to the grand jury investigation into Soviet
spying activity.263 But why would Wolston not be squarely within the
concept of a "limited public figure" under Gertz, a figure to whom the
New York Times standard would apply for the limited purpose of com-
ment on his connection to or involvement with the Soviet espionage ac-
tivities that precipitated the federal grand jury inquiry? Since Barron's
book dealt only with Wolston's link to the Soviet espionage world, why
shouldn't the actual-malice test shield Barron from liability when that
same linkage had already resulted in Wolston's mention in fifteen
newspaper articles, one other book, and an official public FBI report?
At the very least, it would have seemed that Wolston's refusal to ap-
pear before the grand jury, and his subsequent plea of guilty and ac-
ceptance of a probationary sentence conditioned on further cooperation
with the grand jury espionage investigation, would qualify Wolston as
having purposefully involved himself in a matter of legitimate public
interest, and thereby having assumed the position of inviting attention
and comment regarding the investigation of espionage.
The Supreme Court's refusal to accept this argument demonstrates
how myopic the Court's contemplation of "limited public figure" is.
There was no "controversy" about espionage that Wolston could have
thrust himself into, the Court said, "because all responsible United
States citizens understandably were and are opposed to it."2  This is a
facially spurious argument, for it would restrict the limited public-fig-
ure status to people involved in public disputes, as opposed to persons
involved in significant or dramatic public events. John Hinckley, Jr.
would not qualify as a public figure merely for having shot President
Rbnald Reagan, because the assassination attempt was not a matter of
261 Id. at 163 n.6.
22 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 114, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 26-27 (1960)).
263 443 U.S. at 163-69.
24 Id. at 166 n.8.
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"public controversy," assuming "all responsible United States citizens
understandably were and are opposed to" presidential assassination.
John Hinckley, Jr. would become a public figure, however, after his
acquittal on attempted murder charges by reason of insanity, because
the insanity defense is an issue over which Americans are divided. This
distinction is ludicrous; it rests on a hypertechnical construction of the
term "controversy" that treats only debate as a matter of first amend-
ment concern,265 eliminating a plethora of issues and events such as
crime and violence which are obviously subjects of profound concern,
and for which full first amendment protection for speech is vital,
whether or not "all responsible United States citizens" are opposed to
them.
The Supreme Court's decision that Wolston's involvement in the
controversy (assuming one did exist) about Soviet espionage was totally
"involuntary" is similarly flawed in its restrictiveness. It is of course
true that Wolston did not intentionally invite the FBI and the grand
jury to investigate his connection with serious criminal activity. No one
ever does. But how can the fact that Wolston did not "voluntarily
thrust himself" before the grand jury be a legitimate factor in the anal-
ysis? The whole point of Barron's book, of the newspaper stories about
Wolston, and of the grand jury investigation was that Wolston and
others like him were in some way implicated in spying against the
United States for the Soviet Union. Spies are supposed to remain secre-
tive and not invite attention to their surreptitious activity-that's what
makes them spies. Under the Wolston Court's analysis, a good Soviet
agent is entitled to better protection from media investigation than a
bad one, for the good agent has not been caught. Even when the public
authority of the United States is brought to bear on an alleged agent,
that agent is entitled to private-figure status in any media reports about
the arrest or investigation because prior to being investigated he or she
(like any self-respecting spy) leads a "private life."
The Wolston Court thus rejected the view that any person who
engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public figure for
purposes of comment on a limited range of issues relating to his or her
conviction.26 That rejection is wrong because it equates (in the context
of crime) the Gertz requirement of "voluntariness" for limited public
figures as voluntariness in getting caught and convicted rather than vol-
untariness in committing the crime itself. Furthermore, Wolston did
265 Cf supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text (discussion of the Gertz distinc-
tion between public and private plaintiffs and the difficulty of applying it to modem
communications).
266 443 U.S. at 168.
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voluntarily refuse to appear before an extremely important and obvi-
ously "public" body-a special federal grand jury-and he voluntarily
pleaded guilty to the contempt charge and was sentenced in a court of
law, another obviously public institution. That Wolston did not wish
these unhappy events upon himself and did not seek media attention
does not vitiate their substantial social importance, and does not under-
cut the need for first amendment breathing space for commentary upon
them.
Further restrictions on the public-figure formula came in Hutchin-
son v. Proxmire,267 which involved a suit brought by Ronald Hutchin-
son, an adjunct professor at Western Michigan University and the Di-
rector of Research at Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital in Michigan,
against William Proxmire, a United States Senator from Wisconsin,
and Proxmire's legislative aide. Proxmire invented, in 1975, a mock
prize that he termed the "Golden Fleece of the Month Award,"
through which Proxmire, playing the role of a self-appointed vigilante
against wasteful federal spending, awarded the "Golden Fleece" to per-
sons or agencies that he perceived to be engaging in egregious episodes
of wasteful or frivolous governmental spending.268 In April 1975 the
Proxmire Golden Fleece was awarded jointly to the National Science
Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
the Office of Naval Research, for spending over $500,000 over a seven-
year period to fund Dr. Hutchinson's research. Hutchinson's research
involved the study of emotional behavior through objective measure-
ment of behavior patterns of certain animals, such as the clenching of
jaws by primates when exposed to irritating or stressful stimuli. 6 '
Proxmire ridiculed federal spending on such research in a speech and
press release that belittled Hutchinson's work.2
Legitimate doubts can be raised as to whether the law of defama-
267 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
268 Id. at 114.
269 Id. at 115.
270 "The finding of this nonsense makes me almost angry enough to
scream and kick or even clench my jaw. It seems to me it is
outrageous.
Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers as well as
his monkeys grind their teeth. In fact, the good doctor has made a
fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey out of
the American taxpayer.
It is time for the Federal Government to get out of this 'mon-
key business.' In view of the transparent worthlessness of Hutchin-
son's study of jaw-grinding and biting by angry or hard-drinking
monkeys, it is time we put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the
bureaucrats who fund him have been taking of the taxpayer."
Id. at 116 (quoting 121 Cong. Rec. 10,803 (1975)).
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tion was even intended to facilitate the expenditure of substantial social
resources in the resolution of so inane and petty a dispute; the case,
nonetheless, reached the Supreme Court. Most of the Supreme Court's
opinion involved the determination that Proxmire was not absolutely
shielded from liability under the speech or debate clause of the Consti-
tution.27 ' The Supreme Court did, however, secondarily deal with
Proxmire's argument that he was entitled to the benefit of the actual-
malice standard because Hutchinson was a "limited public figure" for
the purpose of commentary on his publicly funded research. Hutchin-
son had, after all, voluntarily applied for federal funds, and reports of
his successes in obtaining federal grants appeared in local newspapers.
Further, Hutchinson was not without access to the media; some news-
papers and wire services reported Hutchinson's response to the Golden
Fleece Award.
But the Court found that Hutchinson was not a public figure
within the narrowed meaning of that term after Firestone and Wolston.
Repeating the familiar bootstrap argument, the Court noted that
Proxmire could not turn Hutchinson into a public figure by virtue of
Proxmire's own allegations, for that would permit a defendant to create
a public figure defense through the defendant's own conduct.2 72 Picking
up on Wolston's emphasis on the term "public controversy" as limited
to matters of public debate, the Court noted that Hutchinson did not
thrust himself into the public eye "to influence others." ' General con-
cern about public expenditures, even large ones, was not enough in the
Court's view to activate the New York Times test, for that would involve
the Court in illegitimate subject matter classification, and ignore the
public-figure compromise struck in Gertz.2"
The Court's application of the public-figure test has become rigid
because it focuses exclusively on the person allegedly defamed by the
communication. The test would be more flexible and still be responsive
to its underlying policies2'" if the Court looked for guidance to the ap-
plication of the common law privileges. Those privileges provide
heightened protection to speech that is determined to be of particular
importance to the community based on the entire context of the com-
271 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
272 443 U.S. at 135 ("Clearly, those charged with defamation cannot, by their
own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure.").
273 Id.
274 See id.
217 The policies underlying the Gertz public-figure test were that public figures
must expect that their reputations may be attacked and that public figures have access
to the media for purposes of rebutting any defaming communications. These policies
are discussed in detail infra at notes 361-68 and accompanying text.
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munication.27 6 A more responsive test based on the common law's con-
textual approach is proposed in the next section.
277
The Court's requirement in Gertz that states require some show-
ing of fault before holding "a publisher or broadcaster" liable for defa-
mation17 also has been less coherent because the Court has failed to
consider and to integrate common law notions of fault. Although Gertz
intentionally allowed the states to "define for themselves the appropri-
ate standard of liability,"279 the constitutional prohibition against strict
liability is meaningless unless there is some minimum additional range
of communication permitted under the fault standard. The Court, how-
ever, has not given proper attention to this issue and may, in fact, fail
to distinguish the liability/fault issue from the public-figure
determination.
Firestone is an example of the lack of attention to the issue of
fault. In that case, the Court, although ultimately remanding for a de-
termination of liability,2 80 appeared ready to infer and to approve a
finding of fault by the Florida Supreme Court despite the failure of the
Florida courts to make a determination on that issue.28' The facts of
the case indicate, however, that Time could hardly have been found
negligent under traditional, common law notions of fault:282 Time's al-
leged libel involved at best a legalistic and picayune error.
The trial judge in the divorce proceeding had stated that there was
testimony that both Firestones had engaged in frequent extramarital
sex, and that some of Mary Alice Firestone's alleged activity "would
have made Dr. Freud's hair curl."28 The only "falsehood" in the brief
two-sentence article was that the grounds of the divorce were "extreme
cruelty and adultery." The trial court actually made no formal finding
of adultery, even though adultery had been alleged in Russell Fire-
stone's pleadings. In fact the trial court made no finding as to the
grounds for the decree. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the
basis of the judgment was actually "lack of domestication of the par-
ties," a ground not pleaded and not theretofore recognized by Florida
See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 297-372 and accompanying text.
278 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
79 Id.
2" Firestone, 424 U.S. at 464.
281 See id. at 463 ("It may well be that petitioner's account in its 'Milestones'
section was the product of some fault on its part .... ").
28 See id. at 466-70 (Powell, J., concurring) (Justice Powell surveys the facts
surrounding the publication of the "Milestones" section and concludes that "there was
substantial evidence supportive of Time's defense that it was not guilty of actionable
negligence." (emphasis in original)).
I See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 450.
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law."8 4 What, then, could possibly have been negligent about Time's
assumption, an assumption that most qualified Florida lawyers would
probably have made, that the trial court's grounds were in fact those
pleaded-extreme cruelty and adultery-the only grounds recognized
by Florida law at the time of the judgment? The answer offered by the
Florida Supreme Court, which the United States Supreme Court
seemed prepared to accept, was that Time had engaged in "flagrant"
"journalistic negligence" because it had not realized that adultery could
not have been the basis of the decree, because Florida law prohibited an
award of alimony to a wife found guilty of adultery and Mary Alice
Firestone had been awarded alimony.28 5 This hyperlegalistic view of
negligence seems hardly consistent with common law notions: Time was
negligent for not realizing that its interpretation of the judgment was
inconsistent with then-existing Florida law, yet Time was not permitted
to defend itself on the ground that any alternative interpretation of the
basis of the decree (such as "lack of domestication") was also inconsis-
tent with then-existing Florida law.
The Wolston decision 88 also illustrates the Court's failure to de-
fine the substance of a fault standard. The Wolston Court seemed to be
most concerned with Barron's serious charge that Wolston was at least
an "indicted" Soviet agent, when in fact he was a relatively minor fig-
ure in the overall scheme of the 1957 and 1958 investigation into Soviet
espionage and was never actually indicted for the crime of espionage.
Although the author and publisher emphasized the critical importance
of Soviet espionage as a public issue, the Supreme Court concluded that
it is not the issue but the person that is dispositive, and Wolston was
only a small player in the public events that transpired. The Court's
conclusion seems to be based partly on sympathy for Wolston: he was
only tangentially related to an investigation into Soviet espionage, and
his own worst known crime was contempt of court, for which he had
passively accepted his punishment and payed his debt to society. The
Court, therefore, seemed to have been moved by a feeling that the libel
was disproportionate to the crime. In effect, Wolston's message is that
when an author embarks on a subject, such as espionage, that can be
seriously defamatory, and "innocent" persons are erroneously accused,
the New York Times standard will not apply unless the person defamed
plays a major role in the subject matter and virtually mounts a rostrum
28 Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972).
285 Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974), vacated, 424 U.S.
448 (1976).
286 The facts of Wolston are discussed supra at notes 253-62 and accompanying
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to proclaim that role prior to drawing initial media attention. This
message, however, confuses the issue of ultimate liability-how false
was the publication and what type of conduct resulted in the fal-
sity-with the issue whether New York Times should apply in the first
instance-whether Wolston was a public figure.
In addition to the Court's failure to separate clearly the public
figure and fault analysis, the Court's sense of the defendants' culpabil-
ity was not fully informed. It is perfectly proper to compare the gravity
of the harm with the burden of greater care when assessing fault.28"
The more damaging an accusation, the more careful the reasonable
person is in making it. An accusation that someone is a spy for a for-
eign power requires more diligence in investigation to avoid characteri-
zation as reckless than an accusation that someone is mean to her
cat. 88 But as will be discussed later, 8 9 the calculation of fault cannot
27 Under Learned Hand's familiar Carroll Towing algebra, a party is liable
when the burden (B) is less than the injury (L) multiplied by the probability ( P ). See
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand,
J.).
288 Whatever standard one adopts on the continuum of fault from negligence to
recklessness to intentional misconduct, ultimately some comparison of the gravity of the
harm (discounted by its probability) and the burden of further precaution must be
made. In the defamation context, the burden should include the actual "cost" of further
investigation into the truth of the allegations, as well as the "cost" of delaying the
speech-some news items, for example, may be so "hot" that almost immediate publi-
cation without careful verification is perfectly reasonable. In assessing the other side of
the equation, the injury multiplied by its probability are factors that will be heavily
influenced by the harmfulness of the accusation and by the inherent plausibility of the
accusation. There is a greater duty to investigate (thus increasing the burden) as the
accusation gets more seriously damaging, and also, as the likelihood of it being true
decreases. It is true that the Supreme Court has held that in applying the "reckless-
ness" half of the New York Times standard, the mere failure to investigate a story
before publishing it when a reasonably prudent publisher would have so investigated is
not recklessness for first amendment purposes. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968). There must instead "be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that
the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id.
But the St. Amant standard does not preclude traditional Carroll Towing-type assess-
ments of fault in New York Times cases; it rather utilizes precisely those traditional tort
law variables that Judge Hand identified. St. Amant simply made it clear that there
must be a substantial imbalance in the fault equation against the defendant's conduct
before it will be labeled "constitutionally reckless." Thus, the Court in St. Amant noted
that mere claims by the defendant that he or she subjectively believed a story was true
do not insulate the defendant from liability. The trier of fact must still find the claims
believable. The Court noted that "[p]rofessions of good faith" will not be persuasive
when the story is fabricated by the defendant, is a product of his or her imagination, or
"is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call." Id. at 732. More impor-
tantly, the Court recognized that such claims of subjective innocence will not be con-
vincing "when the publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reck-
less man would have put them in circulation . . . [or] where there are obvious reasons
to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." Id. (emphasis
added).
289 See infra text following note 400.
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be made without also including an assessment of the social importance
of inquiry into the subject matter of the defamatory speech. This is a
lesson of the common law29 0 and the Supreme Court's refusal to draw
upon that lesson means that the constitutional fault requirement may
not serve its function of "shield[ing] the press and broadcast media from
the rigors of strict liability for defamation."29
3. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's efforts, begun in New York Times, to fash-
ion a coherent body of defamation law that responds to both the inter-
ests in free speech and in protecting reputation have failed and have
actually contributed to the current increase in libel litigation. The
Court's failure can be traced to the new, increased number of defama-
tion standards and to the lack of integration of constitutional and com-
mon law doctrine. Modern defamation law is overly confusing." ' All
else being equal, this confusion is most likely to cause courts to leave
the decisonmaking to juries, and juries are likely to entertain an an-
timedia bias.29
III. REFORMULATING THE AMERICAN LAW OF DEFAMATION
The labyrinth of conflicting common law and constitutional rules
that surrounds defamation today is unacceptable. Legal thought about
defamation since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2"9 has been domi-
nated by the large issue, the fundamental clash between speech and
reputation, and not enough energy has been devoted to the more techni-
cal tasks of straightening out defamation rules so that they have some
chance of actually reflecting whatever balance between reputation and
speech is finally struck. The law of defamation should be streamlined,
simplified, stripped of internal contradictions, and generally made more
coherent. If nothing else, common law rules and constitutional rules
should be made sufficiently compatible so that neither plaintiffs nor
defendants stand to gain from the confusion alone.
The cultural and doctrinal bias discussed in the previous section " 5
290 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir.
1947).
291 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
292 Cf Winfield, supra note 110, at 15 (the "same qualities that make libel litiga-
tion so exasperatingly imprecise and so interesting suggest that the quality of advocacy
has a disproportionate effect on the outcome of a case").
292 See stpra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
294 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
295 See supra text accompanying notes 82-293.
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and the empirical evidence of a rejuvenation of the American libel
law2"' demonstrate that confusion in the law has resulted in a benefit to
defamation plaintiffs. If such a benefit in fact resulted from clear, refor-
mulated standards, it would be a welcome reflection of constitutional
doctrine and state policy, rather than a random reflection of shifting
attitudes about reputation and the media. The reforms suggested below
are proposed in the hope that they will aid in clearing up the confusion
that has plagued the law of defamation and help to ensure that deci-
sionmakers in defamation suits properly weigh all of the interests in-
volved in such suits.
Four basic reforms will be suggested: a new context public-figure
standard, revitalized common law conditional privileges, a uniform set
of common law standards that integrates relevant constitutional stan-
dards, and the abolition of punitive damages.
A. The Context Public Figure: A Formula for Flexibility
Perhaps the most critical element of necessary reform for the law
of defamation is a new flexibility in the application of the public figure
test. A more flexible and rational application of the test established by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.297 is possible even while retaining its basic
policies. Ironically, the framework for this flexibility is supplied by
borrowing from the common law system.
1. The Common Law Privileges
Long before New York Times, the common law protected certain
speech by recognizing conditional privileges if a functional inquiry into
the social importance of the speech viewed in the context of the rela-
tionship between the speaker, listener, and victim made it important for
the community to encourage the speech and discourage liability for
false statements arising from it.2" 8
Common law conditional privileges, unlike the public figure doc-
trine of Gertz, 99 do not attach to speech about certain individuals; nor
do they follow the path of the Supreme Court plurality in Rosenbloom
v. Metro-Media, Inc.300 of protecting particular topics of speech in
2 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
2- 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
29 The common law privileges, in existence long before New York Times, were
created out of the common law's own developing sense that in certain recurring factual
situations values of free and open communication should transcend concern for reputa-
tion. See Eaton, supra note 230, at 1359-64.
2" See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.a00 403 U.S. 29 (1971); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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which there is a strong public interest. Rather, common law conditional
privileges attach to particular "occasions," or contexts of
communication.30 '
A conditional privilege exists to make statements for the protection
of one's own legitimate interests, such as statements made to defend
one's reputation in response to attack by another, or statements made in
connection with the retrieval of stolen property, or in the course of col-
lecting a bona fide debt. 02 The privilege is roughly analogous to the
common law privilege to defend oneself from physical attack and the
privilege to defend property.303 Just as the self-defense privilege is lost
if excessive force is used, this conditional defamation privilege is tradi-
tionally regarded as lost if the speaker says more than is reasonably
necessary to defend his or her interest.3 04 The protection is also lost if
the speaker publishes the speech beyond the audience to whom the self-
defensive action would be relevant.305 For example, the privilege is lost
if one complains to another that a third party will not pay a debt, when
the listener is in no position to render legitimate assistance in obtaining
payment.306 Again, the analogy to the self-defense and defense-of-prop-
erty privileges is apt, for excessive publication parallels the use of ex-
cessive force in self-defense of person or property. The common law
conditional privilege also has been considered to have been abused, and
thus lost,307 if the speaker acted with ill will or malice 08 in the com-
munication or did not believe or have any reasonable grounds for be-
"0" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, ch. 25 scope note & §§ 593-598A.
302 See id. at § 594; W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 785-87.
sos See RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, at §§ 63, 68, 77-86; W. PROSSER, supra
note 49, § 114, at 776.
so See RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, at §§ 605-605A.
o See id. at § 604; W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 787.
311 See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 787.
30' For one current formulation of what can constitute abuse of a conditional priv-
ilege sufficient to entail the loss of that privilege, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 115,
at §§ 599-605A.
308 See, e.g., Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Servs., Inc., 537 F.2d 1255, 1259-
60 (4th Cir. 1976); Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1373, 1379-80
(D. Mass.), affd mem., 636 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S 821
(1981); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 794-95.
The common law was and still is somewhat confused and imprecise in its use of
the term "malice" as a standard for abuse of common law privilege where the showing
of abuse is actually grounded on the basis "that the privilege is lost if the publication is
not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to pro-
tection." Id. at § 115, at 795 (citing RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF TORTS, § 603 (1938));
see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 603 comment a. This original confusion
surrounding the use of the term malice has only been compounded by the use of the
term "actual malice" (meaning reckless or intentional disregard for the truth) as the
standard for abuse or loss of the constitutional privilege of New York Times and Gertz.
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lieving the truth of the defamatory statement.30 9
The common law also recognizes a conditional privilege to make
statements for the protection of the legitimate interests of another, par-
ticularly when the speaker's relationship with the protected party en-
tails a moral or legal obligation to render protection. 1' This privilege
finds a parallel in the common law privilege to use force to protect the
safety of another. The defamation privilege protects speech in a wide
variety of situations.31 As in the case of the conditional self-interest
privilege, the privilege to protect another's interests is lost if the publi-
cation extends beyond the scope necessary to defend the interest.
31 2
"" The basic formulation of the common law appears to be that the privilege is
lost if the speaker knows the statement is false or lacks probable cause for believing it is
true. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. v. Finberg, 58 A.D.2d 808, 809, 396 N.Y.S.2d
260, 262 (1977); see also Zuschek v. Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1163,
1166 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (privilege abused if defendant "does not believe in the truth of
the statements" or "has no reasonable ground for so believing"), affd mem., 571 F.2d
573 (3d Cir. 1978); W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 795-96. Prosser describes
this rule as a requirement "to act as a reasonable man under the circumstance." Id. at
796. That formulation has a negligence ring to it that is troublesome when one consid-
ers that Gertz already requires a negligence showing as a matter of course, at least in
defamation suits involving the media. If negligence defeats the privilege and negligence
is required for liability with or without the privilege then the privilege is meaningless.
See infra notes 376-77 and accompanying text. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 115,
attempts to remedy this problem by suggesting that the common law rule that the privi-
lege is lost if the speaker "did not believe the statement to be true or lacked reasonable
grounds for so believing," id. at § 600 comment a, be replaced by a standard of knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth, id. Universal adoption of this standard,
perhaps even through a constitutional mandate like the Gertz mandate of a finding of
fault for liability, would be a welcome development and would help to place common
law privileges back in the position they enjoyed prior to Gertz. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 115, ch. 25, special note on conditional privileges and the constitutional
requirement of fault; infra notes 373-83 and accompanying text.
310 See, e.g., Schlaf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Ill. App. 2d 195, 145
N.E.2d 791 (1957); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, at § 595; Eaton, supra
note 230, at 1361.
311 For example, Prosser suggests that this privilege protects speech in the follow-
ing circumstances: a warning to a woman that a prospective fiancee is an ex-convict; a
doctor's statements to protect a patient; an attorney's statements on behalf of a client,
and statements to a landlord that a tenant is undesirable. W. PROSSER, supra note 49,
§ 115, at 787-88; see also Eaton, supra note 230, at 1361 (stating that the privilege
protects an answer to a prospective employer's inquiry concerning a person's fitness for
a job).
There has been a long-standing controversy about whether the statements of credit
reporting agencies are protected by this privilege. See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, §
115, at 790; Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies-Macintosh v. Dun,
14 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 296 (1914) (supporting the privilege); Note, Defamation and
the Mercantile Agency, 2 DE PAUL L. REV. 69 (1952) (supporting the privilege with a
special standard of care); Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J.
1035, 1050-51 & nn.85 & 87 (1971) (noting that all but two states that have consid-
ered the problem have granted the privilege).
31' See, e.g., Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Il. App. 559, 581-83, 64
N.E.2d 751, 761-62 (1945); W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 788-89.
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A conditional privilege exists when the speaker and recipient have
common legitimate interests in a particular subject matter, and the
communication is made in furtherance of those interests. 13 The privi-
lege had its roots in cases in which there was a legal obligation to
speak, such as communications by officers or directors of a corporation
to stockholders 3 14 but it has been expanded to encompass a broad
range of situations in which persons with shared interests in organiza-
tions or enterprises exchange information relevant to that common
activity.
31 5
The common law has long recognized a conditional privilege for
speech that constitutes "fair comment" on the conduct of public offi-
cials.318 This fair comment privilege in its original form applied to
opinion and criticism rather than to misstatements of fact.3 17 It there-
fore could be viewed not as a privilege but rather as a threshold means
of ensuring that pure opinion was protected in all cases. 318 The fair
comment privilege at common law was not limited solely to comment
on the conduct of public officials, but also was applied to comment on
matters of concern to the community such as the management of insti-
tutions and even private businesses whose operations had significant
impact on the community.319 For example, complaints made to school
boards about the conduct or fitness of teachers have been held to be
protected by this privilege.
32 0
313 See, e.g., Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 17 Ill. App. 2d 365, 376-77,
150 N.E.2d 202, 208 (2d Dist. 1958); Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill.
App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751 (4th Dist. 1945); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115,
at 789-90.
314 See Eaton, supra note 166, at 1361.
315 E.g., Jamison v. Rebenson, 21 Ill. App. 2d 364, 369, 158 N.E.2d 82, 84
(1959); W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 789-91.
316 E.g., Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 871 (1951); Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135 N.E. 515 (1922).
31 See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 118, at 819-20; Eaton, supra note 230, at
1363.
318 See Eaton, supra note 230, at 1363. Pure opinion is nonactionable in common
law libel and is directly contradictory to the core of the New York Times/Gertz first
amendment jurisprudence. Regarding this matter, the Court stated in Gertz that:
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However perni-
cious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas." 418 U.S. at 339-40.
319 See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 118, at 822-23.
320 E.g., Segall v. Piazza, 46 Misc. 2d 700, 260 N.Y.S.2d 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1965); W. PRosSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 792; cf. Johnson v. Board of Junior
College, 31 111. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (applying the constitutional ac-
tual-malice standard to speech concerning a teacher's conduct on the theory that teach-
ers are public figures within a school); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th
Cir. 1974) (en banc) (applying absolute privilege to statements made about the fitness
of a school teacher during an open executive session of a school-board meeting), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 clarified, 527 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1975).
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2. The Context Public Figure
The "context public figure" concept is an attempt to extrapolate
from the traditional common law privileges a notion that for most peo-
ple speech concerning the neighborhoods, the workplaces, and other in-
stitutions in which they operate daily is more immediately vital than
the speech that appears in the CBS Evening News, the Washington
Post, or Harper's. There are national marketplaces of ideas and local
marketplaces of ideas, and for most citizens the local marketplaces are
usually where wide-open, robust, and uninhibited discussion is most
relevant. Few people purposefully inject themselves into arenas of na-
tional attention, but many people involve themselves actively in events
and controversies in their neighborhoods, their children's schools, and
their workplaces. A professor at a law school, for example, is not likely
to be a public figure as defined in Gertz, and an article in Newsweek
about that professor should probably not be protected by the actual-
malice standard. Within the law school community, however, that pro-
fessor is a "public figure." '21 Statements in a student newspaper attack-
ing the professor for poor teaching, bad scholarship, diffident public
service, or arbitrary grading deserve the special protection of the actual-
malice standard, just as statements made within the faculty committee
reviewing the professor's application for tenure and promotion should
be actionable only upon a showing of actual malice. 22 There are indi-
cations that, despite the near unanimity with which the states have ac-
"I1 See Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973) (assistant dean
and professor at a law school should be treated as a public figure); Torgerson v. Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune, 7 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1805 (D. Minn. 1981) (dean of law
school held to be a public figure).
322 In 1972 the Arkansas Gazette acquired documents allegedly prepared by six
members of the faculty at the School of Law at the University of Arkansas at Fayette-
ville that cast doubt upon the teaching and scholarship of then assistant dean James
Gallman. The Gazette ran an article detailing the intra-faculty dispute, and Gallman
sued. The Arkansas Supreme Court stated with "no hesitancy" that Gallman, as an
assistant dean and professor at a state law school, was a public official. Gallman v.
Carnes, 254 Ark. at 992, 497 S.W.2d at 50.
The Gallman court apparently reasoned that among the slings and arrows of out-
rageous fortune one accepts in becoming an administrator and teacher at a state univer-
sity law school is the risk of public debate concerning one's professional qualifications.
Wide-open and robust communications relating to the qualifications of those who un-
dertake to serve the state by educating its inchoate lawyers may often be unpleasant,
but such communications serve the vital state interest of helping to ensure that a quality
legal education is purchased (largely at state taxpayers' expense). Assistant Dean
Gallman would certainly not have been a public figure in any national sense; commen-
tary on his teaching is hardly the stuff of the CBS Evening News. Such commentary,
however, is of significant local importance and deserves the special shelter of the New




cepted Gertz's invitation to establish liability on a showing of negli-
gence when a plaintiff is a private figure, 8' many lower courts simply
will not follow the drastically constricted definition of a public figure
82'
that the Supreme Court has adopted in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,32 5 Wol-
ston v. Readers Digest Association, Inc., 8' and Hutchinson v.
Proxmire. 27 A number of courts have found school officials, teachers,
and athletic coaches to be public figures over many different educa-
tional levels.328 In particular contexts, courts have quite appropriately
found public-figure status for a wide variety of persons including a stu-
dent class president,829 the head of an agricultural cooperative,330 a re-
puted mobster,331 an undercover policeman, 2 a Roman Catholic
323 See supra note 161-64 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 239-74 and accompanying text.
325 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
326 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
327 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
328 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (professional
basketball player); Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (1978) (high
school teacher); Byers v. Southeastern Newspaper Corp., 161 Ga. App. 717, 288
S.E.2d 698 (1982) (dean of college); Johnson v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508,
31 11. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (junior college teachers); State v. Defley,
395 So. 2d 759 (La. 1981) (school superintendant and school supervisor); Kapiloff v.
Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (1975) (high school principal); Reaves v. Fos-
ter, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967) (school principal); Johnston v. Corinthian Television
Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978) (grade school wrestling coach); Grayson v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967) (college basketball coach).
329 Henderson v. Kaulitz, 6 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 2409 (1981). The plaintiff in
Henderson was president of his high school student senate, an announced candidate for
the school board, and a counselor at a drug center. In a controversy surrounding the
moving of the drug center, the plaintiff was held to have public figure status with
regard to criticism about his stand on the drug-center issue. Id. at 2410.
330 Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
331 Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), affd, 580
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978). This holding should be contrasted with Wolston. In Rosa-
nova the court emphasized that the plaintiff "'voluntarily engaged in a course [of or-
ganized crime] that was bound to invite attention and comment.'" 580 F.2d at 861
(quoting 411 F. Supp. at 445).
332 Cassidy v. ABC, 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126 (1978). Cassidy is an-
other lower court decision that contrasts interestingly with the Supreme Court's narrow
view of what constitutes a public figure as set out in Wolston. Cassidy involved an
undercover policeman who was filmed by Channel Seven News in Chicago, without his
knowledge or consent, while in a massage parlor. The television station showed film
depicting the undercover policeman gathering evidence in the massage parlor for arrests
for solicitation of prostitution. The court held that the broadcasters were entitled to the
New York Times defense, because the policeman was discharging a public duty. Id. at
837-38, 377 N.E.2d at 131-32: The press is protected under New York Times from
privacy actions as well as libel actions, the court held, while engaged in gathering and
disseminating news concerning an official's discharge of public duties. Id. at 838, 377
N.E.2d at 131-32. Cassidy is an interesting counterpoint to the Supreme Court's Wol-
ston decision, in which alleged involvement in surreptitious antisocial behavior (spying
for a foreign power) did not trigger New York Times protection. In combination, the
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priest,338 a doctor, 34 an author of pop psychology 3 a football
player,336 a social worker, 37 the head of a credit union,338 a former
two decisions create the anomolous possibility that a person engaged in secretive illegal
activity-a mafia figure, drug smuggler, or Soviet spy-would have only to prove negli-
gence in an action for defamation or invasion of privacy while the undercover govern-
mental agent, working in secret opposition to that person, would have to prove New
York Times malice.
To illustrate this anomaly, imagine that a concealed "action news mini-cam" films
what appears to be a cocaine sale on a streetcorner, and the film is shown with com-
mentary accusing the two principles of criminal activity. Unknown to the broadcaster,
the would-be seller is actually an undercover Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agent trying to penetrate the higher levels of cocaine trafficking, and the other
party is an underworld drug dealer. If the story ultimately turned out to be false and
defamatory (perhaps there was no drug deal actually made or discussed on that day),
the underworld figure would have a much stronger privacy or defamation action than
the agent, who would be encumbered by the New York Times barrier. See Meinens v.
Moriarty, 563 F.2d 343, 352 (7th Cir. 1977) (DEA agent held to be a public official);
Ethridge v. North Miss. Communications, Inc.., 460 F. Supp. 347, 350 (N.D. Miss.
1978) (undercover narcotics agent held to be a public official). This anomaly strongly
supports the holding in Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga.
1976), affd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussed supra at note 331), that a re-
puted member of organized crime is a public figure. It is worth noting that police
officers have usually been found to be public officials or figures. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v.
Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1971) (deputy chief of detectives); St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968) (deputy sheriff); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357
(1965) (per curiam) (city police chief and county attorney); Meiners v. Moriarty, 563
F.2d 343, 352 (7th Cir. 1977) (federal DEA agent); Ethridge v. North Miss. Commu-
nications, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 347, 350 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (undercover narcotics agent);
Thuma v. Hearst Corp., 340 F. Supp. 867, 869 (D. Md. 1972) (police captain);
Rosales v. City of Eloy, 122 Ariz. 134, 135, 593 P.2d 688, 689 (1979) (police ser-
geant); Hines v. Florida Publishing Co., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2605 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1982) ("moonlighting" policemen). But cf. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004 (4th
Cir. 1981) (undercover police informant is not a public official).
McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
84 Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969). Doctors
have not fared as well as lawyers in libel litigation, making one suspicious that lawyers
and judges may have an unconscious tendency to protect their own. A dissenting justice
recently made this suggestion in an Arkansas Supreme Court case holding that a sus-
pended lawyer was not a public figure with regard to reports about his bar examina-
tion results, despite his status as an officer of the court who had been suspended for a
breach of the public trust. Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 640-41,
590 S.W.2d 840, 846 (1979) (Hickman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076
(1980).
"' Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (action brought by au-
thors of I'm Okay-You're Okay).
86 Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir.
1979); see also Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (professional
basketball player).
... Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1978).
11 Korbar v. Hite, 43 Ill. App. 3d 636, 357 N.E.2d 135 (1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 837 (1977). Korbar is a good example of the context-public-figure approach. In
Korbar, the plaintiff was the president of the Reynolds-McCook Employees' Credit
Union. The defendant wrote an article in the Aluminum Workers News implying that
the plaintiff was incompetent and stating that the plaintiff had in essence proclaimed
"he could not care less" about the steel and aluminum workers' problems. Id. at 638,
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president's personal friend, 3 ' a woman who posed for a Playboy
centerfold,3 "4 and a belly-dancer.3 41 Those decisions, which sometimes
jump intermittently between constitutional and common law vocabu-
lary, evidence a willingness to consider the public-figure notion more
flexibly, in ways similar to the "context public figure" notion espoused
here.
One particularly revealing application of the context-public-figure
approach is a recent Illinois Supreme Court case that may quite radi-
cally alter the whole shape of the law of defamation in Illinois. It is
worth examining in some detail for what it reveals about the potential
flexibility of the public-figure concept. In Colson v. Stieg,342 John Cal-
vin Colson, an assistant professor in the Department of Library Science
at Northern Illinois University, brought suit against Lewis Stieg, the
chairman of the school's Library Science Department. Colson had ac-
cepted the position at Northern Illinois with the expectation that he
would ultimately be granted tenure. Colson's tenure expectations were
never realized, however, and it was Northern Illinois' denial of Col-
son's request for promotion and tenure that precipitated the suit against
Stieg. Stieg had on two occasions stated to review committees that he
had information which he could not divulge that reflected adversely on
Colson's performance as a teacher. Colson learned of these statements
357 N.E.2d at 137. The court held that the statements were protected by the New York
Times actual-malice standard because within the contours of the credit union's activities
the plaintiff was a public figure. Id. at 640-42, 357 N.E.2d at 138-39. Looking to the
nature and extent of the plaintiff's involvement in the controversy that gave rise to the
alleged defamation, the Court noted, it was apparent that the plaintiff had thrust him-
self into the forefront of the dispute by virtue of running for and being elected president
of the credit union. In so doing, he invited attention and comment within the institu-
tional parameters in which the credit union operated. Id. at 642, 357 N.E.2d at 139.
Korbar is an eminently sensible opinion, for it is grounded in the commonsense
notion that to the average aluminum worker, proper conduct by the president of a
worker's credit union is probably as important to the worker's day-in and day-out live-
lihood and happiness as proper conduct by the President of the United States. Also, the
Aluminum Workers News is likely to be as significant an informational source and
forum for debate to that aluminum worker as the New York Times (or any other news-
paper with a national circulation). Unless the New York Times privilege is understood
as an elitist standard shielding the national corporate press, it seems obvious that to
many average hardworking people localized trade or labor publications have just as
strong a claim to first amendment protection as CBS News or the Washington Post.
"Wide-open, uninhibited, and robust debate" is as strong a social value to most Ameri-
cans in discussing mismanagement of a small-town credit union or small union pension
fund as it is in discussing the mismanagement of the Federal Reserve Board.
... Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981) (Bebe Rebozo,
personal friend of former President Nixon), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981).
"4 Vitale v. National Lampoon, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
341 James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871
(1976).
342 89 IlI. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982).
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and sued Stieg for defamation.
The basc methodology of the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis in
Colson was to treat the first amendment principles enunciated in New
York Times as subsuming the privileges that the common law had pre-
viously evolved at a subconstitutional level, but then to ignore the more
conservative limitations that the United States Supreme Court placed
on those first amendment requirements in the wake of the cases that
defined the content of the public-figure doctrine created in Gertz. Col-
son is in many ways a doctrinal throwback to the Warren Court era, a
decision that cuts decidedly against the grain of United States Supreme
Court decisions of the last eight years.
The court began its analysis of John Colson's defamation claim by
noting that, since New York Times, the first amendment has taken over
and altered a large part of the law concerning common law privi-
leges."' As a result of these first amendment "considerations," 44 the
court stated, "the scope of the privileges has been broadened beyond
that within which they had previously been recognized. 3 4 5 The court
then stated that the New York Times holding had "essentially replaced
the common law qualified privilege . . . of 'fair comment.' "348 The
fair-comment privilege "was not limited to public discussion of public
officials or figures, but also extended to the discussion of matters of
public concern. 3- 4 7 The court then noted with approval William Pros-
ser's statement several years before the Supreme Court's decision in
Gertz that "there is no reason the constitutional privilege of New York
Times should not be extended to all matters of public concern."34 8
In these preliminary remarks, the court worked a clever bit of
lawyering. The deliberate intermingling of the New York Times deci-
sion and the history of the fair-comment privilege served to lay the
groundwork for the court's ultimate conclusion that Stieg's statements
concerning Colson were protected by the New York Times privilege.
The court linked the common law privilege of fair comment that it was
ostensibly interpreting to the constitutional privilege established in New
York Times. Then it subtly broke that link and generated an even more
aggressive common law privilege when the constitutional doctrine be-
came too restrictive. Although the court was surely correct in stating
that the New York Times decision did supersede much of what had pre-
84s Id. at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 247-48 (citing Schaefer, Defamation and the First
Amendment, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1980)).
344 89 Ill. 2d at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 248.
345 Id.
846 Id.
37 Id. at 210, 433 N.E.2d at 248.
34 Id. (citing with approval W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 118, at 823).
[Vol. 132:1
LIBEL
viously been encompassed by the common law fair-comment privi-
lege,"49 the court was absolutely mistaken in its effort to distill from the
United States Supreme Court's current jurisprudence the principle that
the actual-malice standard should apply whenever the subject of the
defamatory speech is a matter of public interest or concern. "5 The Su-
preme Court in Gertz emphatically rejected the Rosenbloom test based
on the public interest in the subject matter as the touchstone for the
application of the first amendment privilege; 51 the Illinois Supreme
Court's reincarnation of that test in effect mischaracterized federal con-
stitutional law in the service of expanding Illinois common law.
The Colson opinion strongly emphasized the importance of avoid-
ing self-censorship on controversial subjects. In order to accord the
"breathing space" essential to the exercise of first amendment rights,
the court observed, the actual-malice standard is imposed.35 Applying
that standard minimizes the chance that a speaker will forgo constitu-
tionally protected speech rather than risk liability because his or her
assessment of a given set of facts is subsequently determined to be
wrong. In reaching an accommodation between the competing concerns
of the first amendment and the state's interest in protecting reputation,
the Colson court held, "the challenged statement must be assessed in
the context in which it was published." ' Rather than focus exclusively
on the public or private status of the person defamed, the Colson court
focused on the statement, the audience, and the functional relationship
between the two. Thus, the court emphasized that "whether or not one
is defamed depends upon the effect the publication had upon those who
received it," and that "[t]he focus therefore must be upon the statement
and its predictable effect upon those who received the publication."' "
This functional relationship analysis led easily to the invocation of
a New York Times-style privilege. The publication of Stieg's comments
concerning Colson was not made to the general public, but to a small,
specialized group of committee members. The audience apparently con-
sisted of four state employees charged with the duty of evaluating the
academic performance of another state employee. 55 This departmental
personnel committee was thus involved in a matter of central impor-
tance to the function of Northern Illinois University, a public institu-
tion. It is certainly understandable that the Supreme Court of Illinois
349 89 I1. 2d at 209-10, 433 N.E.2d at 247-48.
350 See id. at 212-13, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
*11 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
352 89 111. 2d at 212-13, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
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would treat speech concerning the teaching ability of a professor at a
state university as a matter important enough to require breathing
space for free and uninhibited discussion. In the court's words, "[tlhe
need for the free flow of information and for vigorous and uninhibited
discussion in a situation [involving tenure and promotion decisions] is
such that the first amendment privilege defined in New York Times
must apply to the publication of statements to this committee.
'3 56
Whether one accepts the first amendment pedigree of these concerns,
the court's worries about self-censorship intuitively ring true. Most of
us are not heroic. Without some degree of enhanced protection frank
appraisals of teachers would not be forwarded to personnel commit-
tees;357 people are more likely to run the institutional risk of allowing
persons they deem unqualified to be considered for promotion without
objection if they must run the personal risk of a suit for defamation if a
statement they make later proves false.
What is remarkable about the Colson opinion, however, is not the
wisdom of its commonsense appraisal of the functional importance of
Stieg's speech in relation to the personnel committee. Rather, it is the
court's almost schizophrenic insistence that its opinion was based on the
first amendment values expressed in New York Times and Gertz, 35
while it simultaneously rejected completely the public figure/private
figure distinction that Gertz and its progeny created. Thus, although
the Colson court repeatedly phrased its holding squarely in terms of the
first amendment-stating, for example, that "we find that the first
amendment privilege of New York Times must be applied to the state-
ment made by the defendant"" 5'-the court also managed to remain
totally unencumbered by the Gertz matrix.
The Illinois court's rethinking of the public-figure concept is per-
suasive because it is fully consistent with the two policy considerations
articulated in Gertz. These considerations were a normative judgment
about the types of persons who may properly be held to have assumed
the risk of heightened public scrutiny and a more pragmatic judgment
concerning the types of persons best equipped to counter defamatory
statements through their own access to the media.360 Colson applied
these two concepts in a manner that made them more relevant to the
communications of everyday life.
The first rationale that the Supreme Court utilized to prop its de-
3 Id. at 213, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
37 See id.
See id. at 208-13, 433 N.E.2d at 247-49.
359 Id. at 213, 433 N.E.2d at 249 (emphasis added).
"0 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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cision in Gertz,""1 and the rationale that came to be heavily reempha-
sized in Firestone,36 2 Wolston,3 63 and Hutchinson,64 was the normative
judgment that one who seeks fame must accept some of its resulting
outrageous slings and arrows; there is a certain equity to a rule that
those who voluntarily enter and achieve either general or limited prom-
inence in the public arena accept as a quid pro quo heightened public
scrutiny and a greater risk of reputational attack. The "context public
figure" concept recognizes that few Americans inject themselves into
the public arena on a national level, thereby inviting scrutiny by na-
tional media outlets. Nor do most Americans inject themselves into local
controversies of the sort that usually command the attention of the
small-town newspaper or local television and radio stations. For the
vast majority of citizens, it is still a rare event to be mentioned in a
news article or broadcast. But events and controversies of interest to
national or local media are by no means the only events and controver-
sies that are both interesting and important to most Americans. Work-
places, schools, and churches are among the myriad institutions in
which disputes constantly arise, and the ordinary citizen is frequently
involved quite voluntarily in expressing views involving both fact and
opinion within the context of such institutions. Colson recognizes that
robust exchanges of information are essential to the functioning of such
institutions, and that it is equitable to subject those who have power
and who enter controversies in such institutions to the heightened scru-
tiny and criticism afforded by a defamation privilege with regard to
matters affecting those institutions as long as the audience of the defam-
atory speech is also limited to those in the same contextual setting.
The second of the two analytic bases of the Gertz decision was the
Court's belief that public officials and public figures enjoy greater ac-
cess to channels of communication than do private citizens.365 Because
public officials and public figures have a more realistic opportunity to
parlay their notoriety into media access, they are more likely to be able
to engage in self-help when defamed, by countering the defamatory
speech with their own speech published through the same media chan-
nels as the original falsehood. 66 The context public figure concept as
developed in Colson accepts this analytic prop of Gertz, but shapes it to
fit the realities of a more localized information market. Assistant Pro-
3861 Id.
363 See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 456.
363 See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164, 166-67.
3" See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134-35.
I65 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. Ironically, however, Gertz also noted that "the law of
defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie." Id.
368 Id. at 344.
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fessor Colson, the court noted, had ample opportunity to present his
own case before the very persons to whom the allegedly defamatory
remarks were spoken.3 67 Whatever effect Stieg's remarks may have had
on those charged with evaluating Colson's career, the remarks were not
spoken in a vacuum: Colson could both offer his own counter-speech
and appeal the initial decision of the department's personnel committee
to a university-wide forum. 8"
867 89 111. 2d at 214, 433 N.E.2d at 250.
318 Id. There is an unspoken interplay in Colson between Colson's opportunity to
meet the impact of the allegedly defamatory remarks and procedural due process con-
straints on a state university's decision not to grant an assistant professor tenure and
promotion. Under the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), an untenured professor at a state university is entitled to no federal due process
protection whatsoever onless the professor can demonstrate a state-created entitlement
to continued employment. Roth, 408 U.S at 577-78; Perry, 408 U.S. at 599, 601. A
detailed discussion of Roth may be found in Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35
STAN. L. REV. 69 (1983). For a review of the progeny of Roth, see, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS,
ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 350 (1979); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
19 (1980); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 480-97 (1978); Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common
Law and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 355 (1978); Grey, Procedural Fairness
and Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS, NoMos XVIII 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chap-
man eds. 1977); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Pro-
cess, in DUE PROCESS, NoMos XVIII 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977);
Monaghan, supra note 84; Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunc-
tion, in DUE PROCESS, NoMos XVIII 172 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977);
Smolla, supra; Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substan-
tive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 261; Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Prop-
erty": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445
(1977).
Without undertaking a similarly detailed analysis here, one can safely say that the
state of Illinois provided Colson with all (and probably more) of the procedural due
process to which he was entitled under the United States Constitution. Since the real
heart of Colson's defamation claim was that he was injured professionally by Stieg's
remarks, in that they allegedly cost him his job and will injure his prospects at other
colleges and universities, it would be anamolous if Colson could force Northern Illinois
University through a defamation action to abide by a higher standard of accuracy in
reaching personnel decisions about untenured faculty than the University would other-
wise be subject to under mainstream doctrines of constitutional and administrative law.
Doctrines of procedural due process and defamation would be working at cross-
purposes if a state university's supervisory personnel could be in full compliance with
state and federal procedural due process dictates in handling a subordinate and yet still
be subject to a tort suit for defamation arising from the same conduct, without the
benefit of any conditional privilege in the tort suit. Colson thus may embody a sort of
first amendment due process concept engrafted onto the common law of Illinois, for it
treats the conditional-privilege concept as triggered to a large degree by the existence of
built-in channels for counter-speech within the context of the original defamatory state-
ments. This aspect of Colson was emphasized in an early Illinois appellate court deci-
sion applying Colson. See American Pet Motels v. Chicago Vet Medicine Ass'n, 106
Ill. App. 3d 626, 435 N.E.2d 1297 (1982). A more thorough discussion of the relation-
ship between the existence of state tort remedies and federal due process requirements
[Vol. 132:1
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Intimately tied into this counter-speech notion in Colson is the re-
peated caveat that the conditional privilege recognized is itself condi-
tioned on restraining the publication of the speech within the confines
of the "localized market" within which the speech is of vital interest.
Thus, the Colson court indicated that "[i]f the defendant in our case
would have published the statement in question to the public in gen-
eral, it is possible that the plaintiff would not have had sufficient access
to the channels of communication to overcome or offset the damaging
effect of defendant's statement." '69 Although the court did not explicitly
state that such an excessive publication would constitute abuse of the
qualified privilege and loss of the advantage of the New York Times
malice standard, it strongly intimated that such a result would
follow. 370
3. Conclusion
The Colson decision thus illustrates a more subtle application of
the public-figure notion, an approach that courts in a number of states
appear to be embracing.37 1 By integrating common law privilege no-
tions with Gertz's constitutional rule that media reports about public
figures receive enhanced protection against libel claims, a new public-
figure definition grounded in long-standing Supreme Court policy is
possible. Advocacy of this context public figure concept, however, must
come with a disclaimer. Although I believe that the context public fig-
ure notion ought ultimately to be incorporated into the set of first
amendment rules set forth in Gertz, as a litigation strategy it may be
preferable for defendants to frame the context public figure approach in
both constitutional and common law terms. In light of the Supreme
Court's current conservatism in its formulation of the public-figure doc-
trine there is a danger that any lower court that adopts a more flexible
approach to the public-figure definition will be reversed on appeal. To
the extent that the context public figure concept is treated as an elabo-
ration on common law conditional privileges, however, this danger may
be substantially diminished.72
may be found in Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State
Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 1982 U. ILL.
L. REv. 831.
38 89 Ill. 2d at 214, 433 N.E.2d at 250.
370 Id.
371 See supra notes 328-41 and accompanying text.
"I The most significant recent example of the perils of confusing state and federal
law in the context of New York Times and its progeny come in the "human cannonball
case," Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d
454 (1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Zacchini involved an entertainment act in
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B. Rediscovering the Common Law Privileges
Conditional, common law privileges protect specific communica-
which Hugo Zacchini was shot from a cannon into a net 200 feet away, a performance
that lasted 15 seconds from take-off to landing. A free-lance reporter filmed the act,
after Zacchini had asked him not to. The film clip, lasting 15 seconds and including a
favorable commentary, was televised on the local news that evening. The Supreme
Court of Ohio held that, although state tort law recognized that Zacchini enjoyed a
"right of publicity" regarding his performance, 47 Ohio St. 2d at 231-33, 351 N.E.2d
at 459-60, the media enjoyed "a privilege to report matters of legitimate public interest
even though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise private." Id. at 234, 351
N.E.2d at 461.
As in Colson, the Ohio court's opinion discussed both first amendment and com-
mon law concepts. The Ohio court, however, placed its principal reliance on United
States Supreme Court opinions after New York Times, primarily Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967). The court stated that "the gravamen of the issue in this case is
not whether the degree of intrusion is reasonable, but whether First Amendment princi-
ples require that the right of privacy give way to the right to be informed of matters of
public interest and concern." 47 Ohio St. 2d at 234 n.5, 351 N.E.2d at 461 n.5 (em-
phasis added). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 433
U.S. at 578-79.
Had the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly rested its decision on both state and fed-
eral grounds so that either would have been dispositive, the "independent and adequate
state ground" doctrine, see, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1945), would
have precluded Supreme Court review of the decision. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 566. The
article III principle that federal courts may not render "advisory opinions," see Herb,
324 U.S. at 126, deprives the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to review a state-court
judgment even if that judgment erroneously interprets federal law, whenever the signif-
icance of the error concerning federal law is obviated by a state law precept also in-
voked by the state court that will independently support the judgment. See, e.g., Wilson
v. Loew's Inc., 355 U.S. 597 (1958); Herb, 324 U.S. at 125.
The Supreme Court, in discussing the independent and adequate state ground is-
sue, conceded that "[t]here is no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded in state
law and that the right of publicity which petitioner was held to possess was a right
arising under Ohio law." 433 U.S. at 566. The Supreme Court further admitted that
the "source of [the] privilege [relied on by the Ohio court] was not identified." Id.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that a careful reading of the Ohio court's opin-
ion convinced it that the decision rested on the Ohio court's perceptions of federal con-
stitutional law and not on an interpretation of Ohio law. The Supreme Court noted
that the Ohio court's opinion was phrased in terms of first amendment principles, cited
first amendment cases, and did not mention the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 568. "That
the Ohio court might have, but did not, invoke state law," the Supreme Court stated,
"does not foreclose jurisdiction here." Id. (emphasis added).
Far more critical to the tactics for attempting to implement a context public figure
approach, however, was the following language included by the Court in Zacchini:
"Even if the judgment in favor of respondent must nevertheless be understood as ulti-
mately resting on Ohio law, it appears that at the very least the Ohio court felt com-
pelled by what it understood to befederal constitutional considerations to construe and
apply its own law in the manner it did." Id. (emphasis added). In such a case, the
Court held, it has jurisdiction to decide the federal issue. Id. The United States Su-
preme Court thus found jurisdiction to reverse the Ohio Supreme Court in Zacchini.
Because the liberal jurisprudence that informs Colson is substantially inconsistent with
the Burger Court's current retraction of first amendment defenses to defamation, it is
probably wise stategy in light of Zacchini that decisions such as Colson be placed
clearly on state law grounds.
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tions that a state determines are particularly important to the commu-
nity. 3 At common law, the privilege was considered abused and lost
by the defendant if there was excessive publication, common law mal-
ice, or in some states a lack of probable cause to believe the statement to
be true.
37 4
Although malice and excessive publication continue to be at least
arguably relevant in determining abuse of privilege,37 5 the lack of prob-
able cause (or negligence) does not continue to be a persuasive ground
for concluding that a privilege has been abused. Because Gertz has pro-
hibited liability for defamation without fault, conditional privileges are
meaningless, unless they require conduct more culpable than negligence
before they are lost.37 6 When strict liability was the operative law, a
conditional privilege that protected certain speech by shielding from lia-
bility a defendant who was not negligent was reasonable, because re-
quiring proof of negligence added a new burden to the plaintiff's case.
Gertz, however, requires a similar showing of fault (or negligence)
before there can be liability in any case.
In order for the common law to continue to offer special protection
to certain types of speech in the post-Gertz era, conditional privileges
should be rebuttable only by malice, and not by mere negligence.
37 7
The question of how to define malice sufficient to rebut a common law
conditional privilege remains. Should the plaintiff be required to prove
the defendant's express malice of personal ill will as required at com-
mon law, or the actual-malice standard used in constitutional cases
since New York Times?
One could plausibly argue that ill-will malice is more appropriate,
on the reasoning that the standard developed by the common law
should be used for common law privileges, while use of the constitu-
tional standard should be limited to constitutional privileges. The osten-
sible symmetry of that view, however, obscures the confusion inherent
in its scheme. The law of defamation will evolve much more coherently
if ill-will malice is discarded altogether, and the knowing or reckless
disregard of the truth standard is used for all conditional privileges,
8I See supra notes 298-320 and accompaning text.
37, C. MORRIS, supra note 98, at 42.
375But see infra notes 378-83 and accompanying text (arguing that the existence
of common law malice should no longer result in loss of a privilege).
376 See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
37 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, ch. 25 special note on conditional privi-
leges and the constitutional requirement of fault; cf C. MORRIS, supra note 98, at 48
("Gertz requires at least negligence for liability but permits the states to use [New
York] Times malice to determine whether or not a conditionally privileged defendant
has abused his privilege." (emphasis in original)).
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whether their pedigree is common law, constitutional, or both.3 78
There are at least two grounds to support this unified standard.
First, because the purpose of a common law privilege is to protect
speech that furthers interests to which the law attaches special impor-
tance,37 9 it should not matter whether the speaker acts out of ill will if
the speech furthers those interests, as long as the speaker does not know
the statements are false, and does not recklessly disregard indications of
their falsity.380 For example, the common law grants a conditional priv-
ilege for a call to a police station reporting that a neighbor has commit-
ted a crime, because the law favors the reporting of crime.381 As long as
the speaker does not act with knowledge of falsity or with reckless dis-
regard for the truth, the social interest in the report, even if it turns out
to be false, requires that it not be actionable. The social interest is only
diminished if the speaker is knowingly or recklessly lying to the police.
If the caller is not intentionally or recklessly fabricating the report, the
social interest is in no way lessened because the caller happens to hate
the neighbor or because the caller makes the report with a perverse
relish. In cases involving constitutional privilege, ill-will malice is not
enough to defeat the qualified privilege of New York Times, precisely
because of this reasoning. 82 The editor of a newspaper may hate with
the darkest of hearts the politician lambasted by the newspaper, but
that hate does not subtract from the first amendment value of the
speech and, unless the editor knowingly or recklessly defamed the poli-
tician, no liability exists. This is not to say that evidence of ill will is
inadmissible, for it may be highly probative of whether the speaker
knew the communication was false or was so blinded by spite as to act
recklessly. But the ultimate fact to be proved should be knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
The second reason for unifying constitutional and common law
malice standards is simplicity. Constitutional and common law privi-
leges often coexist in the same case, and the existence of more than one
definition of malice can only bewilder juries (and possibly the judges
and lawyers who try to explain the differences to them). Rather than
s78 For an example of a hybrid privilege employing the actual-malice standard,
see Colson v. Stieg, 89 Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982).
379 See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 115, at 785-92.
380 Ill-will malice has long been criticized as an imprecise formulation of the con-
cern that privileges not be abused. See supra note 308.
81 In Baker v. Mann, 276 Ark. 278, 280, 634 S.W.2d 125, 126 (1982), the court
found that a letter sent by a mayor and five members of the city council to a prosecut-
ing attorney concerning possible police misconduct was conditionally privileged.
8 See, e.g., Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563, 566-67 (Minn. 1977); see also
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v.
Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 83-85 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
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maintain diverging standards in the part-constitutional, part-common
law field of defamation, one comprehensive standard should be estab-
lished whenever possible, so that neither plaintiffs nor defendants can
unfairly exploit ambiguity and confusion.
Requiring the plaintiff to allege and prove actual mal-
ice-knowing or reckless disregard for the truth of the statement-in
cases protected by conditional privileges"'3 would both restore the hier-
archy of specially protected types of speech that the common law has
traditionally recognized and help to clear up the confusion in defama-
tion law by the adoption of a unified standard for the rebuttal of both
constitutional and common law conditional privileges.
C. Standards for Evaluating the Defendant's Conduct
Defamation law could be greatly improved and simplifed by focus-
ing attention on the standards that govern a defendant's conduct. The
content of the fault standard, the inappropriate standard for evaluating
works of fiction, and a confusing duplication of standards should be
reevaluated and necessary changes should be made.
1. Applying the Learned Hand Negligence
Formula to Defamation
The Gertz requirement that there be no liability without fault re-
quires some core constitutional content to the term fault."" Although
the Court in Gertz made no effort to define fault,3 85 there is absolutely
no reason to believe that the Court had anything in mind other than
the traditional "ordinary reasonable person" standard as it has evolved
in the negligence branch of tort law. If conventional tort notions of
fault are what the Gertz Court had in mind, then the need to examine
to some degree the content and context of the speech remains alive,
despite the official repudiation of such thought in Gertz. 8 An assess-
ment of the social utility of the speech involved is implicit in the fault
calculation employed by the common law.
The statement in Gertz that there can be no liability in a defama-
tion action without a finding of fault has drawn attention primarily on
M A similar result is suggested in the RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 600, but
that result is reached through somewhat different means, see supra notes 308-09.
S8 See supra text following note 278.
s See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 ("We hold that, so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual.").
386 See id. at 346.
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the question whether it applies to nonmedia cases as well as cases with
media defendants.38 7 Relatively little thought has been given to defining
the contours of the fault standard itself. Cases such as Firestone v.
Time, Inc.,"' a however, lead to a suspicion that the negligence require-
ment as applied to defamatory speech has not been applied with much
intellectual rigor.38 ' Whereas tort theorists have amassed in recent
years an impressively rich body of scholarship exploring in detail the
meaning of negligence-an effort that has triggered substantially more
thoughtful and sophisticated opinions from the bench in areas such as
products liability39 -and whereas constitutional theory has progressed
with some detail in defining the knowing or reckless disregard of the
truth standard of New York Times,391 judicial opinions do not evidence
any comparably serious attempt to elaborate on the meaning of simple
negligence in a defamation action. 92 Thus, as much as Gertz may have
eliminated the applicability of the public-interest standard in determin-
ing the level of fault to be applied, Gertz actually invited inquiry into
the degree of public interest as part of the fault calculation once that
level is determined. What the Supreme Court did not realize, and what
many lower courts continue to fail to realize, is that the traditional
formula for determining negligence liability cannot be meaningfully
employed in an action for defamation without plugging in some mea-
sure of the social utility of the subject matter of the defamatory
communication.
Judge Learned Hand's classic formula for determining whether
conduct is negligent, as set forth in his famous United States v. Carroll
Towing Co."'3 decision, is a function of three variables: the probability
of injury, the gravity of the injury, and the burden of adequate precau-
tions. Liability exists when the burden of preventing the injury's occur-
rence (B) is less than the loss suffered (L) multiplied by the probability
of occurrence ( P ); that is, when B is less than P x L.3 ' The Restate-
ment adopts the same essential calculus, stating that an "act is negligent
117 See supra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
3- 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
"' See supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
390 See generally Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and their Actionability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 551, 554-66 (1980) (short survey of the development of products liabil-
ity law with a discussion of major cases).
391 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (defendant must
have entertained "serious doubts as to the truth of his publication").
'9' Judge Richard Posner has made a brief but interesting start on the develop-
ment of an economic theory of defamation in an article that focuses primarily on the
right to privacy. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 30-
41 (1979).
a 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
3" Id. at 173.
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if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as
the utility of the act."'3 95 Elaborating on the concept of social utility, the
Restatement lists three factors: (1) the social value that the law attaches
to the interest that is to be advanced or protected by the conduct; (2) the
probability that the conduct actually will advance that interest; and (3)
the extent that the interest can be advanced by some less dangerous
course of conduct.3 8
If the negligence minimum set by Gertz is to be applied conscien-
tiously, some effort must be made to translate these negligence formulas
into terms that are meaningful in the context of defamation. The appli-
cation of such algebraic thinking to speech issues is not unfamiliar in
our jurisprudence: Judge Hand himself applied a variation of his Car-
roll Towing formula when he interpreted the "dear and present dan-
ger" test as an issue of "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by
its improbability, justifies such an invasion of free speech as is neces-
sary to avoid the danger."3 ' The Supreme Court accepted Hand's for-
mulation, legitimizing the use of cost/benefit theory in first amendment
analysis. 8" Because this approach to liability is both conventional tort
methodology and a legitimate component of first amendment thinking,
it seems ideally suited for use in defamation, the principal area in
which first amendment and tort analyses coalesce.
Yet, court opinions evidence almost no systematic consideration of
the negligence formula in defamation cases. Assessments of negligence
are almost always one dimensional, tending to focus only upon the ex-
tent to which the defendant thoroughly investigated the truth of what
was said prior to publishing the defamatory communication.399 Often,
the carelessness in investigation is extrapolated almost completely from
the fact of falsity itself, in a sort of unspoken application of res ipsa
loquitur, on the reasoning that ordinarily one does not publish false
and damaging information about another unless there has been a fail-
ure to investigate properly. If the negligence test is correctly applied to
defamation, however, the thoroughness of investigation is merely one
a95 RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 291.
3" Id. at § 292.
397 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S.
494 (1951). See generally Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975).
38 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-70 (1976); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) ("We adopt [the Learned Hand] statement of
the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any
other we might devise at this time."). But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Branden-
burg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1166-67, 1183-86 (1970).
'" See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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factor in a larger equation. Also, the extent of investigation is itself
necessarily dependent upon the interplay of a number of factors that in
combination yield the total burden of more complete investigation.400
It is impossible to talk intelligently about negligence in a defama-
tion case without making a judgment about the social importance of the
speech involved. Since the Restatement explicitly requires consideration
of the social utility that the law attaches to an act as part of the mea-
surement of an actor's negligence, some weighing of the utility of
speech is implicit. The utility of the act of communicating or publishing
a statement naturally depends upon the utility of the content of the
statement. Any weighing of the utility of speech must be done cau-
tiously, to minimize the potential for offending first amendment values,
because it apparently contemplates content-sensitive prioritization of
speech. The Restatement speaks boldly of evaluating negligence by
weighing the "nature" of the interests a defendant is seeking to pro-
mote by publishing the communication, explaining that "[i]nforming
the public as to a matter of public concern is an important interest in a
democracy," while "spreading of mere gossip is of less importance."401
This type of first amendment elitism suggests the problems already
identified in this Article that result from the blurring of the line be-
tween news and entertainment.
The inquiry into the social utility of the speech at issue is further
complicated by two statements in Gertz that may hopelessly polarize
the weighing process. Gertz states that under the first amendment
"there is no such thing as a false idea."'40 2 Two sentences later, how-
ever, the Gertz opinion also declares that "there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact."'403 If these two platitudes are accepted
literally, there seems to be little room for the type of assessment of the
importance of the speech that the Learned Hand formula and the Re-
statement would require. If the speech involved is a false statement of
fact, Gertz defines its social utility as zero. If we expect to measure, not
the value of the particlar facts that are false and defamatory (those facts
with zero value), but rather the value of discussion about the subject
matter within which the defamatory facts were contained, we run
squarely into the first Gertz maxim that there is no such thing as a
false idea.
The Restatement's common sense solution to this conundrum has
been largely ignored, and deserves new attention. The Restatement
"00 See infra notes 404-09 and accompanying text.
401 RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 580B comment h.
402 418 U.S. at 339.
408 Id. at 340.
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seems to suggest that courts make a functional appraisal of the entire
context of the offending speech, including the relationship of speaker,
speech, audience, and victim, in much the same way that they deter-
mine whether "legitimate interests" justify the application of common
law privileges to a certain context. 404 Similarly, there is no reason why
many of the subtleties that are applied to assessments of fault in other
tort cases cannot also be used for defamation. The seriousness of the
allegation, for example, ought to be a primary touchstone in judging
the gravity of the harm. The harm to Mary Alice Firestone in describ-
ing the grounds for her divorce as cruelty and adultery, for example,
should be regarded as greater than an allegation that she lies about her
age, but less than an allegation that she is a murderer. 0 5 This self-
evident proposition should not merely be a factor taken into account to
mitigate damages; 406 it should be part of the underlying calculation of
fault. More duty to investigate is required as the allegations become
more damaging, because the law should encourage greater expense on
prevention of damages as the potential harm from defamation increases.
Similarly, the element of time should be considered in assessing fault.
4
0
Less care ought to be required in a fast-breaking story whose value to
society depends on immediate publication than is required for a story
that is planned and developed without any special time constraints, °8
40 The comment to section 580B of the Restatement states:
The constitutional requirement of fault on the part of the defendant may
be held to extend beyond the defendant's ascertainment of the truth or
falsity and the defamatory character of the statement to other elements of
the defamation action such as excessiveness of publication. If this happens,
then it seems likely that the determination of fault in this regard will sup-
plant the common law method of balancing the conflicting interests of the
parties by establishing a system of qualified privileges protecting the pro-
motion of particular interests and of "abuses" of the privileges by using
them in an improper fashion.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 580B comment 1.
405 Id. at § 580B comment h ("A third factor is the extent of the damage to the
plaintiff's reputation or the injury to his sensibilities that would be produced if the
communication proves to be false.").
406 See, e.g., Firestone, 424 U.S. at 460-61 (content of Time's defamatory state-
ment is considered in determining the extent of the damage to Mrs. Firestone).
407 RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 580B comment h.
408 It is interesting to contrast this approach to whether a defamatory statement
has been negligently published with Justice Blackmun's analysis in his concurring
opinion in Wolston:
This analysis implies, of course, that one may be a public figure for
purposes of contemporaneous reporting of a controversial event, yet not be
a public figure for purposes of historical commentary on the same occur-
rence. Historians, consequently, may well run a greater risk of liability for
defamation. Yet this result, in my view, does no violence to First Amend-
ment values. While historical analysis is no less vital to the marketplace of
ideas than reporting current events, historians work under different condi-
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because the cost of not publishing a particularly timely story (largely a
first amendment cost) is properly considered a burden when evaluating
negligence."0 9
In light of the strong tendency for strict liability values to slip sur-
reptitiously into the law of defamation, 410 a new seriousness when eval-
uating whether conduct is negligent in a defamation action is an impor-
tant element in developing consistency in this area of the law.
2. New Standards for Evaluating Fiction
The modern law of defamation is particularly unresponsive to fic-
tion as a form of communication. In evaluating fiction when claims of
defamation are raised, courts seem ready to conclude that the supposed
fiction is actually a depiction of a real person. Having taken that step,
the barriers that would normally impede recovery for a nonfiction
work-standards of intent, or the nonactionability of opinion-have
quickly come tumbling down.4
The objective in devising a coherent approach to handling libel
claims in fiction should be to create a standard that would give fiction
the same rough quantum of constitutional and common law protection
enjoyed by nonfiction. Because the same verbal formulation under New
York Times and Gertz is applied to both fiction and nonfiction, there is
a surface equality in the treatment they receive. The equivalency, how-
ever, is spurious, because it inherently tends to produce liability when
applied to fiction. One might argue that fiction deserves this fate, be-
cause it is, after all, a lie, and there is no first amendment value to false
statements of fact.4 2 But that argument is wholly unpersuasive, and it
is doubtful that courts, if they reflected on the point, would maintain
tions than do their media counterparts. A reporter trying to meet a dead-
line may find it totally impossible to check thoroughly the accuracy of his
sources. A historian writing sub specie aeternitatis has both the time for
reflection and the opportunity to investigate the veracity of the pronounce-
ments he makes.
Wolston, 443 U.S. 157, 171 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Although Justice Blackmun's observations about the level of care that ought to be
expected from historical reporting as opposed to daily (or weekly) news reporting are
consistent with the level of care advocated by me, Justice Blackmun has confused the
analysis of the defendant's conduct with the determination of the plaintiff's public-
figure status. Cf. suprh text following note 286 (majority in Wolston failed to analyze
the defendant's standard of care properly).
409 RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 580B comment h ("Was the communication
a matter of topical news requiring prompt publication to be useful, or was it one in
which time and opportunity were freely available to investigate?").
410 See supra notes 127-64 and accompanying text.
411 See supra notes 200-24 and accompanying text.
4 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
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that fiction grounded in reality is undeserving of treatment substantially
the same as that applied to nonfiction depicting the same reality. Fic-
tion is a critical component in a robust and open culture. It may help a
reader escape or transcend reality, or it may incisively explore reality.
Authors portray life in an infinite variety of ways for an infinite variety
of reasons, among them the search for truths deeper than what surface
facts reveal. 41" Fictional portrayals are drawn with infinite gradations
of grace and skill. Courts need just enough literary insight to realize
that they are not literary critics, and would be poor judges if they tried
to be. 14' Regardless of the perceived quality of the work at issue, courts
should ensure that it receives approximately the same level of insulation
from liability that would apply to information about the same subject if
it were written as something other than fiction.
The problem, however, is to come up with legal words that accom-
plish this result. One recurring suggestion is to give fiction an absolute
privilege against liability. 415 It is possible to rationalize such an abso-
lute privilege by arguing that all fiction is properly classified as "pure
idea" which cannot ever be either true or false.41 6 But that rationaliza-
tion goes too far. An absolute privilege would not provide equivalent
protection for fiction and nonfiction, it would instead remedy the pre-
sent imbalance by a counter-imbalance of its own. Some safety-valve is
required to allow defamed plaintiffs legal recompense when the fic-
tional garb of a work is nothing but a sham employed to shield inten-
tional reputational attacks. 1
The better nominee for handling the problem of libel in fiction is
to use the same knowing or reckless disregard standard employed by
New York Times, but to change the focus of the inquiry from the au-
thor's culpable knowledge of reckless disregard of truth or falsity, to a
culpable knowledge or reckless disregard that the ordinary reasonable
reader would conclude that the author intended the reader to under-
stand the events described in the work as depictions of real life
413 See Silver, supra note 195, at 1066-70.
414 Cf Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)
(Holmes, J.) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.") (Holmes was warning against judges selecting, on
the basis of their personal preferences, what works of art were worthy of copyright.).
415 See Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for Absolute First Amendment
Protection, supra note 195.
416 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339 ("We begin with the common ground. Under the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.").
"17 See Franklin & Trager, supra note 195, at 223-25; Wilson, supra note 195, at
44-46.
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events."' 8 There is absolutely no harm in an author drawing characters
and events from real life, even if those characters are readily identifi-
able as actual people, as long as the author does not attempt to identify
his or her fantasy as reality. As long as the ordinary reasonable reader
is not led into believing that what is packaged as fiction is meant to be
taken as fact, conventional first amendment and common law doctrine
should make the work nonactionable. As a matter of first amendment
jurisprudence, speech that is neither intended nor understood as factual
should fall into the realm of "ideas," which Gertz flatly declares cannot
be "false." ' 19 There is no better example of "idea" than fantasy,
whether it be the dreams in our minds or the dreams we commit to
paper. Similarly, even if the fictional character is clearly understood as
depicting an actual person, as a matter of common law doctrine,
linkage in identity is not enough. The communication must also be de-
famatory, and it cannot be defamatory as a matter of law if the ordi-
nary reasonable reader would not treat the actions of the character as
real, even if the reality of the character is conceded.420
418 Professor Wilson proposes a thoughtful solution to the libel in fiction problem
which centers on three questions: (1) Has the plaintiff been identified to his or her
detriment? (2) Is the work fiction? (3) Was the characterization intended to defame
the plaintiff? Wilson, supra note 195, at 43-49. My approach is quite similar to Pro-
fessor Wilson's, and certainly my general disposition toward increasing the law of li-
bel's protection for fiction exactly parallels hers. Professor Silver's evocative essay on
this problem similarly voices sentiments with which I agree. Silver, supra note 195. I
would emphasize even more, however, the need to superimpose upon the normal in-
quiries required by the common law, the standards of fault set forth in New York Times
and Gertz, altered so as to focus primarily on the question whether the author has
intentionally or recklessly (assuming a public figure plaintiff) misled the reader into
treating fiction as if it were fact. See Wilson, supra note 195, at 46-47.
41, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339.
420 For example, consider the Cardinal Cody hypothetical discussed supra at notes
202-17 and accompanying text. Even if everyone who reads The Cardinal Sins identi-
fies the fictional Cardinal as the real John Cody, there would be no actionable harm as
long as a reasonable reader also understands that Greeley did not intend that the reader
believe that Greeley is claiming that Cody actually ever did what Greeley has publicly
fantasized about him doing.
The one type of work that my proposal admittedly handles somewhat poorly is a
work where the writer admits that he or she desires to confuse the reader by making it
impossible to separate real people and events from fictitious people and events, precisely
because that confusion enhances the particular message or effect the author is hoping to
achieve. A fascinating example is provided by the "disclaimer" that appears at the
beginning of Frederick Forsyth's novel, The Odessa File:
As in the case of Mr. Forsyth's first novel, The Day of the Jackal, many
characters in The Odessa File are real people. Some will be immediately
recognized by the reader; others may puzzle the reader as to whether they
are true or fictional, and the publishers do not wish to elucidate further
because it is in this ability to perplex the reader as to how much is true
and how much false that much of the grip of the story lies.
Nevertheless, the publishers feel the reader may be interested or as-
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An approach to works of fiction similar to the approach advocated
here was taken by the court in Pring v. Penthouse International,
Ltd.421 The court of appeals in Pring considered a fictional story about
the experiences of Miss Wyoming at a Miss America Pageant. The
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
decision that the story was "about the plaintiff, . . . of and concerning
her as a matter of identity."' 22 The court held, however, that despite
the identity the story was not libelous because it could not be under-
stood to describe actual events in the plaintiff's life.
423
If the law of defamation does not adopt this type of adjustment,
litigation concerning fiction will inevitably be reduced to two questions
on which many important works will be abject losers: the question of
identity and the question of falsity. Because the whole intent of much
fiction drawn from reality is to create an identity linkage and then in-
tentionally "falsify" reality by fantasizing about it, a reduction to only
the issues of identity and falsity results in wholly unwarranted liability
for libel.
3. Sensible Standards
Defamation standards would be more coherent if there were only
one legally relevant definition of malice and if defamation standards
were the same for all defendants. Common law conditional privileges
should be available to protect the defendant unless the plaintiff can
make a showing of actual malice-knowing or reckless disregard for
the truth.4'24 Malice in the sense of personal ill will or spite should be
erased from the vocabulary of defamation law. Two separate malice
standards lead only to confusion and arbitrary decisionmaking. Adop-
tion of actual malice as the unified standard for loss of both constitu-
tional and common law conditional privileges will make the law easier
to understand and will lead to well-considered decisionmaking in defa-
sisted to know that the story of former SS Captain Eduard Roschmann,
the commandant of the concentration camp at Riga from 1941 to 1944,
from his birth in Graz, Austria, in 1908 to his present exile in South
America, is completely factual and drawn from SS and West German
records.
F. FoRsYTH, THE ODESSA FiLE (1972). Forsyth and his publishers, of course, proba-
bly felt they had little to fear, for few Nazi war criminals are likely to come out of
hiding to sue for libel. But the problem does remain that when the confusion is known,
and yet is vital to the message conveyed, first amendment protection ought to be pro-
vided. Exactly how one's disclaimer should read, however, remains troublesome.
421 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
422 Id. at 439.
423 Id. at 442-43.
4 See supra notes 373-83 and accompanying text.
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mation cases.
A unified standard for liability for media and nonmedia defen-
dants would also help to make defamation law more coherent. Under
Gertz media and nonmedia defendants may be held to different stan-
dards of liability for defamation.425 Apparently, courts may continue to
impose strict liability principles in those cases involving nonmedia
defendants.426
If the United States Supreme Court does finally face this issue
squarely, it should hold that the minimum standards imposed by Gertz
do apply to nonmedia defendants. First, there is a certain elitism to the
notion that speech published by media outlets is more hallowed than
speech published by ordinary persons and enterprises. Whether the
speaker is a preacher on the pulpit or a bartender behind the spigot,
such communication is as much a part of our first amendment tradition
as the information that appears on the op-ed page of the Sunday paper.
In cases involving private plaintiffs and private defendants, the Gertz
requirement of a showing of fault427 ensures the proper breathing space
for routine speech that is critical to a free society.
Second, establishing a two-tiered law of defamation, with one set
of rules for the media and another for the nonmedia, needlessly compli-
cates an already bewilderingly complex area of the law. Finally, a
double standard forces courts to make the difficult choice, fraught with
first amendment peril, of deciding who qualifies for the preferred posi-
tion of media status. Would the "media" encompass only the main-
stream corporate press, or would it also include the underground radi-
cal flyer, the pamphlets of special-interest groups, or the intermittently
published student newspaper? Picking and choosing between publica-
tions worthy of Gertz protection would involve courts in a content-sen-
sitive status game that is antithetical to the egalitarian marketplace of
ideas that the first amendment contemplates.428
425 See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
426 See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
417 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
428 The literature on the question whether the institutional press deserves special
first amendment protection is quite extensive. See, e.g, Abrams, The Press Is Different:
Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563
(1979); Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. Rav. 731 (1977);
Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. CT.
REv. 225; Eaton, supra note 530; Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and
Decency, 65 VA. L. REv. 785 (1979); Lange, supra note 143; Lewis, A Preferred Posi-
tion for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (1979); Nimmer, supra note 143;
Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 HoF-
STRA L. REv. 655 (1979); Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitu-
tional Privilege for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629 (1979); Shiffrin,




Prior to the Supreme Court's involvement in the common law of
defamation, damages were usually available to plaintiffs who were able
to prove that they were defamed without any required showing of spe-
cial damages or economic loss.429 The Supreme Court has now ad-
dressed the question of damages in Gertz and Firestone, providing a
constitutional dimension to the availability of punitive30 and compen-
satory431 damages. Gertz allows punitive damages to be awarded only
after the plaintiff has met the actual-malice standard.3 2 In suits by
public officials, this means that after Gertz punitive damages may be
awarded by juries any time a plaintiff proves a prima facie case. Simi-
larly, if one takes the position that I have advocated"3" and applies the
actual-malice test to determine whether a common law privilege has
been abused, punitive damages would be available as a matter of course
when a privilege has been lost. Thus, Gertz, which elevated defamation
liability standards, is likely to result in the award of punitive damages
as a matter of course when liability is proved. In light of the increasing
awards for libel43 4 and the general attitude of the public toward the
media, such a general availability of punitive damages may substan-
tially chill the exercise of first amendment rights.
One alternative to current law is to allow punitive damages only
when the plaintiff, in addition to proving actual malice, proves common
law ill-will malice. The disadvantages to this approach, however, are
the same as those that led to my proposal that ill-will malice be elimi-
nated as a ground for abuse of conditional privileges:4 5 Having two
definitions of malice extant in the same litigation is an invitation to
distorted verdicts and judgments handed down by baffled juries. Em-
phasis on the existence of ill will might result in accidental liability in
some cases in which the defendant did not knowingly or recklessly dis-
regard the truth. Conversely, a defendant who does act with actual
malice might manage to escape liability by emphasizing the lack of ill
on Some New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1980); Van
Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position", 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 761 (1977); Comment, Problems in Defining the Institutional Status of the Press,
11 U. RICH. L. REv. 177 (1976).
429 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
430 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50.
431 Firestone, 424 U.S. at 460-61; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
42 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 ("The private defamation plaintiff who establishes lia-
bility under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may re-
cover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.").
433 See supra note 373-83 and accompanying text.
"" See supra note 41-46 and accompanying text.
'3' See supra notes 373-83 and accompanying text.
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will and trying to obfuscate the difference between the malice
standards.
More important than these difficulties, however, is the fact that
the court in Firestone stated that compensatory damages may constitu-
tionally include reimbursement for "personal humiliation [and] mental
anguish and suffering" in addition to the value of the damage to repu-
tation.4 " Based on this expansive notion of compensatory damages, I
contend that there is no strong social interest served by allowing the
award of punitive damages. The elements of permissible compensatory
damages are incapable of any exact proof and, therefore, are pliable
enough to permit juries to punish particularly egregious misconduct in
the occasional case that warrants it. Because it is likely that juries have
always looked primarily at the seriousness of the falsehood and the cul-
pability of the defendant's conduct when awarding large punitive dam-
ages, the principal effect of eliminating such damages is to streamline
defamation litigation by eliminating multiple standards of fault and
giving courts greater control over juries.
IV. CONCLUSION
The major problem confronting any court or commentator who
sets out to evaluate honestly the current state of the law of defamation
is that it is almost impossible to avoid reducing the entire discussion to
one simple proposition: "Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken
from the field of free debate." 4 7 The protection of reputation and the
protection of free expression are natural antagonists. The substance of
a responsive accommodation between reputation and free-expression
will depend upon essentially unanchored value choices concerning the
relative worth of reputation and expression in American culture. I have
attempted, as best I can, to transcend this central conflict by applying a
"logic of simplicity" to a body of law that is peculiarly sensitive to
cultural forces.
Having recognized in empirical data an emerging rejuvenation of
defamation law in the 1980's, I have set out to explain that rejuvena-
4' Firestone, 424 U.S. at 458; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 ("[Aictual injury is
not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm in-
flicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering."); cf RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 115, § 623 ("One who is liable to another for a libel or slander is
liable also for emotional distress and bodily harm that is proved to have been caused by
the defamatory publication.").
"' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)(quoting Sweeney




tion on the basis of cultural and legal trends extant in today's society. It
appears that the rejuvenation is based at least in part upon a tendency
of Americans to value more highly the sanctity of individuals' reputa-
tions and inner peace. The trend in tort law to favor strict liability for
the sake of compensation and risk spreading over fault notions of liabil-
ity may be reflected in the current libel law rejuvenation despite the
express prohibition of any such strict liability by the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the blurring of the line between news and entertainment in
today's communications and publications may itself create situations in
which large libel verdicts for plaintiffs are more likely than they would
be if news were news and entertainment were entertainment. Finally,
the relatively recent constitutionalization of the law of libel has made
the typical defamation suit even more confusing than it was at common
law. The Supreme Court, by allowing multiple standards where uni-
fied ones could be applied, by failing to define adequately the standards
it has established, and by generally failing to synchronize constitutional
law with common law, is largely responsible for the confusion.
Out of concern that confusion should not be the basis for a major
shift in legal outcomes, I have attempted to outline a number of reforms
for the law of defamation that would help clear up the confusion and
lead to decisions in defamation cases that more accurately reflect the
interests in free speech and in reputation that are involved in those
cases. I have suggested a new context public figure standard that would
follow the lesson of the common law and grant the constitutional privi-
lege established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 8 on the basis of
the overall context of the speech rather than on the somewhat arbitrary
basis of who the plaintiff is. Wherever possible, multiple standards for
similar issues in defamation suits should be unified: the actual-malice
standard should apply for the loss of both constitutional and common
law conditional privileges; and the Gertz requirement of fault should
apply to cases involving nonmedia as well as media defendants. The
fault requirement of Gertz needs to be more clearly defined, relying on
the Learned Hand formula to balance the risks of given conduct against
its social benefits and by defining better what those risks and benefits
are in the context of defamation. The rules for liability for defamation
in works of fiction should be altered so that ideas expressed through
fiction are granted roughly the same degree of protection from incur-
ring defamation liability as that granted to ideas expressed through
nonfiction. Finally, punitive damages should be abolished in defamation
cases. Compensatory damages in defamation cases are broad and plia-
438 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ble enough to vindicate the personal and social interests at stake in
those cases.
Although I have found it impossible to escape completely the ap-
proach of defamation articles that focus almost exclusively on the con-
stitutional issues,4 9 I have tried to proceed in the first instance descrip-
tively, by simply cataloguing the conscious and unconscious factors that
have had an important influence on the current law of defamation, and
have ventured only secondarily into prescriptive judgments, and then
primarily with an eye toward simplification and internal consistency. If
in the end there has been some duplicity in my approach, and I am no
better than Iago, so be it: it still seems more true than not that we have
lost no reputation at all, unless we repute ourselves such losers.
48 See Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of
Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1307 81979). My discussion
of defamation has, at times, admittedly resembled Marc Tushnet's ascerbic but brilliant
indictment of the "standard" modern article on constitutional law: The author describes
recent Supreme Court cases and their antecedents (New York Times, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, Wolston v. Reader's Digest),
notes difficulties in their internal logic (the application of the public figure doctrine is
inconsistent), makes observations that the more recent cases are somewhat inconsistent
with prior decisions (Wolston is not the inevitable product of Gertz or New York
Times), suggests modifications in the prevailing doctrine (adjust the public figure for-
mulation to make more persons public), and concludes that what is needed is a balanc-
ing test with the balance struck usually being a modestly liberal position espousing
roughly the ideology of the moderate left of the Democratic Party. See id. at 1322.
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